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AĶňŉŇĵķŉ
Prices in ėnancial markets are primarily driven by the interaction of risk and time.
ĉe returns to ėnancial assets over long time horizons are primarily driven by
fundamental news regarding their promised cash Ěows. In contrast, short-run price
variation is associated with a large degree of predictable, transient investor trading
behavior unrelated to fundamental prospects.
ĉe quantity of long-run risk directly aﬀects economic well-being, and its
magnitude has varied signiėcantly over the past century. ĉe theoretical model
presented here shows some success in quantifying the impact of news about future
risks on asset prices. In particular, some investing strategies that appear to oﬀer
anomalously large returns are associated with high exposures to future long-run risks.
ĉe historical returns to these portfolios are partly a result of investors’ distaste for
assets whose worth declines when uncertainty increases.
ĉe ėnancial sector is tasked with pricing these risks in a way that properly
allocates investment resources. Over the past thirty years, this sector has grownmuch
more rapidly than the economy as a whole. As a result, asset prices appear to be more
informative. However, the new information relates to short-term uncertainty, not
long-run risk. ĉis type of high-frequency information is unlikely to aﬀect real
investment in a way that would beneėt broader economic growth.
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ĉe energies and skills of the professional investor and spec-
ulator...are, in fact, largely concerned, not with making su-
perior long-term forecasts of the probable yield of an invest-
ment over its whole life, but with foreseeing changes in the
conventional basis of valuation a short time ahead of the gen-
eral public.
JohnMaynard Keynes
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Price Comovement and TimeHorizon:
Fads and Fundamentals
TļĹ ĽłŋĹňŉŁĹłŉ ŇĽňĿ Ńĺ ĵ ńŃŇŉĺŃŀĽŃ is closely connected to the comovement of
its components; risk diversiėes when price movements are independent but persists
when changes in price are correlated. But what if prices move together over short
time intervals but seem less related over long horizons? It would seem they share
exposure to a fad that is unrelated to fundamental risk or proėtability. In other cases,
closely related assets might have prices that move together over long horizons but not
over shorter intervals. ĉis insuﬃcient comovement masks their shared fundamental
ǉ
exposures. Analyzing the returns to individual US equities, I ėnd their correlations
depend signiėcantly on the time horizon considered. For each pair of stocks,
measures of shared trading behavior versus measures of shared fundamentals are
highly predictive of excess or insuﬃcient comovement.
My empirical results employ a novel methodology in estimating howmuch of the
measured diﬀerences in short-horizon and long-horizon correlations arise from
estimation noise. ĉis drives the statistical inference, emphasizing that these
diﬀerences are too large to be circumstantial. ĉe weekly returns to a typical pair of
US stocks have a correlation of ǉǐƻ, but I ėnd the correlation of their ǎ-month
returns are frequently Ǌǈƻ higher or lower than their weekly returns would suggest.
Long-horizon correlations predictably decrease for stocks with similar investor
trading paĨerns and correlations predictably increase for stocks of ėrms with closely
related business prospects as measured by their industry aﬃliation or by past
accounting measures.
In contrast with previous studies studying excess comovement by looking for
special cases where nominal labels change but fundamental risks do not, I take the
broad universe of US stocks and analyze comovement through diﬀerences in
short-run and long-run correlations. ĉemethodology could easily be employed
within or across other asset classes.
Correlations are a key ingredient in asset allocation and asset pricing, and these
ėndings have practical implications for investors. Estimates of portfolio risk should
depend on the time horizon. Buy-and-hold investors may be misled if their
diversiėcation estimates are based on short-term returns. Short-horizon correlations
Ǌ
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Figure ǉ.ǉ: Correlations for Heinz, Phillip Moris and Harley Davidson
will be much more pertinent to an investor who rebalances frequently. Such an
investor might also take advantage of the associated predictability. A simple
long/short trading strategy based on a measure of fads versus fundamentals generates
risk-adjusted annual excess returns of ǐ.ǌƻ and a Sharpe Ratio of ǉ.ǈǋ.
As a motivating example, consider the returns to three large US stocks, Heinz,
Philip Morris, and Harley Davidson. During the ǉǑǑǈ’s, all three stocks were actively
traded, and their business lines were relatively stable until the turn of the century,
when Philip Morris began a series of acquisitions and divestitures. Looking at their
weekly returns during this decade, each pairing of the three ėrms has a correlation of
approximately Ǌǈƻ. ĉis is slightly greater than the average correlation we observe
for most large cap US stocks during this period.
Now consider the long-run fundamentals shared by these stocks. Although
ǋ
popular culture might lead you to connect the customers of Philip Morris’ tobacco
products with the stereotypical motorcyclist astride a Harley, some of the largest
business lines of Philip Morris included more traditional food staple brands such as
Kraě, Oscar Mayer and Jell-O. As you might expect, Philip Morris’ accounting proėts
correlated with those of Heinz (quarterly ROE correlation of ǊǏƻ), another producer
of food staples, yet seem to have no relationship with those of Harley Davidson.
ĉese relationships become increasingly apparent as the time horizon for returns
lengthens and the estimated correlations diﬀer signiėcantly from the one-week
estimates. Figure ǉ.ǉ shows how the correlation estimates change with the length of
the return interval used within the decade. As the horizon increases, the correlation
of the returns of Philip Morris and Heinz steadily increases to greater than Ǐǈƻ, while
the correlations of each ėrm’s returns with those of Harley Davidson decrease to
approximately zero.
AdmiĨedly, the examples of Heinz, Philip Morris and Harley Davidson are
selected ex post from an enormous number of pairwise correlations and possible
sample periods. Estimates of long-horizon correlations are noisy and the plots in
Figure ǉ.ǉ could be coincidental. A more careful analysis of US stock returns between
ǉǑǏǈ and Ǌǈǉǈ conėrms paĨerns of this sort are pervasive.
A number of researchers have highlighted characteristics that appear to drive
excess comovement in equity returns. Barberis, Shleifer andWurgler (ǊǈǈǍ) and
Boyer (Ǌǈǉǉ) consider equity index inclusion and ėnd that the addition of a stock to
major market indices causes an immediate increase in the correlation of its returns
with other index constituents. Similarly, Brealey, Cooper and Kaplanis (ǊǈǈǑ) look at
ǌ
changes in exchange listing due to cross-border mergers and ėnd a stock’s
comovement immediately increases with securities listed in its new homemarket.
Controlling evenmore strongly for diﬀerences in fundamental risk, Dabora and Froot
(ǉǑǑǑ) look at companies with shares that trade on multiple exchanges and ėnd that
the prices of otherwise identical claims diverge from each other and move with other
stocks listed on their respective exchanges. ĉe empirical strategy employed in each
of these papers compares comovement in a speciėc subset of stocks for which
circumstances suggest there are no diﬀerences in fundamental risk, at least on average.
In contrast, my approach examines a broad universe of stock prices and seeks to
measure the aggregate extent to which fads and fundamentals drive comovement.
Instead of comparing correlations immediately before and aěer some event, I
compare correlations made over the exact same time period where the only
diﬀerence is the return increment. In this respect, there are fewer concerns about
omiĨed risks associated with the treatment eﬀect.
ĉe study of excess comovement and fundamentals bears similarity to the work
motivated by Shiller (ǉǑǐǉ), questioning how the aggregate stock market can be so
volatile compared to the relatively stable paĨern of dividends received by investors.
ĉis led to a large literature testing variance ratios over various time horizons. ĉere
are two advantages to studying correlations rather than variance ratios. First,
correlations control for volatility and are less aﬀected by time variation in market
discount rates. Second, the rich cross-section of correlations allows for panel analysis,
avoiding many of the econometric shortcomings associated with analyzing
long-horizon returns in a limited time series.
Ǎ
One of the more striking empirical features of equity correlations is the fact that
the historical correlations between most stocks increase as their return horizon
lengthens. ĉis stylized fact has not gone unnoticed. Campbell, LeĨau, Burton and
Xu (Ǌǈǈǉ) study the volatility of individual equities and note how equity correlations
generally declined during the ǉǑǐǈ’s and ǉǑǑǈ’s and how correlation estimates using
daily returns are, on average, lower than those using monthly returns. Lo and
MacKinlay (ǉǑǑǈ) study the proėtability of contrarian strategies and aĨribute the
success of this strategy to positive cross-autocorrelation. ĉeir conclusions imply that
correlations increase with time horizon. ĉis is historically true, though I showmuch
of this eﬀect is due to market microstructure and becomes less prominent as trading
costs have decreased.
What sort of labels might be most salient for investors’ fads? Since market
capitalization and relative valuations are common groupings, we might associate fads
with investment styles based on size and value. ĉis is a key prediction of Barberis
and Shleifer (Ǌǈǈǋ), who propose style driven investing accommodates the cognitive
limitations of investors. Veldkamp (Ǌǈǈǎ) derives similar predictions in a rational
seĨing where investors generalize costly information across similar ėrms. My
empirical results show weak evidence that ėrms of a similar size exhibit excess
comovement, and my results do not show excess comovement in ėrms with similar
book-to-market ratios.
Others have connected evidence of excess comovement with trading paĨerns by
obtaining trade or position data for retail investors (Kumar and Lee, Ǌǈǈǎ) and
mutual fund managers (Greenwood andĉesmar, Ǌǈǉǉ; Antón and Polk, Ǌǈǉǈ).
ǎ
Given the increasing importance of index benchmarks, Greenwood (Ǌǈǈǐ) looks at
how index construction can lead to return paĨerns induced by index based trading.
In this paper, I aĨempt to measure shared trading behavior directly by using the
mechanical autocorrelations in returns caused by bid-ask bounce (Roll, ǉǑǐǌ) or the
temporary market impact of trading (Campbell, Grossman andWang, ǉǑǑǋ).
To measure shared fundamentals, my primary measure is the past correlation of
accounting returns, measured by return on equity (ROE). I also look at common
industry membership as an indicator that ėrms face similar demand or proėtability
shocks. ĉe aĨempt to connect stock comovement to fundamentals builds on the
work of Pindyck and Rotemberg (ǉǑǑǋ), who ėnd most price comovement is
unrelated to macroeconomic shocks and Cohen, Polk and Vuolteenaho (ǊǈǈǑ), who
ėnd the CAPM performs beĨer when they measure betas using accounting returns
rather than traditional price return betas.
ĉe relationship between return horizon and correlation serves as a valuable
measure of excess comovement in asset prices. It quantiėes the economic
signiėcance of previous studies that identify an individual phenomenon driving
excess comovement. By introducing measures of trading behavior and fundamentals,
I can further identify the fads associated with excess comovement and the insuﬃcient
comovement associated with shared fundamentals. ĉis is a natural framework to
think about risk and portfolio construction, which yields intuition for portfolio
management and asset prices.
Ǐ
ǉ.ǉ MŃĸĹŀĽłĻ ĵłĸMĹĵňŊŇĽłĻCŃŁŃŋĹŁĹłŉ
To beĨer understand how correlations might change with time horizon, consider
what happens to the comovement of asset prices if investors are slow in incorporating
new information about fundamental value and if swings in the popularity of
investments aﬀect their demand. We can contrast this with the case of no return
predictability or where return predictability comes through long-term time variation
in discount rates. ĉis simple model of fads and fundamentals also suggests a
prediction regarding which pairs of assets will show correlations increasing with time
horizon and which pairs of assets will show decreasing correlations.
ĉemodel could apply to any sort of ėnancial asset or portfolio of assets. ĉe
eﬀect of time horizon on correlation is likely greatest in cases where markets are
segmented or where the fundamental value is opaque. However, the notation and
presentation of the model will consider the assets to be individual equity securities, in
line with the empirical analysis to be presented.
MŃĸĹŀĽłĻ ĺĵĸň ĵłĸ ĺŊłĸĵŁĹłŉĵŀň
Deėne the fundamental value of security i at time t as Pi;t, entitling its owner to
payoutDi;t+ƥ. Changes in log value, Δpi;t+ƥ = ln
Pi;t+ƥ+Di;t+ƥ
Pi;t
will be a combination of
the expected return and the unexpected shock,
Δpi;t+ƥ = Et

Δpi;t+ƥ

+ ηi;t+ƥ. (ǉ.ǉ)
ǐ
Suppose that themarket pricemay diﬀer from this fundamental value for two reasons:
ėrst, transitory fads may cause short-run price deviations across certain groups of
securities, and second, changes in fundamental value may be incorporated with a
delay. ĉis can be modeled in a simple way by deėning the log return to security i as
ri;t+ƥ = Δpi;t+ƥ   Δdi;t+ƥ + Δfi;t+ƥ (ǉ.Ǌ)
where the delay in incorporating fundamentals, Δdi;t+ƥ, is governed by δd 2 [Ƥ; ƥ) in
Δdi;t+ƥ = ηi;t+ƥ   (ƥ  δd)
1X
k=Ƥ
δkdηi;t k+ƥ, (ǉ.ǋ)
and the fad component,
Δfi;t+ƥ = "i;t+ƥ   ƥ  δfδf
1X
k=ƥ
δkf "i;t k+ƥ, (ǉ.ǌ)
has shocks "i;t+ƥ that decay through δf 2 [Ƥ; ƥ). I will assume that ηi;t and "i;t are
independent martingale diﬀerence sequences.
Although this implies predictability in returns, it may not be easy to recognize.
ĉese two forces have oﬀseĨing eﬀects on univariate tests of predictability. For
example, consider an aĨempt to detect forecastability using the autocovariance. For
simplicity, we’ll assume for now that expected returns change very liĨle (i.e.
Cov

Et

Δpt+ƥ

;Et+τ ƥ

Δpt+τ
  Ƥ)¹. ĉe autocovariance of rt with return rt+τ
¹Note that short-term variation could be driven by behavioral or rational causes, but the label
”fad” will be used to categorized price movement that is transient and over very short horizons. ĉe
empirical impact of time variation in discount rates is speciėcally addressed in Section ǉ.Ǎ.
Ǒ
realized τ > Ƥ periods in the future is
Cov [rt; rt+τ] = δτd

Var
h
ηi;t   Δdi;t
i
| {z }
momentum in fundamentals
  δτf

δ ƥf Var [Δfi;t   "i;t]

| {z }
reversal in fads
: (ǉ.Ǎ)
ĉe delays in incorporating information contribute to momentum in returns
(positive autocorrelation), but the transient nature of fads contribute to return
reversal (negative autocorrelation). ĉese may oﬀset enough that it is hard for an
autocorrelation or variance ratio test to reject the null hypothesis of no predictability.
Fortunately, we may be able to take advantage of variation in the way fads and
fundamentals aﬀect diﬀerent assets. In the context of this model, there will be an
asset j for which we can measure the eﬀect of the fad (the correlation of "i;t with "j;t)
or delayed fundamentals (the correlation of ηi;t with ηj;t). A temporary increase in the
popularity of blue chip stocks, for example, may cause the prices of these ėrms to rise
together even when their future earnings are unchanged and unrelated. Measures of
comovement across assets could oﬀer beĨer information regarding the extent to
which prices temporarily deviate from fundamentals.
DĹĺĽłĽłĻ ķŃŁŃŋĹŁĹłŉ
To be more precise in deėning comovement, I will generally refer to the short-term
comovement of asset i and asset j as their contemporaneous correlation
ρij (ƥ) =
Cov

ri;t+ƥ; rj;t+ƥ
q
Var [ri;t+ƥ]Var

rj;t+ƥ
 . (ǉ.ǎ)
ǉǈ
ĉe long-horizon return of asset i overH periods will be
PH
h=ƥ ri;t+h, so the long-term
comovement of asset i and asset j is then the correlation associated with their returns
with horizon lengthH ,
ρij (H) =
Cov
PH
h=ƥ ri;t+h;
PH
h=ƥ rj;t+h
q
Var
PH
h=ƥ ri;t+h

Var
PH
h=ƥ rj;t+h
 : (ǉ.Ǐ)
One advantage of measuring comovement through correlations is that it controls for
changes in the variance of assets i and j in the denominator. In that sense we are
focusing on their joint price behavior as opposed to factors aﬀecting their individual
volatilities. A key result comes from expanding the variance and covariance terms in
the deėnition of long-term correlation,
Cov
"
HX
h=ƥ
ri;t+h;
HX
h=ƥ
rj;t+h
#
=
HX
h=ƥ
Cov

ri;t+h; rj;t+h

+
X
k6=h
HX
h=ƥ
Cov

ri;t+h; rj;t+k

Var
"
HX
h=ƥ
ri;t+h
#
=
HX
h=ƥ
Var [ri;t+h] +
X
k6=h
HX
h=ƥ
Cov [ri;t+h; ri;t+k] . (ǉ.ǐ)
ĉe assumption of no fads or delayed fundamentals means past returns do not
forecast the future. ĉis implies Cov

ri;t+h; rj;t

= Ƥ 8j and 8h 6= Ƥ, so the double
summations in the equations above must equal zero. In this case
ρij (H) = ρij (ƥ) 8H , (ǉ.Ǒ)
and correlations should be the same regardless of return horizon. Wemight denote
ǉǉ
the diﬀerence between long-run and short-run correlations as
Δρij = ρij (H)  ρij (ƥ). My null hypothesis is Δρ = Ƥ. As an alternative, I propose
Cov

ri;t+h; rj;t
 6= Ƥ and is instead
Cov

ri;t+h; rj;t

= ρτd

Cov
h
ηi;t   Δdi;t,ηj;t   Δdj;t
i
| {z }
shared fundamentals
  ρτf

ρ ƥf Cov

Δfi;t   "i;t;Δfj;t   "j;t
| {z }
shared fads
: (ǉ.ǉǈ)
ĉis will be positive when the ėrst term is more important for a pair of ėrms and
negative when the second term dominates. Correlations will no longer remain
consistent regardless of time horizon. Instead, equation (ǉ.ǐ) shows how ėrms with
similar fundamentals will have correlations that increase with time horizon and ėrms
whose prices share exposure to fads will have correlations that decrease with time
horizon.
EŁńĽŇĽķĵŀ ĹňŉĽŁĵŉĽŃł Ńĺ ķŃŁŃŋĹŁĹłŉ
In estimating the relationships of long-horizon returns can be problematic within a
given sample. ĉe sample size eﬀectively gets smaller as the return horizon increases.
For example, with a return horizon of six months, a decade of data allows for only
twenty independent increments. Additionally, the long-horizon returns within a
given sample will depend on the start and end dates chosen. Six month returns
starting in January and June might yield diﬀerent results than returns starting in April
and October. We can minimize the impact of these limitations by estimating
ǉǊ
correlations using every possible overlapping window available.
Within a given sample, a correlation for horizon lengthH is estimated as
ρ^ij (H) =
PH
h= H
 H h
H

c^ij (h)q PH
h= H
 H h
H

c^ii (h)
  PH
h= H
 H h
H

c^jj (h)
 : (ǉ.ǉǉ)
ĉe empirical cross-autocovariance c^ij (h)measures the relationship between ri and
rj’s realizations of h periods in the future,
c^ij (h) =
ƥ
H  r
X
(ri;t  ri)
 
rj;t+r  ri

: (ǉ.ǉǊ)
Estimating long-run correlations using (ǉ.ǉǉ) is equivalent to averaging the
correlation estimates for returns of horizon lengthH using all possible windows.
Suggestively, this is also identical to the correlation resulting fromNewey andWest’s
(ǉǑǐǏ) estimator of the long-run covariance of a time series. ĉe fundamental risk in
a ėnancial time series is closely related to the concept of long-run variance, which
continues to be a major topic of research in time series econometrics.
TļĹ ńŇĽķĹ ĽŁńĵķŉ Ńĺ ŉŇĵĸĽłĻ ĶĹļĵŋĽŃŇ
To identify the sorts of ėrms whose prices are driven by shared trading behavior
rather than fundamentals, we could propose characteristics that might be overly
salient to investors and test to see if they predict negative values for Δρij. For example,
if investment styles are indicative of non-fundamental related trading they would
show negative coeﬃcients in a regression.
To capture trading behavior more directly, we can try to measure which assets tend
ǉǋ
to be contemporaneously bought and sold. ĉe simple model above would predict
that assets with a greater degree of shared trading behavior will exhibit more values
for Δρij. While it might seem diﬃcult to observe data on who is initiating
transactions, I will show how shared trading behavior can be inferred by looking at
correlations in bid-ask bounce.
Consider Roll’s (ǉǑǐǌ) model of the eﬀective bid-ask spread. He notes that the
closing price recorded for a security can be aﬀected by whether the last trade was
driven by a purchase or a sale. ĉis price diﬀerential can be interpreted as the literal
bid-ask spread paid by buyers and sellers who initiate trades with market makers, or
this could be a more modern concept of temporary price impact as the intensity of
buying or selling pressure aﬀects liquidity provision.
Suppose that an average sized buyer must pay pi;t + bi, and sellers of an average
quantity receive pi;t   bi. Hence bi can be thought of as the temporary market impact
of trading. Any permanent impact from information in trades is captured by updates
in pi;t. ĉe observed return is then a combination of the price change and the
transitory market impact of purchases (indicated by binary variable ηi;t = ƥ) or sales
(when ηi;t =  ƥ). ĉe observed return (~ri;t+ƥ) can be expressed as the log return
(ri;t+ƥ = pi;t+ƥ   pi;t) plus the market impact
~ri;t+ƥ = ri;t+ƥ + bi

ηi;t+ƥ   ηi;t

: (ǉ.ǉǋ)
Let’s assume that purchases and sales are equally likely and are independent each
period and the null hypothesis that past price changes are not predictive of the future.
ǉǌ
ĉe eﬀect of this trading on the autocovariance sequence for returns will be
Cov [~ri;t;~ri;t] = Var [pi;t+ƥ   pi;t+ƥ] + bƦi
Cov [~ri;t;~ri;t+ƥ] =  bƦi
Cov [~ri;t;~ri;t+k] = Ƥ 8k > ƥ: (ǉ.ǉǌ)
ĉis is precisely what motivated Roll’s estimate of the eﬀective bid-ask spread:
bi =  
q
Cov [~ri;t;~ri;t+ƥ]: (ǉ.ǉǍ)
And what if the buying pressure is correlated across ėrms? Suppose that investors
tend to buy and sell asset i and asset j at the same time, so that νij = E
h
ηi;t; ηj;t
i
6= Ƥ.
We would observe νij > Ƥ if the trading behavior is similar and νij < Ƥ if investors
tend to buy one while selling the other. Intuitively, we can write νij as a simple
function of the probability that securities are both exposed to common trading
behavior,
νij = Ʀ

Pr
h
ηi;t = ηj;t
i
  Ƥ:Ʃ

: (ǉ.ǉǎ)
ĉis is the proposed measure of common trading behavior. Just as we can measure
the eﬀective bid-ask from the autocovariances, we can estimate common trading
behavior from the cross-autocovariances. Under the same assumptions as above, they
ǉǍ
will be
Cov

~ri;t;~rj;t

= Cov

ri;t+ƥ; rj;t+ƥ

+ Ʀνijbibj
Cov

~ri;t;~rj;t+ƥ

=  νijbibj (ǉ.ǉǏ)
Cov

~ri;t;~rj;t+k

= Ƥ 8k > ƥ:
From this, I empirically estimate this measure νij of how trading behavior connects
two stocks through
νij =  
Cov

~ri;t;~rj;t+ƥ

+ Cov

~ri;t+ƥ;~rj;t

Ʀ
q
Cov

~ri;t;~rj;t+ƥ

Cov

~ri;t;~rj;t+ƥ
 : (ǉ.ǉǐ)
ǉ.Ǌ SļŃŇŉ-RŊł ĵłĸ LŃłĻ-RŊłCŃŁŃŋĹŁĹłŉ ĽłUS EŅŊĽŉĽĹň
Dĵŉĵ ňŃŊŇķĹň ĵłĸ ŋĵŇĽĵĶŀĹ ķŃłňŉŇŊķŉĽŃł
To estimate the comovement of US equity prices, I use four decades of weekly total
returns fromĉeCenter for Research in Security Prices² (CRSP), covering the forty
years from ǉǑǏǈ to ǊǈǈǑ, and each decade is considered a subsample. To ensure the
analysis focuses on the most liquid securities, I select the Ǌ,ǈǈǈ largest issues by
market cap as determined immediately prior to the start of each decade. ĉe weekly
log returns are measured using Tuesday’s closing prices and include any distributions
received. For the most recent decade spanning Ǌǈǈǈ-ǊǈǈǑ, the universe consists of
the largest Ǌ,ǈǈǈ ėrms measured by their market cap on December ǋǉst, ǉǑǑǑ, and
²Center for Research in Security Prices. ©Ǌǈǉǉ Booth School of Business, ĉe University of
Chicago. Used with permission. All rights reserved. www.crsp.chicagobooth.edu
ǉǎ
the ėrst weekly return is measured from January ǌth to January ǉǉth, Ǌǈǈǈ. Only
publicly traded common stock of US incorporated ėrms are considered (CRSP share
codes ǉǈ and ǉǉ).
Within each decade, short-run and long-run correlations are calculated for every
pair of ėrms, where the short run is deėned as one week and the long run is deėned as
half of a year. Short-run correlations of weekly returns, ρ^ (ƥ) are calculated as in (ǉ.ǎ).
ĉe long-run correlation calculation uses the formula in (ǉ.Ǐ) whereH = Ǌǎ weeks,
generating ρ^ (Ʀƪ). ĉe diﬀerence between the two yields Δρ^.
To minimize any bias related to survivorship, long-run correlations are calculated
whenever possible, even when two ėrms coexist for only a small portion of the
decade. ĉeminimum possible number of observations to calculate ρ^ (Ʀƪ) is
approximately one year. ĉe trade-oﬀ for reducing this bias is sampling variance, as
the long-run variance in those cases is exceptionally noisy. In practice, requiring a
longer minimum history decreases the sample size and aﬀects the results very liĨle, so
I make this criterion as permissive as possible.
We can be reasonably comfortable that the results of the empirical analysis are not
driven by the anomalous behavior of illiquid ėrms since the universe consists of the
largest Ǌ,ǈǈǈ securities by market capitalization and the shortest time interval
considered is one week. ĉemean diﬀerence between short-run and long-run
correlation increases when using smaller ėrms and shorter time horizons, and there is
also a slight increase in the predictability of this diﬀerence, but these results are
excluded as they would be open to criticism that they are aﬀected to a larger extent by
ǉǏ
Table ǉ.ǉ: Data Coverage for Correlation Estimates
ĉis table reports the data availability for the estimated return correlations. ĉe return series con-
sidered are log returns calculated from the CRSP total return data, and the minimum unit of mea-
surement is one week, corresponding to returns from Tuesday to Tuesday. ĉe unique correlation
estimates correspond to the upper triangle of the matrix of correlation coeﬃcients, excluding the di-
agonal.
Decade Total
ǉǑǏǈ’s ǉǑǐǈ’s ǉǑǑǈ’s Ǌǈǈǈ’s
max possible pairs ǉ,ǑǑǑ,ǈǈǈ ǉ,ǑǑǑ,ǈǈǈ ǉ,ǑǑǑ,ǈǈǈ ǉ,ǑǑǑ,ǈǈǈ Ǐ,ǑǑǎ,ǈǈǈ
pairs w/ min ƺ returns ǉ,ǐǏǊ,ǉǉǈ ǉ,ǐǉǉ,ǈǐǐ ǉ,ǐǊǐ,ǐǊǎ ǉ,ǎǋǊ,ǏǑǋ Ǐ,ǉǌǌ,ǐǉǏ
stale prices or other liquidity related issues.
SŊŁŁĵŇĽŐĽłĻ ŉļĹ ķŃŇŇĹŀĵŉĽŃłň ŃŋĹŇ ŀŃłĻ ĵłĸ ňļŃŇŉ ļŃŇĽŐŃłň
Summary statistics for the correlation estimates are shown in Table ǉ.Ǌ. ĉe sample
size of Ǌ,ǈǈǈ ėrms will generate slightly less than two million unique correlation
estimates each decade. ĉe ėrst panel shows the eﬀect of aĨrition on data coverage.
You can see that correlations can be calculated for more than Ǒǈƻ of all possible pairs
of ėrms except in the most recent decade where the ten-year period begins in the year
Ǌǈǈǈ, at the peak of the Internet frenzy. Acquisitions and failures cause an atypical
number of ėrms to disappear during the ėrst ǉǊ months of this subsample.
For the four decades considered, the short-run correlation, ρ^ij (ƥ), averages ǉǐ.ǌƻ,
with a standard deviation of ǉǉ.ǌƻ. In contrast, long-run correlations are much
higher, with a full sample average of ǋǈ.ǈƻ and standard deviation of ǊǏ.ǈƻ. ĉe
diﬀerence between the two, ρ^ (H)  ρ^ij (ƥ), averages ǉǉ.ǎƻ. ĉe diﬀerence decreases
ǉǐ
Table ǉ.Ǌ: Summary Statistics for Correlation Estimates
ĉis table reports the data availability and summary statistics for the estimated return correlations.
ĉe return series considered are log returns calculated from theCRSP total return data, and themini-
mumunit ofmeasurement is oneweek, corresponding to returns fromTuesday toTuesday. ĉe short
run correlation measures, ρ^ (ƥ), are therefore associated with a one week horizon. In the data panel
measuring coverage by unique correlation pairs, the unique correlation estimates correspond to the
upper triangle of the matrix of correlation coeﬃcients, excluding the diagonal.
short-horizon correlation Decade Full Sample
ǉǑǏǈ’s ǉǑǐǈ’s ǉǑǑǈ’s Ǌǈǈǈ’s
mean ǊǊ.ǐǉ ǉǑ.Ǌǈ ǉǋ.ǈǉ ǉǐ.ǋǉ ǉǐ.ǋǎ
std dev Ǒ.ǉǊ ǉǈ.ǍǍ Ǒ.ǋǉ ǉǋ.Ǒǈ ǉǉ.ǋǎ
ρ^ij(ƥ) Ǎ ƻile ǐ.ǍǍ Ǌ.ǍǑ -ǈ.Ǒǈ -Ǎ.ǉǎ ǈ.Ǎǋ
median ǊǊ.ǍǏ ǉǐ.Ǒǎ ǉǊ.ǌǋ ǉǐ.Ǎǋ ǉǐ.ǉǐ
ǑǍ ƻile ǋǏ.ǐǌ ǋǎ.Ǐǌ Ǌǐ.ǐǐ ǌǈ.Ǐǋ ǋǎ.Ǒǎ
long-horizon correlation Decade Full Sample
ǉǑǏǈ’s ǉǑǐǈ’s ǉǑǑǈ’s Ǌǈǈǈ’s
mean ǌǍ.ǉǊ ǋǈ.ǈǋ ǊǊ.ǏǏ Ǌǈ.ǏǊ ǋǈ.ǈǈ
std dev ǉǑ.Ǒǐ Ǌǌ.ǏǑ Ǌǌ.ǐǌ ǋǈ.ǎǍ Ǌǎ.Ǒǌ
ρ^ij(Ʀƪ) Ǎ ƻile ǉǈ.ǍǊ -ǉǍ.ǏǊ -ǉǐ.ǌǌ -ǋǏ.ǋǈ -ǉǐ.ǎǊ
median ǌǎ.ǎǑ ǋǊ.ǐǈ Ǌǋ.ǈǎ Ǌǌ.Ǌǎ ǋǊ.ǐǏ
ǑǍ ƻile Ǐǌ.ǑǍ ǎǍ.ǎǐ ǎǋ.ǍǑ ǎǌ.Ǐǉ ǎǐ.ǐǉ
correlation diﬀerence Decade Full Sample
ǉǑǏǈ’s ǉǑǐǈ’s ǉǑǑǈ’s Ǌǈǈǈ’s
mean ǊǊ.ǋǉ ǉǈ.ǐǋ Ǒ.Ǐǎ Ǌ.ǌǊ ǉǉ.ǎǌ
std dev ǉǐ.ǋǎ ǊǊ.Ǌǉ ǊǊ.Ǐǋ Ǌǎ.Ǌǋ Ǌǋ.ǍǊ
Δρ^ij Ǎ ƻile -Ǒ.ǋǏ -Ǌǐ.ǉǍ -ǊǏ.ǏǏ -ǌǍ.ǎǐ -ǊǑ.ǐǎ
median Ǌǋ.Ǐǈ ǉǊ.ǋǈ ǉǈ.ǈǉ ǌ.Ǒǉ ǉǋ.ǍǍ
ǑǍ ƻile ǌǑ.ǌǏ ǌǌ.ǎǋ ǌǎ.ǏǑ ǌǈ.Ǒǋ ǌǎ.ǌǋ
ǉǑ
over time, with an average diﬀerence of ǊǊ.ǋƻ in the ǉǑǏǈ’s decreasing to a diﬀerence
of only Ǌ.ǌƻ in the most recent decade.
By deėnition, there are upper and lower bounds on the possible observed
correlations. In practice, the estimated short-run correlations are nearly always
positive, with less than Ǎƻ of the estimated values being less than zero. However,
there is much more variation in the long horizon correlation estimates. Even though
the average long-run correlation is nearly twice as large, a liĨle less than a third of the
estimates are less than zero.
While the standard deviations and percentiles shown in Table ǉ.Ǌ make it tempting
to conclude that there is a larger degree of cross-sectional variation in correlations
measured over long horizons, it is important to note that the short-run correlations
are estimated much more precisely. Even under the null hypothesis where the true
correlation does not depend on the time horizon, the empirical long-run correlations
will showmore variation due to the fact that they are estimated using far fewer
independent observations. We cannot yet draw conclusions about the distribution of
the true long-run correlations. ĉe full sample standard deviation of ǊǏ.ǈƻ reĚects
both the dispersion of correlations in the population as well as the measurement
error. ĉe subsequent section will present a method for quantifying the eﬀect of
measurement error in the long run estimates.
Ǌǈ
ǉ.ǋ A RĹĻŇĹňňĽŃłMĹŉļŃĸŃŀŃĻŏ ĺŃŇ CŃŇŇĹŀĵŉĽŃłň
RĹĻŇĹňňĽłĻ ĹŎńŀĵłĵŉŃŇŏ ŋĵŇĽĵĶŀĹň Ńł ŉļĹ ķŃŇŇĹŀĵŉĽŃł ĸĽĺĺĹŇĹłķĹň
To test the null hypothesis in (ǉ.Ǒ) against the alternative, I propose running a
regression of the diﬀerence in long-run and short-run correlation on candidate
explanatory variables for each pair of ėrms. Negative values for this diﬀerence in
correlations correspond to excess comovement, indicating the pair of stocks has a
higher correlation in the short run than can be justiėed by their long-run returns.
Positive values are indicative of insuﬃcient comovement, as the short-run returns do
not seem to capture the comovement observed over longer horizons.
Given explanatory variables corresponding to each pair of ėrms (i; j) whose shared
characteristics constitute vector Zij (including a constant term), the coeﬃcient vector
β is estimated from the linear regression
Δρ^ij = βZij + eij: (ǉ.ǉǑ)
Under the null hypothesis, every element of β, including the constant, is equal to zero.
Calculating the standard errors for β^ requires special aĨention, since these errors
are not independent across pairs of ėrms. ĉe traditional standard errors estimated
using an OLS regression to estimate (ǉ.ǉǑ) will be far too small. What appears to be a
large cross-sectional sample is eﬀectively smaller since much of the variation in stock
returns is driven by common factors. Even worse, all stocks likely have a positive
loading on a single factor, the market. If none of the residuals are independent,
Ǌǉ
traditional techniques to handle correlated residuals in a cross-sectional regression,
like clustering standard errors, will oﬀer liĨle help.
A ŇĹňļŊĺĺŀĽłĻ ŉĹķļłĽŅŊĹ ĺŃŇ ňŉĵŉĽňŉĽķĵŀ ĽłĺĹŇĹłķĹ
ĉe problem would beneėt from a new approach. Note that under the null
hypothesis, this error term eij is equal to the estimation error between the true
long-horizon correlation and whatever empirical estimate results from the particular
sample used. We can call this estimation error
"ij = Δρ^ij   Δρij (H) ; (ǉ.Ǌǈ)
and note that eij = "ij, under the null hypothesis.
Fortunately we can take advantage of some properties of the null hypothesis. In
particular, the assumption of no predictability suggests that the error terms in (ǉ.Ǌǈ)
result from the purely coincidental estimation noise of past returns appearing to
predict the future.
ĉerefore, the historical ordering of the weekly returns makes no diﬀerence. We
just need to preserve the contemporaneous return structure. In fact, if we randomly
reshuﬄe the historical ordering of the weeks and recalculate the long-run
correlations, we would generate an independent draw of error terms with the same
statistical properties.
ĉis is eﬀectively what I propose as a robust, non-parametric method for
calculating standard errors. With new long-term correlation estimates from each
reshuﬄing of the weekly returns, we ėnd the distribution of β under the null by
ǊǊ
repeatedly rerunning the regression in (ǉ.ǉǑ). ĉen we can compare our β^ estimate
to the distribution of estimates generated from the reshuﬄed data. We can now test
the hypothesis that β^ = Ƥ properly accounting for the strong dependence across our
observations.
ĉe reshuﬄing technique also makes it possible to revisit the variation in the
estimated long-horizon correlations. ĉe observed diﬀerences in long-horizon and
short-horizon correlations are due to both the variation expected from sampling
noise as well as the true dispersion in correlation values. A casual glance at the
magnitudes might lead someone to prematurely reject the null hypothesis based
solely on the large variation in Table ǉ.Ǌ. ĉe two panels in Figure ǉ.Ǌ plot a
histogram of the cross-sectional variation in the estimated Δρ^ij against the density
function of the sampling error expected under the null hypothesis for the earliest and
the most recent decade.
Figure ǉ.Ǌ also graphically emphasizes the diﬀerence between the previously
documented observation that correlations seem to increase with time horizon on
average (Campbell et al., Ǌǈǈǉ) and the claim that some correlations increase with
horizon and some decrease. By inspection, the estimated long-horizon correlations
are signiėcantly higher than what would be expected under the null hypothesis for
the ǉǑǏǈ’s, though the signiėcance of the diﬀerence is less obvious in the Ǌǈǈǈ’s. ĉis
paper will show empirical analysis suggesting that the earlier diﬀerence in mean
correlation diﬀerences can be largely aĨributed to microstructure noise from the
bid-ask spread.
SeĨing aside diﬀerences in the mean, the dispersion in the reshuﬄed values is
Ǌǋ
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Figure ǉ.Ǌ: Comparing Empirical and Reshuﬄed Correlation Diﬀerences
quite high, suggesting that we cannot immediately rule out the possibility that large
cross-sectional diﬀerences in correlation estimates for diﬀerent time horizons are
simply sampling error. A more careful analysis will show evidence that correlations
will predictably increase or decrease as the return horizon lengthens.
Ǌǌ
ǉ.ǌ EŎńŀĵĽłĽłĻ EŁńĽŇĽķĵŀ CŃŇŇĹŀĵŉĽŃłň
Dĵŉĵ ĸĹňķŇĽńŉĽŃł Ńĺ ĹŎńŀĵłĵŉŃŇŏ ŋĵŇĽĵĶŀĹň
All of the explanatory variables that form the elements of the Zij vector of explanatory
variables in estimating (ǉ.ǉǑ) are calculated using data available prior to each decade.
I group them by factors ostensibly related to investment behavior and factors that are
indicative of shared fundamental risks.
I estimate shared trading behavior by calculating the correlations in bid-ask
bounce, νij, as deėned in (ǉ.ǉǐ). Log weekly returns are used to estimate νij using a
two year window prior to the start of the decade. ĉe eﬀective bid/ask spread, used
in the denominator of the deėnition of shared trading behavior is shrunk toward the
median value estimated across all securities, which prevents a negative implied spread
in most cases. To further control for large outliers that may be driven by a very small
denominator, or by estimation error in the numerator, the ėnal values of νij are all
shrunk toward zero.
Somewhat surprisingly, Table ǉ.ǌ shows that, on average, ėrms do not tend to be
bought and sold together for the ėrst two decades in the sample. ĉis might be
indicative that the trading behavior tended to reĚect investors shiěing investments
across stocks rather than a paĨern of broad net inĚows or outĚows in the equity
market. For the more recent two decades, however, the mean coeﬃcient is much
closer to zero and shows no particular propensity for stocks to be bought or sold
together, though this varies signiėcantly across pairs of stocks.
ǊǍ
Table ǉ.ǋ: Summary Statistics for Primary Explanatory Variables
ĉis table reports the data availability and summary statistics for the explanatory variables used in
the regression analysis. ĉe summary of unique correlation pairs represent the upper triangle of the
correlationmatrix, excluding the own correlations on the diagonal. ĉe shared trading behavior is an
estimate of the propensity of buyers and sellers of ėrms to have correlations in the temporary market
impact they cause, as measured through temporary components in autocorrelations. ĉe primary
variable representing fundamental correlation is the correlation of ėrms return on equity, as derived
from quarterly accounting data from Compustat. Dummy variables capture shared characteristics
related to primary trading exchange and market cap quintiles, using data from CRSP, and the book
equity (BE) and GICS industry data are obtained from the linked CRSP-Compustat database.
Data Availability
Decade Full Sample
ǉǑǏǈ’s ǉǑǐǈ’s ǉǑǑǈ’s Ǌǈǈǈ’s
pairs w/ min ƺ returns ǉ,ǐǏǊ,ǉǉǈ ǉ,ǐǉǉ,ǈǐǐ ǉ,ǐǊǐ,ǐǊǎ ǉ,ǎǋǊ,ǏǑǋ Ǐ,ǉǌǌ,ǐǉǏ
with νi;j values ǉ,Ǌǐǈ,Ǎǐǎ Ǒǈǌ,ǏǍǎ ǉ,ǌǐǊ,Ǌǌǋ ǉ,ǈǉǑ,ǈǑǎ ǌ,ǎǐǎ,ǎǐǉ
with Corr[ROEi;ROEj] Ǌǈǌ,ǏǍǏ ǉ,ǋǊǈ,Ǎǋǋ Ǒǎǋ,ǌǏǏ ǎǏǏ,ǍǑǐ ǋ,ǉǎǎ,ǋǎǍ
Summary Statistics
Decade Full Sample
νij ǉǑǏǈ’s ǉǑǐǈ’s ǉǑǑǈ’s Ǌǈǈǈ’s
mean -ǈ.ǌǍ -ǉ.ǊǊ ǈ.ǈǊ -ǈ.ǉǌ -ǈ.ǋǐ
std dev ǉ.ǉǍ ǉ.ǋǊ ǈ.Ǒǌ ǉ.ǈǎ ǉ.Ǌǈ
Ǎ ƻile -Ǌ.ǋǐ -ǋ.ǉǎ -ǉ.ǎǊ -ǉ.ǑǏ -Ǌ.ǌǌ
median -ǈ.ǌǊ -ǉ.ǌǊ ǈ.ǉǉ -ǈ.ǈǐ -ǈ.ǊǏ
ǑǍ ƻile ǉ.ǋǋ ǉ.ǋǈ ǉ.ǋǏ ǉ.ǌǎ ǉ.ǋǏ
Decade Full Sample
Corr[ROEi;ROEj] ǉǑǏǈ’s ǉǑǐǈ’s ǉǑǑǈ’s Ǌǈǈǈ’s
mean ǈ.ǉǊ ǈ.ǈǐ ǈ.ǈǉ ǈ.ǈǊ ǈ.ǈǍ
std dev ǈ.ǌǑ ǈ.ǋǍ ǈ.ǋǈ ǈ.ǊǑ ǈ.ǋǋ
Ǎ ƻile -ǈ.ǏǊ -ǈ.Ǎǈ -ǈ.ǌǐ -ǈ.ǌǎ -ǈ.Ǎǈ
median ǈ.ǉǎ ǈ.ǈǐ ǈ.ǈǉ ǈ.ǈǉ ǈ.ǈǌ
ǑǍ ƻile ǈ.ǐǌ ǈ.ǎǌ ǈ.ǍǊ ǈ.Ǎǉ ǈ.ǎǊ
Ǌǎ
My primary measure to estimate fundamental correlation is the correlation of
ėrms’ return on equity. ROE values are constructed from Compustat data, deėned as
the ratio of earnings per share (Compustat item: epspiq) divided by common equity
per share (Compustat item: ceqq). ĉis value is censored at -Ǒǈƻ and +ǉǈǈƻ and
then converted to a log return. Annual Compustat data is used to supplement where
quarterly data is not available. Correlations in this ROE series are calculated for each
pair of ėrms over the prior ǉǈ years, excluding the quarter immediately prior to the
beginning of the decade, since this data is typically not released until January or later.
I set a minimum requirement of ǌ years of accounting data to estimate a valid
correlation. As can be seen in the coverage statistics in Table Ǌ, lack of Compustat
data tends to be the most restrictive data requirement, especially near the beginning
of the sample when only a few hundred ėrms have accounting data available. ĉis
does not have a substantive eﬀect on the regression results, but I will run a regression
speciėcation that excludes Corr

ROEi;ROEj

to take advantage of the larger data set.
Market cap and exchange information all come fromCRSP, and the book equity
and GICS industry assignments are all taken from the CRSP-Compustat linked
database. ĉe construction of the book equity / market equity (BE/ME) variable
mirrors that described by Fama and French (ǉǑǑǊ). Each decade, the Ǌǈǈǈ ėrms in
the universe are matched to their assigned to BE/ME quintiles relative to the CRSP
universe of ėrms. I do not use the CRSP universe for market cap quintile
assignments, since my sample of the Ǌ,ǈǈǈ largest ėrms only represents the largest
quintiles. Instead, I create market cap quintiles speciėc to this sample using market
cap data from the December previous to the start of each decade.
ǊǏ
ĉis information allows for the construction of the dummy variables shown in
Table ǉ.ǌ. ĉey correspond to pairs of ėrms being listed on the same exchange,
sharing the same size quintile, being assigned the same GICS industry, etc. As usual,
the dummy variables equal ǉ for each pairwise observation where the criteria are met.
ĉe classiėcations of sharing the same GICS sector, industry or subindustry are not
exclusive of each other, so a pair of ėrms in the same subindustry will necessarily also
be in the same industry and sector. ĉe occurrence of ėrms in the same subindustry
is the rarest of the dummy variables, occurring in about ǉ.Ǐƻ of the unique ėrm pairs,
but will be shown to have a strong eﬀect even aěer controlling for industry and sector.
ǉ.ǌ.ǉ RĹĻŇĹňňĽłĻ ĹŎńŀĵłĵŉŃŇŏ ŋĵŇĽĵĶŀĹň Ńł Δρ^
Following the methods described in section ǉ.ǋ, I estimate regression coeﬃcients for
each decade subsample via least squares and use the reshuﬄing technique to calculate
standard errors. ĉe regression estimates for regressions of Δρ^ on various
explanatory variables are combined (assuming independent subsamples) and
reported in Table ǉ.Ǎ.
ĉe ėrst regression speciėcation includes no explanatory variables other than
constant terms. While these regression coeﬃcients are going to reĚect the simple
means previously noted in the summary statistics, the reshuﬄing methodology help
us beĨer understand the signiėcance of these results. We can see that even across
almost Ǌ million observations per decade, the common factors driving returns can
generate standard errors in the average diﬀerence in long-run and short-run
correlations of about ǋƻ. ĉe fact that long-horizon correlations average Ǌ.ǌǊƻ
Ǌǐ
Table ǉ.ǌ: Summary Statistics for Dummy Variables
ĉis table reports the data availability and summary statistics for dummy variables used as explana-
tory variables in the regression analysis. ĉey characteristics related to primary trading exchange and
market cap quintiles use data from CRSP, and the book equity (BE) and GICS industry data are
obtained from the linked CRSP-Compustat database.
Data Availability
Decade Full Sample
ǉǑǏǈ’s ǉǑǐǈ’s ǉǑǑǈ’s Ǌǈǈǈ’s
pairs w/ min ƺ returns ǉ,ǐǏǊ,ǉǉǈ ǉ,ǐǉǉ,ǈǐǐ ǉ,ǐǊǐ,ǐǊǎ ǉ,ǎǋǊ,ǏǑǋ Ǐ,ǉǌǌ,ǐǉǏ
with GICS industry ǎǐǎ,ǉǎǊ ǉ,ǉǑǐ,ǐǌǍ ǉ,ǏǏǉ,Ǒǈǉ ǉ,ǎǉǉ,ǉǐǋ Ǎ,Ǌǎǐ,ǈǑǉ
with BE/ME values ǉ,ǊǉǊ,ǏǍǑ ǉ,ǍǉǊ,ǌǌǌ ǉ,ǍǎǏ,ǋǋǋ ǉ,ǉǎǏ,ǎǈǌ Ǎ,ǌǎǈ,ǉǌǈ
Frequency
Decade Full Sample
ǉǑǏǈ’s ǉǑǐǈ’s ǉǑǑǈ’s Ǌǈǈǈ’s
same exchange Ǎǋ.Ǌƻ ǌǏ.Ǐƻ ǌǌ.ǌƻ ǌǑ.ǎƻ ǌǐ.Ǐƻ
same size quintile Ǌǈ.ǈƻ Ǌǈ.ǈƻ Ǌǈ.ǈƻ Ǌǈ.ǈƻ Ǌǈ.ǈƻ
same BE/ME quintile Ǌǈ.ǋƻ Ǌǉ.ǎƻ Ǌǉ.ǐƻ ǋǈ.Ǒƻ Ǌǋ.ǌƻ
same sector ǉǍ.Ǌƻ ǉǋ.ǉƻ ǉǊ.ǐƻ ǉǍ.Ǐƻ ǉǌ.ǉƻ
same industry Ǌ.Ǐƻ ǋ.ǉƻ ǋ.Ǌƻ Ǌ.ǐƻ ǋ.ǈƻ
same subindustry ǉ.ǎƻ ǉ.ǐƻ ǉ.Ǐƻ ǉ.Ǐƻ ǉ.Ǐƻ
ǊǑ
higher than short-horizon correlations in the most recent decade is well within the
range of diﬀerences wemight randomly observe. ĉe diﬀerences in earlier decades, as
large as ǊǊƻ during the ǉǑǏǈ’s, cannot be explained by estimation error.
ĉe second regression speciėcation includes the two primary explanatory
variables reĚecting shared trading behavior (νij) and shared fundamentals
(Corr

ROEi;ROEj

). Both of these variables are highly signiėcant in explaining the
eﬀect of return horizon on correlations. As expected, common trading behavior is
indicative of temporary price comovement, as indicated by the negative coeﬃcient.
Firms that have a higher probability of being bought or sold together have higher
short-horizon correlations but lower correlations over long horizons. ĉe variable
measuring shared fundamentals generates a positive regression coeﬃcient and the
opposite eﬀect of trading behavior. Firms with highly similar fundamental exposures
tend to have lower short-horizon correlations relative to long horizons, suggesting
insuﬃcient comovement.
ĉe third regression speciėcation adds the dummy variables indicating ėrms are
traded on the same exchange, and in similar size or valuation categories, or belong to
the same GICS industry categories. Trading on the same exchange is indicative of
excess comovement, consistent with the international evidence that exchange listings
maĨer. Considering the three principal exchanges on which these stocks are listed
(NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ), more than ǉƻ of stock price variation is associated
with temporary comovement with other stocks on the same exchange. As is true with
all the explanatory variables considered, the exchange listing may not be the causal
force driving excess comovement, but it is predictive.
ǋǈ
Table ǉ.Ǎ: Cross-Sectional Regressions of Correlation Diﬀerence, Δρ^ij
In the regressions below, the dependent variable is the diﬀerence between long run and short run
correlation (Δρ^ij). All of the explanatory variables are dummy variables except for Shared Trading
Behavior (νxy) and Shared Fundamentals (Corr[ROEi;ROEj]). ĉe reported coeﬃcients are from com-
bining cross-sectional regressions for each decade, and standard errors, reported in parentheses below
the regression coeﬃcients, use the reshuﬄing methodology described in section ǉ.ǋ for each cross-
section and assume the subsamples are independent. Statistical signiėcance of the coeﬃcient relative
to the null hypothesis of zero is denoted using asterisks, where * indicates signiėcance at the Ǎƻ level
and ** indicates signiėcance at the ǉƻ level.
(ǉ) (Ǌ) (ǋ) (ǌ)
ǉǑǏǈ’s Decade Dummy ǊǊ.ǋǉ** ǉǐ.Ǌǈ** Ǌǈ.ǈǊ** ǉǑ.ǋǎ**
(ǋ.ǐǎ) (ǌ.ǊǊ) (ǋ.ǑǑ) (ǋ.ǑǏ)
ǉǑǐǈ’s Decade Dummy ǉǈ.ǐǋ** Ǒ.ǎǍ** ǉǈ.ǐǍ** ǉǈ.ǊǏ**
(ǋ.ǋǉ) (ǋ.ǋǏ) (ǋ.ǍǏ) (ǋ.Ǎǉ)
ǉǑǑǈ’s Decade Dummy Ǒ.Ǐǎ** Ǒ.ǈǉ** Ǒ.ǋǉ** Ǒ.ǋǈ**
(Ǌ.ǎǐ) (Ǌ.ǐǉ) (Ǌ.ǎǍ) (Ǌ.ǏǍ)
Ǌǈǈǈ’s Decade Dummy Ǌ.ǌǊ ǋ.ǋǋ Ǌ.ǉǍ Ǌ.ǌǍ
(ǋ.ǉǐ) (ǋ.ǎǊ) (ǋ.Ǎǐ) (ǋ.Ǐǎ)
Shared Trading Behavior (νij) -ǈ.ǐǊ** -ǈ.Ǐǌ**
(ǈ.ǉǋ) (ǈ.ǉǋ)
Same Exchange -ǉ.ǋǌ** -ǉ.ǐǍ**
(ǈ.ǌǐ) (ǈ.ǎǈ)
Same Size Quintile -ǈ.ǌǋ* -ǈ.Ǒǋ**
(ǈ.ǉǏ) (ǈ.Ǌǐ)
Same Be/MEDecile ǈ.Ǎǐ* ǈ.Ǐǉ**
(ǈ.Ǌǌ) (ǈ.ǉǑ)
Shared Fundamentals (Corr[ROEi;ROEj]) ǉ.ǊǏ** ǈ.Ǒǐ**
(ǈ.Ǌǋ) (ǈ.ǊǊ)
Same Sector ǌ.ǌǑ** ǌ.ǑǊ**
(ǈ.ǌǋ) (ǈ.ǌǋ)
Same Industry ǉ.ǋǌ** ǈ.Ǌǎ
(ǈ.ǌǏ) (ǈ.ǎǋ)
Same Subindustry Ǌ.ǌǏ** ǋ.ǋǉ**
(ǈ.Ǎǐ) (ǈ.Ǒǋ)
Observations Ǐ,ǉǌǌ,ǐǉǏ Ǌ,Ǌǈǐ,ǎǎǊ ǌ,ǋǊǌ,ǌǎǎ ǉ,Ǒǌǎ,ǉǍǎ
ǋǉ
ĉe dummy variable indicating ėrms are in the same size quintile also has the
expected sign. Prices of ėrms with similar market caps seem to move together over
short horizons much more than over longer return horizons. On the other hand, the
same logic would suggest a negative regression coeﬃcient on the dummy variable
indicating ėrms are in the same BE/ME quintile, but this is not the case. ĉe
coeﬃcient on this variable is positive. A closer examination of excess comovement
across subsamples and controlling for autocorrelations frommarket microstructure
suggests the value results are not robust and the size eﬀect is primarily driven by
excess comovement in the ėrms at the smaller range of this sample.
ĉe variables indicating ėrms share the same sector, industry or subindustry all
show large positive coeﬃcients. As with the measure of shared fundamentals that
looks at correlations in proėtability, these variables seem to indicate ėrms with
similar factors driving their proėtability show insuﬃcient price comovement over
short horizons. For ėrms in the same subindustry, the correlation of their ǎ-month
returns will, on average, be ǐ.ǋƻ higher than the correlation of their weekly returns.
ĉis is one of the strongest statistical results, though it’s not without precedent.
Cohen and Frazzini (Ǌǈǈǐ) andMoskowitz and GrinblaĨ (ǉǑǑǑ) show evidence of
evidence of positive momentum across connected ėrms, which would cause their
correlations to increase with the time horizon.
ĉe fourth regression speciėcation includes all explanatory variables. ĉis serves
as a check that each makes an independent contribution. ĉere is a slight decrease in
the coeﬃcients on the main variables measuring shared trading behavior and shared
fundamentals, but they remain highly signiėcant.
ǋǊ
Interestingly, the coeﬃcients on the other variables intended to capture labels that
might be salient to investors all increase. ĉe coeﬃcient on ėrms that share the same
size quintile almost doubles, indicating that it might be more prominent conditioned
on the other explanatory variables than it is when measured in isolation.
ĉe variables intended to capture common exposures to fundamental risks all
remain signiėcant predictors of insuﬃcient short-run comovement with the
exception of the dummy variable for ėrms sharing the same industry. ĉis is actually
an artifact of this measure being so similar to the subindustry dummy variable that
the coeﬃcient shiěs from one to the other.
ĉe general conclusions from the empirical results are broadly consistent across
regression speciėcations. ĉey provide evidence in favor of the hypothesis that
short-run comovement is diﬀerent than long-run comovement, and that excess and
insuﬃcient comovement can be predicted by measures of shared trading behavior
and exposures to shared fundamentals.
RŃĶŊňŉłĹňň
ĉe key results in Table ǉ.Ǎ are robust across a variety of alternative estimation
approaches. However, there are two critiques that deserve special aĨention, which I’ll
call the ”micro explanation” and the ”macro explanation.”ĉemicro explanation
would assert that the correlation diﬀerences are the result of bid-ask spreads and
similar eﬀects in market microstructure, and the macro explanation would assert that
correlation diﬀerences are simply a manifestation of predictability in well-known risk
factors.
ǋǋ
Just as the bid-ask bounce can be used to estimate trade-driven price behavior,
serial correlation frommarket microstructure can also aﬀect correlations. ĉis is clear
from the eﬀects derived in (ǉ.ǉǌ) and (ǉ.ǉǏ). In general, long-run correlations will
appear mechanically higher than short-run correlations simply because the
temporary price impact of trading constitutes a much smaller fraction of total price
movement in long-horizon returns relative to short-horizon returns. Since this eﬀect
will be larger for stocks that are less liquid, the regression analysis might mistakenly
associate measures correlated with liquidity as indicators of insuﬃcient comovement.
To show this is not the source of the results in Table ǉ.Ǎ, I construct a measure that
adjusts the diﬀerence between long and short-horizon correlations that excludes the
ėrst order autocorrelation and cross-autocorrelation terms that could be aﬀected by
the impact of trading on closing prices. I label this variable Δ _ρij. ĉese excluded ėrst
order autocorrelations would also contain a large degree of information about excess
comovement, so it is important to recognize that assuming them to be zero may be a
useful robustness check, but it biases all results in favor of the null hypothesis.
Table ǉ.ǎ reports summary statistics for Δ _ρij. Comparing these microstructure
adjusted estimates to the original summary statistics reported in Table ǉ.Ǌ. ĉemost
striking diﬀerence is that the mean short-run correlation is much closer to the mean
long-run correlation. ĉis suggests that the lower comovement in the short run is
driven, in a large part, by the idiosyncratic price impact from trading that immediately
reverses in the subsequent period. ĉis is in line with the predicted eﬀect of market
microstructure.
Not surprisingly, the microstructure adjustments become less signiėcant over
ǋǌ
Table ǉ.ǎ:Microstructure Robust Correlation Diﬀerences
ĉis table reports summary statistics for the microstructure-robust correlation diﬀer-
ences, Δ _ρij, where the autocorrelation terms in deėning the long run correlation are as-
sumed to be zero. ĉe calculations are otherwise identical to those described for Δρij.
Decade Full Sample
ǉǑǏǈ’s ǉǑǐǈ’s ǉǑǑǈ’s Ǌǈǈǈ’s
mean Ǒ.ǋǈ ǉ.Ǐǉ Ǎ.ǈǉ ǉ.Ǐǌ ǌ.ǍǍ
std dev ǉǎ.ǉǋ ǋǏ.ǎǐ ǉǑ.ǉǌ ǋǊ.ǍǑ ǊǏ.ǐǋ
Δ _ρij Ǎ ƻile -ǉǎ.Ǐǌ -ǋǌ.ǌǑ -ǊǍ.ǎǌ -ǌǍ.ǌǏ -ǋǈ.ǈǏ
median Ǒ.ǏǍ ǋ.ǈǋ Ǎ.ǈǎ ǌ.ǎǏ Ǎ.Ǒǎ
ǑǍ ƻile ǋǋ.ǑǊ ǋǍ.Ǎǌ ǋǍ.Ǎǋ ǋǐ.ǉǈ ǋǍ.ǎǈ
time, which is likely a result of increased liquidity and tighter bid-ask spreads. ĉe
dispersion of the diﬀerence remains high on average and over time, suggesting that
the return horizon may have a large eﬀect on individual correlations, even when the
diﬀerence is only slightly positive in the cross-section.
To check the robustness of the regression results directly, I run the previous
regressions on Δ _ρ, the diﬀerence in long-term and short-term correlations that have
been adjusted for microstructure. ĉese regression results are shown in Table ǉ.Ǐ.
ĉemost noticeable diﬀerences are in the unconditional averages, as seen in the
ėrst regression speciėcation with no other explanatory variables. As was observed in
the summary statistics, the diﬀerences all decrease. Looking at the statistical
signiėcance only the Ǒ.ǋƻ average diﬀerence in the ǉǑǏǈ’s remains statistically
diﬀerent from zero at the Ǎƻ conėdence level. ĉis is consistent with the idea that a
great degree of the insuﬃcient comovement we observed was an artifact of
temporary impact of trades on closing prices.
ǋǍ
Table ǉ.Ǐ: Regressions Adjusted for Microstructure Eﬀects, Δ _ρij
In the regressions shown, the dependent variable is the diﬀerence between long run and short run
correlation, aěer adjusting for the ėrst order autocorrelation that is likely caused by bid-ask bounce
andothermicrostructure eﬀects, yielding (Δ _ρij). All of the explanatory variables are dummyvariables
except for Shared Trading Behavior (νxy) and Shared Fundamentals (Corr[ROEi;ROEj]). ĉe reported
coeﬃcients are from combining cross-sectional regressions for each decade, and standard errors, re-
ported in parentheses below the regression coeﬃcients, use the reshuﬄingmethodology described in
section ǉ.ǋ for each cross-section and assume the subsamples are independent. Statistical signiėcance
of the coeﬃcient relative to the null hypothesis of zero is denoted using asterisks, where * indicates
signiėcance at the Ǎƻ level and ** indicates signiėcance at the ǉƻ level.
(ǉ) (Ǌ) (ǋ) (ǌ)
ǉǑǏǈ’s Decade Dummy Ǒ.ǋǈ* ǎ.Ǐǈ ǎ.ǑǍ ǎ.ǎǊ
(ǋ.ǐǎ) (ǌ.ǊǊ) (ǋ.ǑǑ) (ǋ.ǑǏ)
ǉǑǐǈ’s Decade Dummy ǉ.Ǐǉ ǉ.ǈǋ Ǌ.ǋǋ ǉ.ǑǏ
(ǋ.ǋǉ) (ǋ.ǋǏ) (ǋ.ǍǏ) (ǋ.Ǎǉ)
ǉǑǑǈ’s Decade Dummy Ǎ.ǈǉ ǌ.ǑǍ ǌ.ǎǉ ǌ.ǏǊ
(Ǌ.ǎǐ) (Ǌ.ǐǉ) (Ǌ.ǎǍ) (Ǌ.ǏǍ)
Ǌǈǈǈ’s Decade Dummy ǉ.Ǐǌ ǌ.ǑǏ ǋ.Ǒǌ Ǎ.ǊǊ
(ǋ.ǉǐ) (ǋ.ǎǊ) (ǋ.Ǎǐ) (ǋ.Ǐǎ)
Shared Trading Behavior (νij) -ǈ.Ǌǌ -ǈ.Ǌǉ
(ǈ.ǉǋ) (ǈ.ǉǋ)
Same Exchange -ǈ.Ǐǈ -ǈ.ǐǑ
(ǈ.ǌǐ) (ǈ.ǎǈ)
Same Size Quintile -ǈ.ǈǏ -ǈ.ǉǋ
(ǈ.ǉǏ) (ǈ.Ǌǐ)
Same Be/MEDecile ǈ.ǉǋ ǈ.Ǌǎ
(ǈ.Ǌǌ) (ǈ.ǉǑ)
Shared Fundamentals (Corr[ROEi;ROEj]) ǈ.Ǒǌ** ǈ.Ǎǎ*
(ǈ.Ǌǋ) (ǈ.ǊǊ)
Same Sector ǉ.ǎǉ** ǉ.ǐǋ*
(ǈ.ǌǋ) (ǈ.ǌǋ)
Same Industry ǈ.Ǒǈ ǈ.ǈǌ
(ǈ.ǌǏ) (ǈ.ǎǋ)
Same Subindustry ǉ.Ǌǈ* ǉ.Ǎǈ
(ǈ.Ǎǐ) (ǈ.Ǒǋ)
Observations Ǐ,ǉǌǌ,ǐǉǏ Ǌ,Ǌǈǐ,ǎǎǊ ǌ,ǋǊǌ,ǌǎǎ ǉ,Ǒǌǎ,ǉǍǎ
ǋǎ
Although none of the explanatory variables identiėed as signiėcant in the prior
regression change drastically, most of their eﬀects are more muted. For example, in
the second regression speciėcation the coeﬃcient on the shared trading behavior
variable previously had a coeﬃcient of -ǈ.ǐǊ and a t-statistic of -ǎ.ǌ, but this now
drops to a coeﬃcient of -ǈ.Ǌǌ and an associated t-statistic of -ǉ.ǐǋ. It might be that
much of the temporary impact captured by this variable corrects itself in the
subsequent week, which is excluded in the calculation of Δ _ρ, or it may be that the
shared trading behavior variable also proxies for liquidity.
ĉe other main explanatory variable, measuring correlation in shared
fundamentals, sees a much more moderate decrease in magnitude aěer adjusting for
microstructure and also remains highly statistically signiėcant. Its coeﬃcient drops
from ǉ.ǊǏ to ǈ.Ǒǌ.
In the fourth regression speciėcation on Table ǉ.Ǐ where all explanatory variables
are included, the coeﬃcients are generally smaller than they were in Table ǉ.Ǎ. ĉe
only dummy variable that could be considered statistically diﬀerent from zero with
greater than ǑǍƻ conėdence is the measure of ėrms being in the same GICS sector.
ĉe assumption that long-horizon and short-horizon correlations should be
equivalent comes from equation (ǉ.ǐ) where past returns are assumed not to predict
the future. No arbitrage assumptions in asset pricing theory suggest that this should
be true for conditional moments, but not necessarily true for unconditional measures
of volatility and correlation. Cochrane (ǉǑǑǉ) emphasizes this point, showing how
unconditional return predictability does not reject rational pricing models outright
and are exactly what we could expect to see in macroeconomic models where
ǋǏ
discount rates vary over time due to changing growth prospects or risk preferences.
ĉe same principle holds true in our analysis. Our null hypothesis would be
rejected by a broad class of models that generate time variation in the price of equity
risk. Let’s consider what we would expect to see in a standard model of this type. In a
one-factor model where the expected returns to stocks are driven by their exposures
to the aggregate stock market, time variation in expected market returns would imply
that some of the short-horizon price correlation between stocks is driven by their
common exposure to changes in aggregate return expectations. ĉis common
component of comovement becomes less prominent as time horizons increase. We
would then expect that long-horizon correlations across all ėrms should, on average,
be lower than short-horizon correlations. Instead, the data shows the opposite.
Additionally, we can speculate how aggregate market predictability might explain
cross-sectional variation in Δρ. Pairs of ėrms with large diﬀerences in their betas to
priced risk factors should have lower short-run correlations relative to their long-run
correlations, while ėrms with similar exposures should less of a diﬀerence. If we
include the absolute value of their beta diﬀerences in our regressions, we should get a
positive coeﬃcient.
I test this hypothesis by estimating ėrm betas for the three factor model of Fama
and French (ǉǑǑǊ) prior to each decade. With ėrm-level coeﬃcients for the market
portfolio βMKT, for the size spread portfolio, βSMB, and for the value spread portfolio,
βHML. I calculate the absolute value of the diﬀerence in their estimated betas. ĉese
are considered as an additional explanatory variable in the cross sectional regressions
of the diﬀerences in long-horizon and short-horizon correlations adjusted for
ǋǐ
Table ǉ.ǐ: Regressions of Δ _ρij on Diﬀerences in Risk Factor Exposures
In the regressions below, the variables labeled as the jβi;XYZ   βj;XYZj are the absolute value of the
diﬀerences in the ex ante estimated beta on risk factorXYZ for the pair of ėrms. ĉese are included in
cross-sectional regressions with other explanatory variables found to be predictive of Δ _ρij. ĉe stan-
dard errors, reported in parentheses below the regression coeﬃcients, use the reshuﬄing methodol-
ogy described in section ǉ.ǋ. Statistical signiėcance of the coeﬃcient relative to the null hypothesis
of zero is denoted using asterisks, where * indicates signiėcance at the Ǎƻ level and ** indicates sig-
niėcance at the ǉƻ level.
(ǉ) (Ǌ) (ǋ) (ǌ)
ǉǑǏǈ’s Decade Dummy Ǒ.ǈǌ* ǐ.Ǎǐ* Ǐ.ǋǎ ǐ.ǋǐ*
(ǋ.Ǒǐ) (ǋ.ǑǏ) (ǌ.ǌǐ) (ǋ.Ǒǈ)
ǉǑǐǈ’s Decade Dummy Ǌ.ǊǏ Ǌ.ǊǍ Ǌ.ǉǐ Ǌ.ǑǏ
(ǋ.ǌǊ) (ǋ.ǋǈ) (ǋ.ǌǈ) (ǋ.ǍǍ)
ǉǑǑǈ’s Decade Dummy Ǐ.Ǐǈ** Ǐ.Ǎǐ* ǎ.Ǐǈ* ǎ.Ǌǎ*
(Ǌ.Ǒǌ) (Ǌ.ǑǍ) (ǋ.ǉǉ) (ǋ.ǈǏ)
Ǌǈǈǈ’s Decade Dummy Ǎ.ǋǉ Ǎ.ǐǍ Ǎ.ǏǏ ǎ.ǌǋ
(ǋ.ǎǍ) (ǋ.Ǐǋ) (ǌ.ǈǈ) (ǋ.ǑǏ)
Shared Trading Behavior (νij) -ǈ.ǉǎ -ǈ.ǊǊ -ǈ.ǉǐ
(ǈ.ǉǈ) (ǈ.ǉǋ) (ǈ.ǉǋ)
Same Exchange -ǉ.Ǌǉ*
(ǈ.ǍǑ)
Shared Fundamentals (Corr[ROEi;ROEj]) ǈ.Ǒǉ** ǈ.ǍǍ*
(ǈ.ǊǊ) (ǈ.ǊǊ)
Same Sector ǉ.ǎǋ**
(ǈ.ǌǌ)
Same Industry ǈ.ǈǊ
(ǈ.ǎǋ)
Same Subindustry ǉ.ǊǑ
(ǈ.Ǒǈ)
jβi;MKT   βj;MKTj -ǈ.ǈǎ -ǈ.ǈǋ -ǈ.ǌǋ -ǈ.ǋǎ
(ǈ.ǋǌ) (ǈ.ǋǍ) (ǈ.Ǎǉ) (ǈ.ǍǊ)
jβi;SMB   βj;SMBj -ǈ.ǎǐ** -ǈ.ǐǈ** -ǈ.ǋǐ -ǈ.Ǎǎ
(ǈ.Ǌǎ) (ǈ.Ǌǎ) (ǈ.ǋǋ) (ǈ.ǋǋ)
jβi;HML   βj;HMLj -ǈ.ǎǋ* -ǈ.ǎǌ* -ǈ.Ǎǐ -ǈ.ǌǋ
(ǈ.Ǌǎ) (ǈ.Ǌǐ) (ǈ.ǋǌ) (ǈ.ǋǍ)
Observations ǎ,ǉǌǐ,ǍǏǌ ǌ,ǋǑǏ,ǋǊǎ Ǌ,ǊǈǏ,Ǎǈǐ ǉ,ǑǌǏ,Ǐǎǐ
ǋǑ
microstructure eﬀects, Δ _ρ:
ĉe regression results are summarized in Table ǉ.ǐ. ĉe ėrst speciėcation, with the
diﬀerence in the betas on risk factors as the only explanatory variables shows the
regression coeﬃcients are negative–the opposite of our prediction. ĉe coeﬃcient
for the diﬀerence in βMKT is eﬀectively zero.
In the other three regression speciėcations considered, the explanatory variables
previously found to be signiėcant are also included. ĉe coeﬃcients on the new
variables measuring diﬀerences in risk factor loadings remain negative and hardly
precise enough to distinguish from zero. It appears that time variation in discount
rates in loadings on known risk factors may explain a small portion of the diﬀerences
in long-horizon versus short-horizon correlations across this sample of US stocks, but
this is not the sort of mean-reverting behavior commonly modeled and it is primarily
driven by SMB and HML, not the aggregate equity market.
It should also be noted that the regression coeﬃcients on the diﬀerences in risk
exposures are certainly underestimated because of estimation error. ĉis aĨenuation
bias similarly aﬀects the shared trading behavior and ROE correlation variables,
which likely have even more estimation error than the betas on the risk factors.
ǉ.Ǎ IŁńŀĽķĵŉĽŃłň ĺŃŇ AňňĹŉ PŇĽķĹň ĵłĸ IłŋĹňŉŃŇň
ĉere is nothing about the proposed framework analyzing correlation and time
horizon that is speciėc to the returns of individual stocks. In a traditional asset
pricing context, we can consider how the time horizon will aﬀect betas on risk
factors, and hence, asset pricing.
ǌǈ
As a ėrst pass, consider how the return horizon aﬀects the volatilities and
correlations of the three factors of the Fama-French model. ĉese are ploĨed in
Figure ǉ.ǋ using the same time period as in the other empirical analysis, ǉǑǏǈ-ǊǈǈǑ.
Since these factor returns coexist for a much longer history than the typical equity
security, we can consider long-term horizons that extend much longer than ǎ months.
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Figure ǉ.ǋ: Annualized Volatility and Correlations for Risk Factors, ǉǑǏǈ-ǊǈǈǑ
ǌǉ
Looking at the top axis, ploĨing the estimate of volatility as a function of time
horizon, the most striking feature is the upward sloping relationship for SMB and
HML.ĉe positive relationship between volatility and time horizon suggest that
returns to the SMB and HML portfolios exhibit positive autocorrelation–at least at
horizons in the range of ǈ-Ǌ years. ĉis is exactly the sort of behavior that would lead
to the negative regression coeﬃcients in the regression presented in Table ǉ.ǐ. At the
two year horizon, the HML volatility begins to decrease while the volatility of the
SMB portfolio continues to increase for return horizons as long ǎ or Ǐ years. ĉis is
indicative of momentum, rather than mean reversion, over these horizons.
Consistent with previous research (Fama and French, ǉǑǐǐ), the broad market
portfolio shows relatively liĨle predictability for horizons shorter than one year, with
a relatively constant relationship between volatility and time horizon. ĉis would
explain why aggregate market exposure explains liĨle of the cross-sectional
diﬀerences in Δρ^ij at the stock level. ĉe well-documented tendency for the aggregate
stock market to exhibit mean reversion over long horizons begins to kick in as the
horizon increases beyond one year.
ĉe pairwise correlations are ploĨed on the lower axis in Figure ǉ.ǋ. ĉe SMB and
HML portfolios have a negative relationship with the market portfolio over short and
medium horizons, but these correlations tend toward zero as the return horizon
lengthens. Perhaps the most striking relationship is the correlation between SMB and
HML.While these portfolios seem to have uncorrelated returns over short horizons,
the correlation coeﬃcient increases signiėcantly over long horizons. Repeating the
caveat that estimates of long-horizon correlations can be noisy, the initial evidence
ǌǊ
suggests that SMB and HMLmay be distinct risks over short time horizons but
contain similar fundamental risks that become evident over longer time periods.
At the same time, the SMB and HML portfolios are not nearly as aĨractive to a
long-horizon investor. While at horizons of a few days these portfolios seem to have
half the volatility as the market portfolio, the volatility almost doubles when the
horizon stretches to a few years. Worse still, these portfolios that previously seemed
to oﬀer good diversiėcation relative to the aggregate equity market see their
correlations increase signiėcantly.
IŁńŀĽķĵŉĽŃłň ĺŃŇ SļŃŇŉ-TĹŇŁ TŇĵĸĹŇň
While buy-and-hold investors may have poor measures of risk calculated from
short-horizon returns, active investors with a short-term focus (or even long-term
investors who rebalance frequently) may ėnd short-term comovement estimates
appropriately capture the portfolio risks that maĨer to them. Although the
underlying driver of short-horizon comovement may be fads rather than
fundamentals, it accurately reĚects the one-period risks they face.
However, the relationship between correlation and time horizon reveals how one
period aﬀects the next. As equation (ǉ.ǐ) emphasizes, correlation diﬀerences imply
predictability. With predictability, there is an implied trading strategy that should be
aĨractive to tactical traders.
In this section, I will show the historical performance of a simple trading strategy
based on the comovement paĨerns identiėed. ĉis exercise provides additional
evidence that the comovement paĨerns established in the empirical analysis cannot
ǌǋ
be easily explained by established risk factors. It also frames the results in a seĨing
familiar to other empirical studies of asset (mis)pricing where a portfolio formation
rule generates a trading strategy.
For beĨer or for worse, this trading strategy based on comovement paĨerns has no
anchor suggesting the true fundamental value of any particular asset. ĉe intuition is
roughly equivalent to that of a ”pairs trading” strategy (albeit with a much longer
horizon). When the prices of two assets with similar fundamentals diverge, the
strategy puts on a long-short convergence trade. ĉis comes with some danger. A
more savvy investor would consider the actual news and prices rather than pursue
what Stein (ǊǈǈǑ) terms an ”unanchored” trading scheme. In that sense, the trading
strategy is empirically instructive but not recommended.
A ňĽŁńŀĹ ŉŇĵĸĽłĻ ňĽĻłĵŀ
ĉe proposed trading signal is derived from the regression relationships for the short
run return
E

rt;ijrt;j

= E [rt;i] + ρij (ƥ)
σ i
σj
 
rt;j   E

rt;j

(ǉ.Ǌǉ)
and the long run return
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of rt;i conditional on rt;j. If we assume that the volatility ratio ( σ iσj) is roughly constant
and the unconditional expected return for each stock is approximately equal, then we
ǌǌ
can subtract (ǉ.Ǌǉ) from (ǉ.ǊǊ) and forecast the excess return for the future
E
"
H ƥX
τ=ƥ
ri;t+τjrt;j
#
  E
"
H ƥX
τ=ƥ
ri;t+τ
#
= Δρij
σ i
σj
rt;j: (ǉ.Ǌǋ)
WithN assets, equation (ǉ.Ǌǋ) will yieldN  ƥ univariate forecasts. For simplicity,
the trading signal will weight them equally.³ ĉe signal is then deėned as
Xi;t =
ƥ
N  ƥ
X
j6=i
Δρi;j
σ i
σ j
rt;j: (ǉ.Ǌǌ)
EŁńĽŇĽķĵŀ ĽŁńŀĹŁĹłŉĵŉĽŃł
In the empirical implementation of the trading strategy, the universe of ėrms will be
determined in much the same way as before, comprising the Ǌǈǈǈ largest ėrms by
market cap over the ǌǈ year sample. ĉe set of ėrms will be updated annually, using
data available the ėnal business day in December of the previous year.
To predict the future diﬀerence in long-run and short-run correlation (Δρi;j) I use
the two main variables presented previously, where investor trading behavior is
proxied by the correlation in bid-ask bounce, νij, and fundamentals are measured as
the correlation of the return on equity, Corr

ROEi;ROEj

. ĉe diﬀerence between
long-horizon and short-horizon correlation that determines the trading signal for
forecasting in (ǉ.Ǌǌ) can be constructed without too much fear of overėĨing from
the in-sample regression results by simply taking the equal-weighted diﬀerence:
Δρi;j  Corr

ROEi;ROEj
  νij.
³An alternative would be to create the multivariate optimal forecast with GLS weights
ǌǍ
ĉese two variables are updated annually and implemented in portfolios formed
each January using information that would be available in December. ĉe volatility
ratio σ iσj is also updated annually, and is calculated as the standard deviation of the
weekly returns over the prior three years. Shorter histories are used for any ėrm
where three years are not available, and outliers are winsorized at the Ǎth and ǑǍth
percentiles.
SĽĻłĵŀ ńĹŇňĽňŉĹłķĹ
ĉere remains the question of how long this signal should persist. ĉe empirical
analysis arbitrarily chose the long horizon to beH = Ʀƪ weeks but did not suggest
whether the correlation diﬀerences resolved in a maĨer of weeks or if the correlations
continued to evolve even aěer the six-month window. In the context of this trading
strategy, this question is analogous to asking how long the signal Xt is expected to
forecast excess returns.
In the framework of the simple model of fads and fundamentals presented earlier,
we want to know the decay rates δd and δf. While there is likely a high degree of
variation in the characteristics of fads and fundamentals that aﬀect the US equity
market, it is interesting to take the simpliėed model and estimate the half-life of the
signal.
We can do this by building a simply portfolio rule, sorting stocks into quintiles
based on their signal Xt and constructing a long-short portfolio that buys the highest
quintile and sells the lowest quintile. ĉe event time returns to this portfolio, shown
in Figure ǉ.ǌ will show the degree to which the information persists.
ǌǎ
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Figure ǉ.ǌ: Event Time Returns to Xt Components of the L/S Portfolio
Each column in the bar chart represents the average weekly return resulting from a
portfolio formed at time t = Ƥ. ĉe ėrst column, colored white, represents the return
that would be received from buying at the close of the formation week. To be as
conservative as possible in representing the returns to a trading strategy, this ėrst
week is omiĨed from the trading strategy results shown in the following subsection.
Even discarding this ėrst week, there is a paĨern of positive returns that continues at
lags of up to two months.
BĵķĿŉĹňŉ ŇĹňŊŀŉň
Given the matrix Δβ, the trading signal in (ǉ.Ǌǌ) is obtained each week by
multiplying Δβ by the returns from the recent past. For the purposes of this backtest,
I will consider the recent past to be the returns from the past ǎ weeks, omiĨing the
ǌǏ
most recent weeks’ returns to avoid the gaining credit for returns previously shown to
be partially aĨributed to microstructure eﬀects. ĉe results without lagging the signal
by one week would be extraordinarily large.
I generate calendar time backtest returns by sorting stocks each week into
equal-weighted quintile portfolios based on their respective trading signal predicting
future returns. ĉe Ǌǈǈ ėrms with the highest factor values, populating portfolio QǍ,
are predicted to outperform the quintiles with lower factor values, particularly those
in the quintile with the lowest factor values, Qǉ. A long/short portfolio is created by
taking a long position in the ėrms in QǍ and an equivalent short position in the ėrms
comprising Qǉ.
I will also show event time returns that would result from creating the trading
signals using only one week returns over a range of lags. ĉis will give an indication of
how fast the predicted components of excess and insuﬃcient comovement are
corrected in asset prices. ĉis will also conėrm the choice of using a six week window
in the calendar time backtest is both sensible and robust to alternative speciėcations.
TŇĵĸĽłĻ SŉŇĵŉĹĻŏ RĹňŊŀŉň
ĉe annual returns to the long/short portfolio are graphed in Figure ǉ.Ǎ. ĉe
performance of this long/short portfolio is relatively consistent over time and does
not show a tendency to decrease over time. ĉis is true even in the most recent
decade when you might expect that trading by hedge funds, especially so-called
statistical arbitrage funds, might employ similar strategies and erode the returns
available to a comovement based strategy.
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Figure ǉ.Ǎ: Annual Calendar Time Returns to L/S Portfolio
ĉe strong recent performance is also surprising given the fact that, on average,
short-horizon and long-horizon comovement have converged. ĉis result suggests
that the dispersion of comovement diﬀerences across ėrms remains large and
predictable even while the average is near zero. Looking again at the annual returns to
the strategy, the most proėtable of the ǌǈ years considered was Ǌǈǈǐ, with a return of
Ǌǐ.ǐƻ. Over the ǌǈ-year sample, the long/short portfolio generates an average annual
excess return of Ǎ.ǋƻ with a corresponding Sharpe Ratio of ǈ.ǎǍ.
ĉe weekly event time returns, shown in Figure ǉ.ǌ, provide additional insight on
the nature of the portfolio returns. ĉese event time returns only interact one week of
past returns (dated rt) to generate the signal vector Xt. ĉe event time graph displays
the mean return to the long/short portfolio traded various weeks into the future. You
can see that the t+ ƥ return is shaded in white. ĉis is because the week immediately
ǌǑ
following portfolio formation is excluded in the analysis, since some of that (very
large) return may be generated by temporary price impact and would not achievable.
ĉe returns from t+ Ʀ to t+ ƪ are shaded in dark blue. ĉis is to indicate that these
ėve weeks of returns are the ones used in the construction of the calendar time
long/short portfolios. Returns to all subsequent weeks are in light blue. From these
event returns, it appears that the predictive component of comovement identiėed by
these two signals generates declining abnormal returns for about ǉǈ weeks aěer
portfolio formation, and aěerwards, the returns seem indistinguishable from noise.
AĸľŊňŉĽłĻ ŉļĹ ķĵŀĹłĸĵŇ ŉĽŁĹ ŇĹŉŊŇłň ĺŃŇ ŇĽňĿ ĹŎńŃňŊŇĹň
ĉe average weekly excess returns alphas for the calendar time analysis of the ėve
quintile portfolios and the long/short portfolio are presented in Table ǉ.Ǒ. As would
be desired, there is a consistent paĨern of returns increasing by quintile. In the
unadjusted excess returns, the lowest quintile portfolio earns only ǈ.ǌǎ basis points
per week versus the ǐ.ǎ basis point average return of the highest quintile, which
corresponds to an annual return of ǈ.Ǌǌƻ. ĉe ǐ basis point weekly return of the
long/short portfolio has an associated t-statistic of ǋ.ǋǎ, indicating we can
conėdently reject the notion that the true excess return of the strategy is zero.
Table ǉ.Ǒ also reports the alphas for each portfolio aěer controlling for risk factors
known to generate positive returns. ĉese alphas are the intercept in the regression of
the weekly returns of risk factors on the returns to the quintile and long/short
portfolios. Four factor models are considered, and the Tuesday-to-Tuesday weekly
returns for each of the component risk factors are derived from the daily research
Ǎǈ
Table ǉ.Ǒ:Weekly Abnormal Returns (in bps) to Δβ Trading Strategy
ĉis table shows the calendar time portfolio abnormal returns, reported in basis points ( ǉ/ǉǈǈ th
of one percent). ĉe ėrst row shows the average weekly returns of the quintile portfolios and the
long/short (L/S) portfolio formed by going long the highest quintile with the highest signal values
(QǍ) and short the quintile portfolio with the lowest. Alpha is the intercept coeﬃcient from regress-
ing the weekly returns on various risk factors. ĉe return series of the risk factors and the risk free
rates are derived from the data provided by Ken French on his website. T-statistics are displayed in
brackets below each return coeﬃcient.
Factor Quintile L/S
(low) (high)
Qǉ QǊ Qǋ Qǌ QǍ QǍ-Qǉ
Excess Returns ǈ.ǌǎ Ǌ.Ǌǌ ǌ.ǋǎ ǎ.Ǎǌ ǐ.ǎǊ ǐ.ǉǎ
[ǈ.Ǌǎ] [ǉ.ǎǋ] [ǋ.ǊǍ] [ǌ.ǐǎ] [Ǎ.ǌǈ] [ǋ.ǋǎ]
ǉ-factor alpha -ǈ.ǌǐ ǌ.ǌǍ Ǐ.Ǐǐ Ǒ.ǏǊ Ǒ.ǑǍ ǉǈ.ǌǋ
(Mkt) [-ǈ.ǉǑ] [Ǌ.ǌǋ] [ǌ.ǋǑ] [Ǎ.ǋǉ] [ǌ.Ǌǈ] [ǌ.ǋǉ]
ǋ-factor alpha -ǌ.ǉǌ ǈ.ǈǏ Ǌ.ǐǐ ǌ.Ǐǉ Ǎ.ǎǍ Ǒ.ǏǑ
(...+ SMB, HML) [-Ǌ.ǉǈ] [ǈ.ǈǍ] [Ǌ.ǉǊ] [ǋ.ǌǊ] [ǋ.ǋǎ] [ǌ.ǈǊ]
ǌ-factor alpha ǈ.ǌǎ Ǌ.Ǌǌ ǌ.ǋǎ ǎ.Ǎǌ ǐ.ǎǊ ǐ.ǉǎ
(...+ UMD) [ǈ.Ǌǎ] [ǉ.ǎǋ] [ǋ.ǊǍ] [ǌ.ǐǎ] [Ǎ.ǌǈ] [ǋ.ǋǎ]
ǎ-factor alpha -ǎ.ǋǏ -ǈ.Ǌǐ Ǌ.ǉǊ Ǎ.ǑǊ Ǒ.ǈǋ ǉǍ.ǌǈ
(...+ STREV, LTREV) [-ǋ.Ǎǌ] [-ǈ.ǉǑ] [ǉ.Ǎǉ] [ǌ.ǉǐ] [Ǎ.ǋǏ] [ǎ.ǉǏ]
Ǎǉ
returns available on Ken French’s website⁴. ĉe ėrst two models include a ǉ-factor
model that controls for exposure to the value-weightedmarket index, and the ǋ-factor
alpha, that additionally includes the SMB and HML factors popularized by Fama and
French (ǉǑǑǊ).
In addition to these standard benchmarks, we might wonder if the returns to
portfolios based on comovement are related to momentum and reversal paĨerns
found to empirically generate positive returns in the cross-section of US equities. To
answer this, we can introduce two additional models, a ǌ-factor model including
Carhart’s (ǉǑǑǏ) momentum factor, and ėnally, a ǎ-factor model which additionally
includes short-term and long-term reversal paĨerns. ĉese reversal returns are
deėned by French to be the lagged one month return and the past Ǎ-year return
excluding the most recent year. Interestingly, this comovement trading strategy tends
to trade in the opposite direction of these reversal factors, making the alphas look
even more compelling. ĉe long/short portfolio, which averages ǐ.Ǌ basis points of
excess returns weekly, reports a ǎ-factor alpha of ǉǍ.ǌ basis points. Translated to an
annual time frequency, these risk adjusted returns would yield an average return of
ǐ.ǌƻ and a Sharpe Ratio of ǉ.ǈǋ.
CŃłķŀŊňĽŃł
Asset price comovement changes with time horizon. ĉe evidence is consistent with
a model where fads and information delays cause prices to temporarily deviate from
fundamentals. In particular, there is compelling evidence that investor trading
⁴hĨp://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html
ǍǊ
behavior and salient security characteristics are more important factors in
determining the correlation of US equity returns over short horizons while measures
of long-run fundamentals play a greater role in return correlations over longer
horizons.
I propose the diﬀerence between short-horizon and long-horizon comovement is a
natural metric for studying excess comovement. Measures of common trading
behavior and shared economic fundamentals show signiėcant power in explaining
cross-sectional diﬀerences in excess comovement across pairs of stocks. ĉey can also
form a successful trading strategy. A portfolio based on predictable diﬀerences in
stock correlations generates consistent excess returns not explained by risk exposures.
ĉemain implication for investors with a buy and hold strategy is that they may be
underestimating (or overestimating) the risk concentration of their portfolio if they
extrapolate comovement and volatility from short-horizon returns. ĉis also suggests
a degree of caution to ėnancial econometricians who propose the use of intra-day
data to estimate the covariance of security returns. It would seem that using ever
shorter return horizons to estimate second moments will likely capture a greater
degree of comovement driven by trading behavior rather than the fundamentals that
maĨer over longer horizons.
Although the empirical evidence presented here focuses on US equities, the
principle should apply just as much in other asset classes as well as in the broader
asset allocation decision. In fact, there is reason to believe diﬀerences in comovement
may be even larger across asset classes, as market segmentation may be more
pronounced. ĉe relationship between correlation and return horizon may identify
Ǎǋ
risks and opportunities that can arise as short-run comovement deviates from
long-run fundamentals.
Ǎǌ
We must include in the long-period cost a third term which
we might call the risk-cost to cover the unknown possibilities
of the actual yield diﬀering ěom the expected yield.
JohnMaynard Keynes
2
An Intertemporal CAPM
with Stochaﬆic Volatility
authored with John Campbell, Stefano Giglio and Christopher Polk
TļĹ ĺŊłĸĵŁĹłŉĵŀ ĽłňĽĻļŉ of intertemporal asset pricing theory is that long-term
investors should care just as much about the returns they earn on their invested
wealth as about the level of that wealth. In a simple model with a constant rate of
return, for example, the sustainable level of consumption is the return on wealth
multiplied by the level of wealth, and both terms in this product are equally
ǍǍ
important. In a more realistic model with time-varying investment opportunities,
conservative long-term investors will seek to hold “intertemporal hedges”, assets that
perform well when investment opportunities deteriorate. Such assets should deliver
lower average returns in equilibrium if they are priced from conservative long-term
investors’ ėrst-order conditions.
Since the seminal work of Merton (ǉǑǏǋ) on the intertemporal capital asset
pricing model (ICAPM), a large empirical literature has explored the relevance of
intertemporal considerations for the pricing of ėnancial assets in general, and the
cross-sectional pricing of stocks in particular. One strand of this literature uses the
approximate accounting identity of Campbell and Shiller (ǉǑǐǐa) and the
assumption that a representative investor has Epstein-Zin utility ( Epstein and Zin
ǉǑǐǑ) to obtain approximate closed-form solutions for the ICAPM’s risk prices
(Campbell ǉǑǑǋ). ĉese solutions can be implemented empirically if they are
combined with vector autoregressive (VAR) estimates of asset return dynamics
(Campbell ǉǑǑǎ). Campbell and Vuolteenaho (Ǌǈǈǌ), Campbell, Polk, and
Vuolteenaho (Ǌǈǉǈ), and Campbell, Giglio, and Polk (Ǌǈǉǉ) use this approach to
argue that value stocks outperform growth stocks on average because growth stocks
do well when the expected return on the aggregate stock market declines; in other
words, growth stocks have low risk premia because they are intertemporal hedges for
long-term investors.
A weakness of the papers cited above is that they ignore time-variation in the
volatility of stock returns. In general, investment opportunities may deteriorate either
because expected stock returns decline or because the volatility of stock returns
Ǎǎ
increases, and it is an empirical question which of these two types of intertemporal
risk have a greater eﬀect on asset returns. We address this weakness in this paper by
extending the approximate closed-form ICAPM to allow for stochastic volatility. ĉe
resulting model explains risk premia in the stock market using three priced risk
factors corresponding to three important aĨributes of aggregate market returns:
revisions in expected future cash Ěows, discount rates, and volatility. An aĨractive
characteristic of the model is that the prices of these three risk factors depend on only
one free parameter, the long-horizon investor’s coeﬃcient of risk aversion.
Since the long-horizon investor in our model cares mostly about persistent
changes in the investment opportunity set, there must be predictable variation in
long-run volatility for volatility risk to maĨer. Empirically, we implement our
methodology using a vector autoregression (VAR) including stock returns, realized
variance, and other ėnancial indicators that may be relevant for predicting returns
and risk. Our VAR reveals low-frequency movements in market volatility tied to the
default spread, the yield spread of low-rated over high-rated bonds. While this eﬀect
has received liĨle aĨention in the literature, we argue that it is sensible: Investors in
risky bonds perceive the long-run component of volatility and incorporate this
information when they set credit spreads, as risky bonds are short the option to
default. Moreover, we show that GARCH-based methods that ėlter only the
information in past returns in order to disentangle the short-run and long-run
volatility components miss this important low-frequency component.
With our novel model of long-run volatility in hand, we ėnd that growth stocks
have low average returns because they outperform not only when the expected stock
ǍǏ
return declines, but also when stock market volatility increases. ĉus growth stocks
hedge two types of deterioration in investment opportunities, not just one. In the
period since ǉǑǎǋ that creates the greatest empirical diﬃculties for the standard
CAPM, we ėnd that the three-beta model explains over ǎǑƻ of the cross-sectional
variation in average returns of ǊǍ portfolios sorted by size and book-to-market ratios.
ĉemodel is not rejected at the Ǎƻ level while the CAPM is strongly rejected. ĉe
implied coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion is an economically reasonable Ǒ.ǎǋ, in
contrast to the much larger estimate of Ǌǈ.Ǐǈ, which we get when we estimate a
comparable version of the two-beta CAPM of Campbell and Vuolteenaho (Ǌǈǈǌ)
using the same data.¹ ĉis success is due in large part to the inclusion of volatility
betas in the speciėcation. In particular, the spread in volatility betas in the
cross-section generates an annualized spread in average returns of ǎ.ǍǊƻ compared to
a comparable spread of ǋ.Ǒǈƻ and Ǌ.Ǌǌƻ for cash-Ěow and discount-rate betas.
We conėrm that our ėndings are robust by expanding the set of test portfolios in
two important dimensions. First, we show that our three-beta model not only
describes the cross-section of size- and book-to-market-sorted portfolios but also can
explain the average returns on risk-sorted portfolios. We examine risk-sorted
portfolios in response to the argument of Daniel and Titman (ǉǑǑǏ, ǊǈǉǊ) and
Lewellen, Nagel, and Shanken (Ǌǈǉǈ) that asset-pricing tests using only portfolios
sorted by characteristics known to be related to average returns, such as size and
value, can be misleading. As tests that include risk-sorted portfolios are unable to
reject our intertemporal CAPMwith stochastic volatility, we verify that the model’s
¹ĉe risk aversion estimate reported in Campbell and Vuolteenaho’s (Ǌǈǈǌ) paper is Ǌǐ.ǏǍ.
Ǎǐ
success is not simply due to the low-dimensional factor structure of the ǊǍ size- and
book-to-market-sorted portfolios. Speciėcally, we show that sorts on stocks’
pre-formation sensitivity to volatility news generate economically and statistically
signiėcant spread in both post-formation volatility beta and average returns in a
manner consistent with our model. Interestingly, in the post-ǉǑǎǋ period, sorts on
past CAPM beta generate liĨle spread in post-formation cash-Ěow betas, but
signiėcant spread in post-formation volatility betas. Since, in the three-beta model,
covariation with aggregate volatility news has a negative premium, the three-beta
model also explains why stocks with high past CAPM betas have oﬀered relatively
liĨle extra return in the post-ǉǑǎǋ sample.
Second, we show that our three-beta model can help explain average returns on
non-equity portfolios that are exposed to aggregate volatility risk. ĉese portfolios
include the S&P ǉǈǈ index straddle of Coval and Shumway (Ǌǈǈǉ), which is explicitly
designed to be highly correlated with aggregate volatility risk, and the risky bond
factor of Fama and French (ǉǑǑǋ), which should be sensitive to changes in aggregate
volatility since risky corporate debt is short the option to default. Consistent with
this intuition, we ėnd that compared to the volatility beta of a value-minus-growth
bet, the risky bond factor’s volatility beta is of the same order of magnitude while the
straddle’s volatility beta is more than ǋ times larger in absolute magnitude. ĉese
volatility betas are of the right sign to explain the abnormal CAPM returns of the
option and bond portfolios. Approximately ǋǐƻ of the average straddle return can be
aĨributed to its three ICAPM betas, based purely on model estimates from the
cross-section of equity returns. Additionally, when we price the joint cross-section of
ǍǑ
equity, bond, and straddle returns our intertemporal CAPMwith stochastic volatility
is not rejected at the Ǎ-percent level while the CAPM is strongly rejected.
Our work is complementary to recent research on the “long-run risk model” of
asset prices (Bansal and Yaron Ǌǈǈǌ) which can be traced back to insights in Kandel
and Stambaugh (ǉǑǑǉ). Both the approximate closed-form ICAPM and the long-run
risk model start with the ėrst-order conditions of an inėnitely lived Epstein-Zin
representative investor. As originally stated by Epstein and Zin (ǉǑǐǑ), these
ėrst-order conditions involve both aggregate consumption growth and the return on
the market portfolio of aggregate wealth.Campbell (ǉǑǑǋ) pointed out that the
intertemporal budget constraint could be used to substitute out consumption
growth, turning the model into a Merton-style ICAPM. Restoy andWeil (ǉǑǑǐ,
Ǌǈǉǉ) used the same logic to substitute out the market portfolio return, turning the
model into a generalized consumption CAPM in the style of Breeden (ǉǑǏǑ).
Kandel and Stambaugh (ǉǑǑǉ) were the ėrst researchers to study the implications
for asset returns of time-varying ėrst and second moments of consumption growth in
a model with a representative Epstein-Zin investor. Speciėcally, Kandel and
Stambaugh (ǉǑǑǉ) assumed a four-state Markov chain for the expected growth rate
and conditional volatility of consumption, and provided closed-form solutions for
important asset-pricing moments. In the spirit of Kandel and Stambaugh (ǉǑǑǉ),
Bansal and Yaron (Ǌǈǈǌ) added stochastic volatility to the Restoy-Weil model, and
subsequent research on the long-run risk model has increasingly emphasized the
importance of stochastic volatility for generating empirically plausible implications
from this model (Bansal, Kiku, and Yaron ǊǈǉǊ, Beeler and Campbell ǊǈǉǊ). In this
ǎǈ
paper we give the approximate closed-form ICAPM the same capability to handle
stochastic volatility that its cousin, the long-run risk model, already possesses.
One might ask whether there is any reason to work with an ICAPM rather than a
consumption-based model given that these models are derived from the same set of
assumptions. ĉe ICAPM developed in this paper has several advantages. First, it
describes risks as they appear to an investor who takes asset prices as given and
chooses consumption to satisfy his budget constraint. ĉis is the way risks appear to
individual agents in the economy, and it seems important for economists to
understand risks in the same way that market participants do rather than relying
exclusively on a macroeconomic perspective. Second, the ICAPM allows an
empirical analysis based on ėnancial proxies for the aggregate market portfolio rather
than on accurate measurement of aggregate consumption. While there are certainly
challenges to the accurate measurement of ėnancial wealth, ėnancial time series are
generally available on a more timely basis and over longer sample periods than
consumption series. ĉird, the ICAPM in this paper is Ěexible enough to allow
multiple state variables that can be estimated in a VAR system; it does not require
low-dimensional calibration of the sort used in the long-run risk literature. Finally,
the stochastic volatility process used here governs the volatility of all state variables,
including itself. We show that this assumption ėts ėnancial data reasonably well, and
it guarantees that stochastic volatility would always remain positive in a
continuous-time version of the model, a property that does not hold in most current
implementations of the long-run risk model.²
²Eraker (Ǌǈǈǐ) and Eraker and Shaliastovich (Ǌǈǈǐ) are exceptions.
ǎǉ
ĉe closest precursors to our work are unpublished papers by Chen (Ǌǈǈǋ) and
Sohn (Ǌǈǉǈ). Both papers explore the eﬀects of stochastic volatility on asset prices in
an ICAPM seĨing but make strong assumptions about the covariance structure of
various news terms when deriving their pricing equations. Chen (Ǌǈǈǋ) assumes
constant covariances between shocks to the market return (and powers of those
shocks) and news about future expected market return variance. Sohn (Ǌǈǉǈ) makes
two strong assumptions about asset returns and consumption growth, speciėcally
that all assets have zero covariance with news about future consumption growth
volatility and that the conditional contemporaneous correlation between the market
return and consumption growth is constant through time. Duﬀee (ǊǈǈǍ) presents
evidence against the laĨer assumption. It is in any case unaĨractive to make
assumptions about consumption growth in an ICAPM that does not require accurate
measurement of consumption.
Chen estimates a VAR with a GARCHmodel to allow for time variation in the
volatility of return shocks, restricting market volatility to depend only on its past
realizations and not those of the other state variables. His empirical analysis has liĨle
success in explaining the cross-section of stock returns. Sohn uses a similar but more
sophisticated GARCHmodel for market volatility and tests how well short-run and
long-run risk components from the GARCH estimation can explain the returns of
various stock portfolios, comparing the results to factors previously shown to be
empirically successful. In contrast, our paper incorporates the volatility process
directly in the ICAPM, allowing heteroskedasticity to aﬀect and to be predicted by all
state variables, and showing how the price of volatility risk is pinned down by the
ǎǊ
time-series structure of the model along with the investor’s coeﬃcient of risk
aversion.
A working paper by Bansal, Kiku, Shaliastovich and Yaron (ǊǈǉǊ),
contemporaneous with our own, explores the eﬀects of stochastic volatility in the
long-run risk model. Like us, they ėnd stochastic volatility to be an important feature
in the time series of equity returns. ĉeir work puts greater emphasis on the implied
consumption dynamics while we focus on the cross-sectional pricing implications of
exposure to volatility news. More fundamentally, there are diﬀerences in the
underlying models. ĉey assume that the stochastic process driving volatility is
homoskedastic, and in their cross-sectional analysis they impose that changes in the
equity risk premium are driven only by the conditional variance of the stock market.
ĉe diﬀerent modeling assumptions account for our contrasting empirical results; we
show that volatility risk is very important in explaining the cross-section of stock
returns while they ėnd it has liĨle impact on cross-sectional diﬀerences in risk premia.
Stochastic volatility has, of course, been explored in other branches of the ėnance
literature. For example, Chacko and Viceira (ǊǈǈǍ) and Liu (ǊǈǈǏ) show how
stochastic volatility aﬀects the optimal portfolio choice of long-term investors.
Chacko and Viceira assume an AR(ǉ) process for volatility and argue that
movements in volatility are not persistent enough to generate large intertemporal
hedging demands. Campbell and Hentschel (ǉǑǑǊ), Calvet and Fisher (ǊǈǈǏ), and
Eraker andWang (Ǌǈǉǉ) argue that volatility shocks will lower aggregate stock prices
by increasing expected returns, if they do not aﬀect cash Ěows. ĉe strength of this
volatility feedback eﬀect depends on the persistence of the volatility process. Coval
ǎǋ
and Shumway (Ǌǈǈǉ), Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (Ǌǈǈǎ), and Adrian and
Rosenberg (Ǌǈǈǐ) present evidence that shocks to market volatility are priced risk
factors in the cross-section of stock returns, but they do not develop any theory to
explain the risk prices for these factors.
ĉere is also an enormous literature in ėnancial econometrics on modeling and
forecasting time-varying volatility. Since Engle’s (ǉǑǐǊ) seminal paper on ARCH,
much of the literature has focused on variants of the univariate GARCHmodel
(Bollerslev ǉǑǐǎ), in which return volatility is modeled as a function of past shocks to
returns and of its own lags (see Poon and Granger (Ǌǈǈǋ) and Andersen et al. (Ǌǈǈǎ)
for recent surveys). More recently, realized volatility from high-frequency data has
been used to estimate stochastic volatility processes (Barndorﬀ-Nielsen and
Shephard ǊǈǈǊ, Andersen et al. Ǌǈǈǋ). ĉe use of realized volatility has improved the
modeling and forecasting of volatility, including its long-run component; however,
this literature has primarily focused on the information content of high-frequency
intra-daily return data. ĉis allows very precise measurement of volatility, but at the
same time, given data availability constraints, limits the potential to use long time
series to learn about long-run movements in volatility. In our paper, we measure
realized volatility only with daily data, but augment this information with other
ėnancial time series that reveal information investors have about underlying volatility
components.
A much smaller literature has, like us, looked directly at the information in other
variables concerning future volatility. In early work, Schwert (ǉǑǐǑ) links movements
in stock market volatility to various indicators of economic activity, particularly the
ǎǌ
price-earnings ratio and the default spread, ėnding relatively weak results. Engle,
Ghysels and Sohn (ǊǈǈǑ) study the eﬀect of inĚation and industrial production
growth on volatility, ėnding a signiėcant link between the two, especially at long
horizons. Campbell and Taksler (Ǌǈǈǋ) look at the cross-sectional link between
corporate bond yields and equity volatility, emphasizing that bond yields respond to
idiosyncratic ėrm-level volatility as well as aggregate volatility. Two recent papers,
Paye (ǊǈǉǊ) and Christiansen et al. (ǊǈǉǊ), look at larger sets of potential predictors
of volatility, that include the default spread and/or valuation ratios, to study which
ones have predictive power for quarterly realized variance. ĉe former, in a standard
regression framework, ėnds that a few variables, that include the commercial paper to
Treasury spread and the default spread, contain useful information for predicting
volatility. ĉe laĨer uses BayesianModel Averaging to determine which variables are
most important for predicting quarterly volatility, and documents the importance of
the default spread and valuation ratios in forecasting short-run volatility.
Ǌ.ǉ Ał IłŉĹŇŉĹŁńŃŇĵŀMŃĸĹŀŌĽŉļ SŉŃķļĵňŉĽķ VŃŀĵŉĽŀĽŉŏ
AňňĹŉ ńŇĽķĽłĻ ŌĽŉļ ŉĽŁĹ ŋĵŇŏĽłĻ ŇĽňĿ
Preferences
We begin by assuming a representative agent with Epstein-Zin preferences. We
write the value function as
Vt =

(ƥ  δ)C
ƥ γ
θ
t + δ
 
Et

Vƥ γt+ƥ
ƥ=θ θƥ γ
; (Ǌ.ǉ)
ǎǍ
whereCt is consumption and the preference parameters are the discount factor δ; risk
aversion γ, and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution ψ. For convenience, we
deėne θ = (ƥ  γ)=(ƥ  ƥ=ψ).
ĉe corresponding stochastic discount factor (SDF) can be wriĨen as
Mt+ƥ =
 
δ

Ct
Ct+ƥ
ƥ=ψ!θ Wt   Ct
Wt+ƥ
ƥ θ
; (Ǌ.Ǌ)
whereWt is the market value of the consumption stream owned by the agent,
including current consumption Ct.³ ĉe log return on wealth is
rt+ƥ = ln (Wt+ƥ= (Wt   Ct)), the log value of wealth tomorrow divided by reinvested
wealth today. ĉe log SDF is therefore
mt+ƥ = θ ln δ   θψΔct+ƥ + (θ   ƥ) rt+ƥ: (Ǌ.ǋ)
A convenient identity
ĉe gross return to wealth can be wriĨen
ƥ+ Rt+ƥ =
Wt+ƥ
Wt   Ct =

Ct
Wt   Ct

Ct+ƥ
Ct

Wt+ƥ
Ct+ƥ

; (Ǌ.ǌ)
expressing it as the product of the current consumption payout, the growth in
consumption, and the future price of a unit of consumption.
We ėnd it convenient to work in logs. We deėne the log value of reinvested wealth
per unit of consumption as zt = ln ((Wt   Ct) =Ct), and the future value of a
³ĉis notational convention is not consistent in the literature. Some authors exclude current
consumption from the deėnition of current wealth.
ǎǎ
consumption claim as ht+ƥ = ln (Wt+ƥ=Ct+ƥ), so that the log return is:
rt+ƥ =  zt + Δct+ƥ + ht+ƥ: (Ǌ.Ǎ)
Heuristically, the return on wealth is negatively related to the current value of
reinvested wealth and positively related to consumption growth and the future value
of wealth. ĉe last term in equation (Ǌ.Ǎ) will capture the eﬀects of intertemporal
hedging on asset prices, hence the choice of the notation ht+ƥ for this term.
ĉe ICAPM
We assume that asset returns are jointly conditionally lognormal, but we allow
changing conditional volatility so we are careful to write second moments with time
subscripts to indicate that they can vary over time. Under this standard assumption,
the expected return on any asset must satisfy
Ƥ = ln Et expfmt+ƥ + ri;t+ƥg = Et [mt+ƥ + ri;t+ƥ] + ƥƦVart [mt+ƥ + ri;t+ƥ] ; (Ǌ.ǎ)
and the risk premium on any asset is given by
Etri;t+ƥ   rf;t + ƥƦVartrt+ƥ =  Covt [mt+ƥ; ri;t+ƥ] : (Ǌ.Ǐ)
ĉe convenient identity (Ǌ.Ǎ) can be used to write the log SDF (Ǌ.ǋ) without
reference to consumption growth:
mt+ƥ = θ ln δ   θψ zt +
θ
ψ
ht+ƥ   γrt+ƥ: (Ǌ.ǐ)
ǎǏ
Since the ėrst two terms in (Ǌ.Ǎ) are known at time t, only the laĨer two terms appear
in the conditional covariance in (Ǌ.Ǐ). We obtain an ICAPM pricing equation that
relates the risk premium on any asset to the asset’s covariance with the wealth return
and with shocks to future consumption claim values:
Etri;t+ƥ   rf;t + ƥƦVartrt+ƥ = γCovt [ri;t+ƥ; rt+ƥ] 
θ
ψ
Covt [ri;t+ƥ; ht+ƥ] (Ǌ.Ǒ)
Return and risk shocks in the ICAPM
To beĨer understand the intertemporal hedging component ht+ƥ, we proceed in
two steps. First, we approximate the relationship of ht+ƥ and zt+ƥ by taking a loglinear
approximation about z:
ht+ƥ  κ + ρzt+ƥ (Ǌ.ǉǈ)
where the loglinearization parameter ρ = exp(z)=(ƥ+ exp(z))  ƥ  C=W.
Second, we apply the general pricing equation (Ǌ.ǎ) to the wealth portfolio itself
(seĨing ri;t+ƥ = rt+ƥ), and use the convenient identity (Ǌ.Ǎ) to substitute out
consumption growth from this expression. Rearranging, we can write the variable zt
as
zt = ψ ln δ + (ψ   ƥ)Etrt+ƥ + Etht+ƥ + ψθ
ƥ
Ʀ
Vart [mt+ƥ + rt+ƥ] : (Ǌ.ǉǉ)
ǎǐ
ĉird, we combine these expressions to obtain the innovation in ht+ƥ:
ht+ƥ   Etht+ƥ = ρ(zt+ƥ   Etzt+ƥ)
= (Et+ƥ   Et)ρ
0B@ (ψ   ƥ)rt+Ʀ + ht+Ʀ
+ ψθ
ƥ
ƦVart+ƥ [mt+Ʀ + rt+Ʀ]
1CA : (Ǌ.ǉǊ)
Solving forward to an inėnite horizon,
ht+ƥ   Etht+ƥ = (ψ   ƥ)(Et+ƥ   Et)
1X
j=ƥ
ρjrt+ƥ+j
+
ƥ
Ʀ
ψ
θ
(Et+ƥ   Et)
1X
j=ƥ
ρjVart+j

mt+ƥ+j + rt+ƥ+j

= (ψ   ƥ)NDR;t+ƥ + ƥƦ
ψ
θ
NRISK;t+ƥ: (Ǌ.ǉǋ)
ĉe second equality follows Campbell and Vuolteenaho (Ǌǈǈǌ) and uses the
notationNDR (“news about discount rates”) for revisions in expected future returns.
In a similar spirit we write revisions in expectations of future risk (the variance of the
future log return plus the log stochastic discount factor) asNRISK.
Finally, we substitute back into the intertemporal model (Ǌ.Ǒ):
Etri;t+ƥ   rf;t + ƥƦVartri;t+ƥ = γCovt [ri;t+ƥ;NCF;t+ƥ]
+Covt [ri;t+ƥ; NDR;t+ƥ]
  ƥ
Ʀ
Covt [ri;t+ƥ;NRISK;t+ƥ] : (Ǌ.ǉǌ)
ĉis comes from the classic expression expressing the risk premium as risk
ǎǑ
aversion γ times covariance with the current market return, plus (γ   ƥ) times
covariance with news about future market returns, minus one half covariance with
risk. ĉis is an extension of the ICAPM as wriĨen by Campbell (ǉǑǑǋ), with no
reference to consumption or the elasticity of intertemporal substitution ψ:⁴ When
the investor’s risk aversion is greater than ǉ, assets which hedge aggregate discount
rates (Covt [ri;t+ƥ;NDR;t+ƥ] < Ƥ) or aggregate risk (Covt [ri;t+ƥ;NRISK;t+ƥ] > Ƥ) have
lower expected returns, all else equal.
In the rewriĨen form of equation (Ǌ.ǉǌ), the expression followes Campbell and
Vuolteenaho (Ǌǈǈǌ), by breaking the market return into cash-Ěow news and
discount-rate news. Cash-Ěow newsNCF is deėned byNCF = rt+ƥ Etrt+ƥ + NDR.
ĉe price of risk for cash-Ěow news is γ times greater than the price of risk for
discount-rate news, hence Campbell and Vuolteenaho call betas with cash-Ěow news
“bad betas” and those with discount-rate news “good betas” since they have lower risk
prices in equilibrium. ĉe third term in (Ǌ.ǉǌ) shows the risk premium associated
with exposure to news about future risks and did not appear in Campbell and
Vuolteenaho’s model, which assumed homoskedasticity. Not surprisingly, the
coeﬃcient is negative, indicating that an asset providing positive returns when risk
expectations increase will oﬀer a lower return on average.
⁴Campbell (ǉǑǑǋ) brieĚy considers the heteroskedastic case, noting that when γ = ƥ,
Vart [mt+ƥ + rt+ƥ] is a constant. ĉis implies that NRISK does not vary over time so the stochastic
volatility term disappears. Campbell claims that the stochastic volatility term also disappears when
ψ = ƥ, but this is incorrect. When limits are taken correctly, NRISK does not depend on ψ (except
indirectly through the loglinearization parameter, ρ).
Ǐǈ
FŇŃŁ ŇĽňĿ ŉŃ ŋŃŀĵŉĽŀĽŉŏ
ĉe risk shocks deėned in the previous subsection are shocks to the conditional
volatility of returns plus the stochastic discount factor, that is, the conditional
volatility of risk-neutralized returns. We nowmake additional assumptions on the
data generating process for stock returns that allow us to estimate the news terms.
ĉese assumptions imply that the conditional volatility of risk-neutralized returns is
proportional to the conditional volatility of returns themselves.
Suppose the economy is described by a ėrst-order VAR
xt+ƥ = x+ Γ (xt   x) + σtut+ƥ; (Ǌ.ǉǍ)
where xt+ƥ is an n ƥ vector of state variables that has rt+ƥ as its ėrst element, σƦt+ƥ as
its second element, and n  Ʀ other variables that help to predict the ėrst and second
moments of aggregate returns. x and Γ are an n ƥ vector and an n nmatrix of
constant parameters, and ut+ƥ is a vector of shocks to the state variables normalized
so that its ėrst element has unit variance. ĉe key assumption here is that a scalar
random variable, σƦt , equal to the conditional variance of market returns, also governs
time-variation in the variance of all shocks to this system. Both market returns and
state variables, including volatility itself, have innovations whose variances move in
proportion to one another.
Ǐǉ
Given this structure, news about discount rates can be wriĨen as
NDR;t+ƥ = (Et+ƥ   Et)
1X
j=ƥ
ρjrt+ƥ+j
= e0ƥ
1X
j=ƥ
ρjΓjσtut+ƥ
= e0ƥρΓ (I  ρΓ) ƥ σtut+ƥ (Ǌ.ǉǎ)
Furthermore, our log-linear model will make the log SDF,mt+ƥ; a linear function
of the state variables. Since all shocks to the SDF are then proportional to σt,
Vart [mt+ƥ + rt+ƥ] / σƦt : As a result, the conditional variance,
Vart [(mt+ƥ + rt+ƥ) =σt] = ωt, will be a constant that does not depend on the state
variables. Without knowing the parameters of the utility function, we can write
Vart [mt+ƥ + rt+ƥ] = ωσƦt so that the news about risk,NRISK, is proportional to news
about market return variance,NV.
NRISK;t+ƥ = (Et+ƥ   Et)
1X
j=ƥ
ρjVart+j

rt+ƥ+j + mt+ƥ+j

= (Et+ƥ   Et)
1X
j=ƥ
ρj
 
ωσƦt+j

= ωρe0Ʀ
1X
j=Ƥ
ρjΓjσtut+ƥ
= ωρe0Ʀ (I  ρΓ) ƥ σtut+ƥ = ωNV;t+ƥ: (Ǌ.ǉǏ)
Substituting (Ǌ.ǉǏ) into (Ǌ.ǉǌ), we obtain an empirically-testable intertemporal
ǏǊ
CAPMwith stochastic volatility:
Etri;t+ƥ   rf;t + ƥƦVartri;t+ƥ = γCovt [ri;t+ƥ;NCF;t+ƥ]
+Covt [ri;t+ƥ; NDR;t+ƥ]
  ƥ
Ʀ
ωCovt [ri;t+ƥ;NV;t+ƥ] , (Ǌ.ǉǐ)
where covariances with news about three key aĨributes of the market portfolio (cash
Ěows, discount rates, and volatility) describe the cross section of average returns.
ĉe parameter ω is a nonlinear function of the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion
γ, as well as the VAR parameters and the loglinearization coeﬃcient ρ, but it does not
depend on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution ψ except indirectly through the
inĚuence of ψ on ρ.
By deėnition
ωσƦt = Vart [mt+ƥ + rt+ƥ]
= Vart

θ
ψ
ht+ƥ + (ƥ  γ)rt+ƥ

= Vart

θ
ψ

(ψ   ƥ)NDR;t+ƥ + ƥƦ
ψ
θ
ωNV;t+ƥ

+ (ƥ  γ)rt+ƥ

= Vart
h
(ƥ  γ)NDR;t+ƥ + ƥƦωNV;t+ƥ + (ƥ  γ)rt+ƥ
i
= Vart
h
(ƥ  γ)NCF;t+ƥ + ƥƦωNV;t+ƥ
i
:
Ǐǋ
ĉerefore ω solves:
ωσƦt = (ƥ  γ)ƦVart

NCFt+ƥ

+ω(ƥ  γ)Covt

NCFt+ƥ;NVt+ƥ;

+ ωƦ ƥ
ƨ
Vart

NVt+ƥ

: (Ǌ.ǉǑ)
We can see two main channels through which γ aﬀects ω. First, a higher risk
aversionãgiven the underlying volatilities of all shocksãimplies a more volatile
stochastic discount factorm, and therefore a higher RISK.ĉis eﬀect is proportional
to (ƥ  γ)Ʀ, so it increases rapidly with γ. Second, there is a feedback eﬀect on RISK
through future risk: ω appears on the right-hand side of the equation as well. Given
that in our estimation we ėnd Covt

NCFt+ƥ;NVt+ƥ;

< Ƥ, this second eﬀect makes ω
increase even faster with γ.⁵
ĉis equation can also be wriĨen directly in terms of the VAR parameters. If we
deėne xCF and xV as the error-to-news vectors such that
ƥ
σt
NCF;t+ƥ = xCFut+ƥ =
 
e0ƥ + e0ƥρΓ(I  ρΓ) ƥ

ut+ƥ (Ǌ.Ǌǈ)
ƥ
σt
NV;t+ƥ = xVut+ƥ =
 
e0Ʀρ(I  ρΓ) ƥ

ut+ƥ (Ǌ.Ǌǉ)
and deėne the covariance matrix of the residuals (scaled to eliminate stochastic
⁵Bansal, Kiku, Shaliastovich and Yaron (ǊǈǉǊ) derive a similar expression. ĉe equivalent expres-
sion for ω in their case reduces to (ƥ  γ)Ʀ as they impose that the volatility process is homoskedastic
and the conditional equity premium is driven solely by the stochastic volatility.
Ǐǌ
volatility) as Σ =Var[ut+ƥ], then ω solves
Ƥ = ωƦ ƥ
ƨ
xVΣx0V   ω (ƥ  (ƥ  γ) xCFΣx0V) + (ƥ  γ)Ʀ xCFΣx0CF (Ǌ.ǊǊ)
ĉis quadratic equation for ω has two solutions. ĉis result is an artifact of our
linear approximation of the Euler Equation, and the appendix shows that one of the
solutions can be disregarded. ĉis false solution is easily identiėed by its implication
that ω becomes inėnite as volatility shocks become small. ĉe correct solution is
ω = ƥ  (ƥ  γ)xCFΣx
0
V
ƥ
ƦxVΣx
0
V
 
p
(ƥ  (ƥ  γ)xCFΣx0V)Ʀ   (ƥ  γ)Ʀ(xVΣx0V)(xCFΣx0CF)
ƥ
ƦxVΣx
0
V
(Ǌ.Ǌǋ)
ĉere is an additional disadvantage to the quadratic expression arising from our
loglinearization. In the case where risk aversion, volatility shocks and cash Ěow
shocks are large enough, as measured by the product (ƥ  γ)Ʀ(xVΣx0V)(xCFΣx0CF).
equation (Ǌ.ǊǊ) may deliver a complex rather than a real value for ω. While the
conditional variance Vart[mt+ƥ + rt+ƥ] from which we deėne ω will be both real and
ėnite, the loglinear approximation may not allow for a real solution in an
economically important region of the parameter space. Given our VAR estimates of
the variance and covariance terms, we ėnd equation (Ǌ.ǊǊ) yields a real solution as γ
ranges from zero to ƪ:ƭƧ.
ǏǍ
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Figure Ǌ.ǉ: Approximate Gamma-Omega Relationship
ĉis ėgure graphs the approximate relation between the parameter γ and the parameter ω described
by equation (Ǌ.Ǌǌ) as well as the quadratic solution for ω described in equation (Ǌ.Ǌǋ). ĉese func-
tions depend on the loglinearization parameter ρ, set to ǈ.ǑǍ per year and the empirically estimated
VAR parameters of Table ǉ. γ is the investor’s risk aversion while ω is the sensitivity of news about
risk,NRISK, to news about market variance,NV.
To allow for larger values in our risk aversion parameter, we consider an alternative
approximation. If we linearize the right hand side of equation (Ǌ.ǉǑ) around ω = Ƥ
we can approximate Vart[mt+ƥ + rt+ƥ] as a linear, rather than quadratic, function of ω.
We then have
ω  (ƥ  γ)
Ʀ(xCFΣx0CF)
ƥ  (ƥ  γ)(xCFΣx0V)
(Ǌ.Ǌǌ)
which is now deėned for all γ > Ƥ. Figure Ǌ.ǉ plots ω as a function of γ using both the
solution in equation (Ǌ.Ǌǋ) and the approximation in (Ǌ.Ǌǌ) for values of γ up to Ǌǈ.
Ǐǎ
By construction, they will yield similar solutions for values of γ close to one, where
ω gets close to ǈ and volatility news becomes less and less important. In other words,
it is easy to show that our linearization preserves the property of the true model that
as γ ! ƥ, ω! Ƥ and
Vart[mt+ƥ + rt+ƥ]! (ƥ  γ)ƦVart[NCF]
As risk aversion increases, we ėnd that this approximate value for ω continues to
resemble the exact solution of the quadratic equation (Ǌ.ǊǊ) in the region where a
real solution exists. We have also used numerical methods, similar to those proposed
by Tauchen andHussey (ǉǑǑǉ), to solve the model and validate our estimates of ω for
a range of values for γ that include the region where the quadratic equation does not
have a real solution.
IŁńŀĽķĵŉĽŃłň ĺŃŇ ķŃłňŊŁńŉĽŃł ĻŇŃŌŉļ
Following Campbell (ǉǑǑǋ), in this paper we substitute consumption out of the
pricing equations using the intertemporal budget constraint. However the model
does have interesting implications for the implied consumption process. From
equations (Ǎ) and (ǉǋ), we can derive the expression:
Δct+ƥ   EtΔct+ƥ = (rt+ƥ   Etrt+ƥ)  (ψ   ƥ)NDR;t+ƥ
 (ψ   ƥ) ƥ
Ʀ
ω
ƥ  γNV;t+ƥ: (Ǌ.ǊǍ)
ǏǏ
ĉe ėrst two components of the equation for consumption growth are the same as in
the homoskedastic case. An unexpectedly high return of the wealth portfolio has a
one-for-one eﬀect on consumption. An increase in expected future returns increases
today’s consumption if ψ < ƥ, as the low elasticity of intertemporal substitution
induces the representative investor to consume today (the income eﬀect dominates).
If ψ > ƥ, instead, the same increase induces the agent to reduce consumption to beĨer
exploit the improved investment opportunities (the substitution eﬀect dominates).
ĉe introduction of time-varying conditional volatility adds an additional term to
the equation describing consumption growth. News about high future risk is news
about a deterioration of future investment opportunities, which is bad news for a
risk-averse investor (γ > ƥ). When ψ < ƥ, the representative agent will reduce
consumption and save to ensure adequate future consumption. An investor with high
elasticity of intertemporal substitution, on the other hand, will increase current
consumption and reduce the amount of wealth exposed to the future (worse)
investment opportunities.
Using estimates of the news terms from our VARmodel (described in the next
section), we can explore the implications of the model for consumption growth. As
shown in the previous subsection, the three shocks that drive innovations in
consumption growth (rt+ƥ   Etrt+ƥ,NDR;t+ƥ,NV;t+ƥ) can all be expressed as functions
of the vector of innovations σtut+ƥ. ĉe conditional variance of consumption growth,
Vart(Δct+ƥ), will then be proportional to the conditional variance of returns,
Vart(rt+ƥ); similarly, the conditional standard deviation of consumption growth will
be proportional to the conditional standard deviation of returns. As a consequence,
Ǐǐ
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Figure Ǌ.Ǌ: Consumption Growth Variance and Risk Aversion
ĉis ėgure plots plots the coeﬃcient A(γ; ψ) relating the conditional volatility of consumption
growth to the volatility of returns for diﬀerent values of γ and ψ for the homoskedastic case (leě
panel) and for the heteroskedastic case (right panel), where A(γ; ψ) is a function of the variances
and covariances of the scaled residuals ut+ƥ. In each panel, we plot A(γ; ψ) as γ varies between ǉ and
Ǌǈ, for diﬀerent values of psi. Each line corresponds to a diﬀerent ψ between ǈ.Ǎ and ǉ.Ǎ.
the ratio of the standard deviations,
A(γ; ψ) 
p
Vart(Δct+ƥ)p
Vart(rt+ƥ)
will be a constant that depends on the model parameters γ and ψ as well as on the
unconditional variances and covariances of the innovation vector ut+ƥ, which we
obtain by estimating the VAR.
ǏǑ
Figure Ǌ.Ǌ plots the coeﬃcient A(γ; ψ) for diﬀerent values of γ and ψ for the
homoskedastic case (leě panel), and for the heteroskedastic case (right panel) using
the linear approximation for ω described in Section Ǌ.Ǌ. In each panel, we plot
A(γ; ψ) as γ varies between ǈ and Ǌǈ, for diﬀerent values of ψ. Each line corresponds
to a diﬀerent ψ between ǈ.Ǎ and ǉ.Ǎ; when ψ = ƥ the value of A(γ; ψ) is always equal
to ǉ since in that case the volatility of consumption growth is equal to the volatility of
returns.
As expected, in the homoskedastic case (leě panel), the variance of consumption
growth does not depend on γ but only on ψ. It is rising in ψ because our VAR
estimates imply that the return on wealth is negatively correlated with news about
future expected returnsNDR;t+ƥ; that is, wealth returns are mean-reverting. ĉis
conėrms results reported in Campbell (ǉǑǑǎ). Once we add stochastic volatility
(right panel), as γ increases the volatility of consumption growth increases for all
values of ψ as long as ψ 6= ƥ. To understand why this is the case, notice in equation
(Ǌ.Ǌǌ) that since ω grows with γ faster than (ƥ  γ)Ʀ, the term ωƥ γ is increasing in γ in
absolute value. ĉerefore, the larger γ, the more the variance ofNV gets ampliėed
into a higher variance of consumption innovations.
Note also that for ψ < ƥ and for high enough γ (i.e. in the boĨom-right section of
the right panel), the volatility of consumption innovations is higher for lower values of
ψ. When risk aversion is high, innovations in consumption are dominated by news
about future risk. Agents with very low or very high elasticity of intertemporal
substitution, i.e. with ψ far from ǉ, will tend to adjust their consumption strongly (in
diﬀerent directions) to volatility news. ĉerefore, it is possible for individuals with
ǐǈ
lower elasticity of intertemporal substitution to end up with amore volatile process for
consumption innovations, due to their strong reaction to volatility news.
Ǌ.Ǌ PŇĹĸĽķŉĽłĻ AĻĻŇĹĻĵŉĹ SŉŃķĿ RĹŉŊŇłň ĵłĸ VŃŀĵŉĽŀĽŉŏ
SŉĵŉĹ ŋĵŇĽĵĶŀĹň
Our full VAR speciėcation of the vector xt+ƥ includes six state variables, ėve of which
are the same as in Campbell, Giglio and Polk (Ǌǈǉǉ). To those ėve variables, we add
an estimate of conditional volatility. ĉe data are all quarterly, from ǉǑǊǎ:Ǌ to Ǌǈǉǉ:ǌ.
ĉe ėrst variable in the VAR is the log real return on the market, rM, the diﬀerence
between the log return on the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP)
value-weighted stock index and the log return on the Consumer Price Index.
ĉe second variable is expected market variance (EVAR). ĉis variable is meant to
capture the volatility of market returns, σt, conditional on information available at
time t, so that innovations to this variable can be mapped to theNV term described
above. To construct EVARt, we proceed as follows. We ėrst construct a series of
within-quarter realized variance of daily returns for each time t, RVARt. We then run
a regression of RVARt+ƥ on lagged realized variance (RVARt) as well as the other ėve
state variables at time t. ĉis regression then generates a series of predicted values for
RVAR at each time t+ ƥ, that depend on information available at time t:\RVARt+ƥ.
Finally, we deėne our expected variance at time t to be exactly this predicted value at
t+ ƥ:
EVARt \RVARt+ƥ:
ǐǉ
Note that though we describe our methodology in a two-step fashion where we ėrst
estimate EVAR and then use EVAR in a VAR, this is only for interpretability. Indeed,
this approach to modeling EVAR can be considered a simple renormalization of
equivalent results we would ėnd from a VAR that included RVAR directly.⁶
ĉe third variable is the price-earnings ratio (PE) from Shiller (Ǌǈǈǈ), constructed
as the price of the S&P Ǎǈǈ index divided by a ten-year trailing moving average of
aggregate earnings of companies in the S&P Ǎǈǈ index. Following Graham and Dodd
(ǉǑǋǌ), Campbell and Shiller (ǉǑǐǐb, ǉǑǑǐ) advocate averaging earnings over several
years to avoid temporary spikes in the price-earnings ratio caused by cyclical declines
in earnings. We avoid any interpolation of earnings as well as lag the moving average
by one quarter in order to ensure that all components of the time-t price-earnings
ratio are contemporaneously observable by time t. ĉe ratio is log transformed.
Fourth, the term yield spread (TY) is obtained fromGlobal Financial Data. We
compute the TY series as the diﬀerence between the log yield on the ǉǈ-Year US
Constant Maturity Bond (IGUSAǉǈD) and the log yield on the ǋ-Month US
Treasury Bill (ITUSAǋD).
Fiěh, the small-stock value spread (VS) is constructed from data on the six
“elementary” equity portfolios also obtained from Professor French’s website. ĉese
elementary portfolios, which are constructed at the end of each June, are the
intersections of two portfolios formed on size (market equity, ME) and three
portfolios formed on the ratio of book equity to market equity (BE/ME).ĉe size
⁶Since we weight observations based on RVAR in the ėrst stage and then reweight observations
using EVAR in the second stage, our two-stage approach in practice is not exactly the same as a one-
stage approach. However, the results from a RVAR-weighted single-step estimation are qualitatively
very similar to those produced by our two-stage approach.
ǐǊ
breakpoint for year t is the median NYSEmarket equity at the end of June of year t.
BE/ME for June of year t is the book equity for the last ėscal year end in t  ƥ divided
byME for December of t  ƥ. ĉe BE/ME breakpoints are the ǋǈth and Ǐǈth NYSE
percentiles.
At the end of June of year t, we construct the small-stock value spread as the
diﬀerence between the ln(BE=ME) of the small high-book-to-market portfolio and
the ln(BE=ME) of the small low-book-to-market portfolio, where BE andME are
measured at the end of December of year t  ƥ. For months from July toMay, the
small-stock value spread is constructed by adding the cumulative log return (from the
previous June) on the small low-book-to-market portfolio to, and subtracting the
cumulative log return on the small high-book-to-market portfolio from, the
end-of-June small-stock value spread. ĉe construction of this series follows
Campbell and Vuolteenaho (Ǌǈǈǌ) closely.
ĉe sixth variable in our VAR is the default spread (DEF), deėned as the diﬀerence
between the log yield onMoody’s BAA and AAA bonds. ĉe series is obtained from
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Campbell, Giglio and Polk (Ǌǈǉǉ) add the
default spread to the Campbell and Vuolteenaho (Ǌǈǈǌ) VAR speciėcation in part
because that variable is known to track time-series variation in expected real returns
on the market portfolio (Fama and French, ǉǑǐǑ), but mostly because shocks to the
default spread should to some degree reĚect news about aggregate default
probabilities. Of course, news about aggregate default probabilities should in turn
reĚect news about the market’s future cash Ěows.
ǐǋ
SļŃŇŉ-ŇŊł ŋŃŀĵŉĽŀĽŉŏ ĹňŉĽŁĵŉĽŃł
In order for the regression model that generates EVARt to be consistent with a
reasonable data-generating process for market variance, we deviate from standard
OLS in two ways. First, we constrain the regression coeﬃcients to produce ėĨed
values (i.e. expected market return variance) that are positive. Second, given that we
explicitly consider heteroskedasticity of the innovations to our variables, we estimate
this regression usingWeighted Least Squares (WLS), where the weight of each
observation pair (RVARt+ƥ, xt) is initially based on the time-t value of (RVAR) ƥ.
However, to ensure that the ratio of weights across observations is not extreme, we
shrink these initial weights towards equal weights. In particular, we set our shrinkage
factor large enough so that the ratio of the largest observation weight to the smallest
observation weight is always less than or equal to ėve. ĉough admiĨedly somewhat
ad hoc, this bound is consistent with reasonable priors of the degree of variation over
time in expectedmarket return variance. More importantly, we show later that our
results are robust to variation in this bound. Both the constraint on the regression’s
ėĨed values and the constraint onWLS observation weights bind in the sample we
study.
ĉe results of the ėrst stage regression generating the state variable EVARt are
reported in Table Ǌ.ǉ Panel A. Perhaps not surprisingly, past realized variance strongly
predicts future realized variance. More importantly, the regression documents that an
increase in either PE orDEF predicts higher future realized volatility. Both of these
results are very statistically signiėcant and are a novel ėnding of the paper. In
ǐǌ
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ǐǍ
particular, the fact that we ėnd that very persistent variables like PE and DEF forecast
next period’s volatility indicates a potential important role in volatility news for lower
frequency or long-run movements in stochastic volatility.
We argue that the links we ėnd are sensible. Investors in risky bonds incorporate
their expectation of future volatility when they set credit spreads, as risky bonds are
short the option to default. ĉerefore we expect higherDEF to be associated with
higher RVAR. ĉe result that higher PE predicts higher RVARmight seem surprising
at ėrst, but one has to remember that the coeﬃcient indicates the eﬀect of a change in
PE holding constant the other variables, in particular the default spread. Since the
default spread should also generally depend on the equity premium and since most of
the variation in PE is due to variation in the equity premium, for a given value of the
default spread, a relatively high value of PE implies a relatively higher level of future
volatility. ĉus PE cleans up the information inDEF concerning future volatility.
ĉe RƦ of this regression is just over Ǌǋƻ. ĉe relatively low RƦ masks the fact that
the ėt is indeed quite good, as we can see from Figure Ǌ.ǋ, in which RVAR and EVAR
are ploĨed together. ĉe RƦ is heavily inĚuenced by the occasional spikes in realized
variance, which the simple linear model we use is not able to capture. Indeed, our
WLS approach downweights the importance of those spikes in the estimation
procedure.
ĉe internet appendix to this paper (Campbell, Giglio, Polk, and Turley ǊǈǉǊ)
reports descriptive statistics for these variables for the full sample, the early sample,
and the modern sample. Consistent with Campbell, Giglio and Polk (ǊǈǉǊ), we
document high correlation betweenDEF and both PE and VS. ĉe table also
ǐǎ
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Figure Ǌ.ǋ: Realized and Expected Variance, ǉǑǊǎ-Ǌǈǉǉ
ĉis ėgure plots quarterly observations of realized within-quarter daily return variance over the sam-
ple period ǉǑǊǎ:Ǌ-Ǌǈǉǉ:ǌ and the expected variance implied by the estimated model.
ǐǏ
documents the persistence of both RVAR and EVAR (autocorrelations of ǈ.ǍǊǌ and
ǈ.Ǐǌǈ respectively) and the high correlation between these variance measures and the
default spread.
Perhaps the most notable diﬀerence between the two subsamples is that the
correlation between PE and several of our other state variables changes dramatically.
In the early sample, PE is quite negatively correlated with both RVAR and VS. In the
modern sample, PE is essentially uncorrelated with RVAR and quite positively
correlated with VS. As a consequence, since EVAR is just a linear combination of our
state variables, the correlation between PE and EVAR changes sign across the two
samples. In the early sample, this correlation is very negative, with a value of -ǈ.Ǎǉǉ.
ĉis strong negative correlation reĚects the high volatility that occurred during the
Great Depression when prices were relatively low. In the modern sample, the
correlation is positive, ǈ.ǉǌǈ. ĉe positive correlation simply reĚects the economic
fact that episodes with high volatility and high stock prices, such as the technology
boom of the late ǉǑǑǈs, were more prevalent in this subperiod than episodes with
high volatility and low stock prices, such as the recession of the early ǉǑǐǈs.
EňŉĽŁĵŉĽŃł Ńĺ ŉļĹ VAR ĵłĸ ŉļĹ łĹŌň ŉĹŇŁň
Following Campbell (ǉǑǑǋ), we estimate a ėrst-order VAR as in equation (Ǌ.ǉǍ),
where xt+ƥ is a ƪ ƥ vector of state variables ordered as follows:
xt+ƥ = [rM;t+ƥ EVARt+ƥ PEt+ƥ TYt+ƥ DEFt+ƥ VSt+ƥ]
ǐǐ
so that the real market return rM;t+ƥ is the ėrst element and EVAR is the second
element. x is a ƪ ƥ vector of the means of the variables, and Γ is a ƪ ƪ matrix of
constant parameters. Finally, σtut+ƥ is a ƪ ƥ vector of innovations, with the
conditional variance-covariance matrix of ut+ƥ a constant:
Σ = Var(ut+ƥ)
so that the parameter σƦt scales the entire variance-covariance matrix of the vector of
innovations.
ĉe ėrst-stage regression forecasting realized market return variance described in
the previous section generates the variable EVAR. ĉe theory in Section Ǌ.Ǌ assumes
that σƦt , proxied for by EVAR, scales the variance-covariance matrix of state variable
shocks. ĉus, as in the ėrst stage, we estimate the second-stage VAR usingWLS,
where the weight of each observation pair (xt+ƥ, xt) is initially based on (EVARt) ƥ.
We continue to constrain both the weights across observations and the ėĨed values
of the regression forecasting EVAR.
Table Ǌ.ǉ Panel B presents the results of the VAR estimation for the full sample
(ǉǑǊǎ:Ǌ to Ǌǈǉǉ:ǌ). We report bootstrap standard errors for the parameter estimates
of the VAR that take into account the uncertainty generated by forecasting variance in
the ėrst stage. Consistent with previous research, we ėnd that PE negatively predict
future returns, though the t-statistic indicates only marginal signiėcance. ĉe value
spread has a negative but not statistically signiėcant eﬀect on future returns. In our
speciėcation, a higher conditional variance, EVAR, is associated with higher future
returns, though the eﬀect is not statistically signiėcant. Of course, the relatively high
ǐǑ
degree of correlation among PE,DEF, VS, and EVAR complicates the interpretation
of the individual eﬀect of those variables. As for the other novel aspects of the
transition matrix, both high PE and highDEF predict higher future conditional
variance of returns. High past market returns forecast lower EVAR, higher PE, and
lowerDEF.⁷
Tables Ǌ.Ǌ and Ǌ.ǋ report the sample correlation and autocorrelation matrices of
both the unscaled residuals σtut+ƥ and the scaled residuals ut+ƥ. ĉe correlation
matrices report standard deviations on the diagonals. ĉere are a couple of aspects of
these results to note. For one thing, a comparison of the standard deviations of the
unscaled and scaled residuals provides a rough indication of the eﬀectiveness of our
empirical solution to the heteroskedasticity of the VAR. In general, the standard
deviations of the scaled residuals are several times larger than their unscaled
counterparts. More speciėcally, our approach implies that the scaled return residuals
should have unit standard deviation. Our implementation results in a sample
standard deviation of ǈ.ǍǎǊ, that is relatively close to one.
Additionally, a comparison of the unscaled and scaled autocorrelation matrices
reported in Table Ǌ.ǋ reveals that much of the sample autocorrelation in the unscaled
residuals is eliminated by ourWLS approach. For example, the unscaled residuals in
the regression forecasting the log real return have an autocorrelation of -ǈ.ǈǏǌ. ĉe
⁷One worry is that many of the elements of the transition matrix are estimated imprecisely.
ĉough these estimates may be zero, their non-zero but statistically insigniėcant in-sample point es-
timates, in conjunction with the highly-nonlinear function that generates discount-rate and volatility
news, may result inmisleading estimates of risk prices. However, the results are qualitatively similar if
we instead employ a partial VARwhere, via a standard iterative process, only variables with t-statistics
greater than ǉ.ǈ are included in each VAR regression.
Ǒǈ
Table Ǌ.Ǌ: VAR Residual Correlations and Standard Deviations
ĉe table reports the correlation (”Corr/std”) matrices of both the unscaled and scaled shocks from
the second-stage VAR; the correlationmatrix reports shock standard deviations on the diagonal. ĉe
sample period for the dependent variables is ǉǑǊǎ.ǋ-Ǌǈǉǉ.ǌ, ǋǌǊ quarterly data points.
Corr/std rM EVAR PE TY DEF VS
unscaled
rM ǈ.ǉǈǎ -ǈ.ǌǐǐ ǈ.ǑǈǏ -ǈ.ǈǊǊ -ǈ.ǌǐǑ -ǈ.ǈǋǎ
EVAR -ǈ.ǌǐǐ ǈ.ǈǉǐ -ǈ.ǍǏǍ -ǈ.ǈǏǌ ǈ.ǎǌǍ ǈ.ǉǊǉ
PE ǈ.ǑǈǏ -ǈ.ǍǏǍ ǈ.ǈǑǑ -ǈ.ǈǉǉ -ǈ.ǎǈǉ -ǈ.ǈǎǌ
TY -ǈ.ǈǊǊ -ǈ.ǈǏǌ -ǈ.ǈǉǉ ǈ.Ǎǎǉ ǈ.ǈǈǎ -ǈ.ǈǊǌ
DEF ǈ.ǈǈǈ -ǈ.ǌǐǑ ǈ.ǎǌǍ -ǈ.ǎǈǉ ǈ.ǈǈǎ ǈ.ǊǑǈ
VS -ǈ.ǈǋǎ ǈ.ǉǊǉ -ǈ.ǈǎǌ -ǈ.ǈǊǌ ǈ.ǋǉǎ ǈ.ǈǐǎ
scaled
rM ǈ.Ǎǎǐ -ǈ.ǌǐǌ ǈ.Ǒǈǌ -ǈ.ǈǌǋ -ǈ.ǋǐǋ ǈ.ǈǊǋ
EVAR -ǈ.ǌǐǌ ǈ.ǈǑǈ -ǈ.Ǎǎǉ -ǈ.ǈǎǑ ǈ.ǎǊǏ ǈ.ǈǐǐ
PE ǈ.Ǒǈǌ -ǈ.Ǎǎǉ ǈ.ǍǊǊ -ǈ.ǈǋǋ -ǈ.ǌǐǐ ǈ.ǈǈǌ
TY -ǈ.ǈǌǋ -ǈ.ǈǎǑ -ǈ.ǈǋǋ ǋ.ǊǌǏ ǈ.ǈǉǐ -ǈ.ǈǋǋ
DEF -ǈ.ǋǐǋ ǈ.ǎǊǏ -ǈ.ǌǐǐ ǈ.ǈǉǐ ǉ.ǋǎǋ ǈ.Ǌǎǉ
VS ǈ.ǈǊǋ ǈ.ǈǐǐ ǈ.ǈǈǌ -ǈ.ǈǋǋ ǈ.Ǌǎǉ ǈ.ǌǑǎ
Ǒǉ
Table Ǌ.ǋ: VAR Residual Autocorrelations
ĉe table reports the autocorrelation (”Autocorr.”) matrices of both the unscaled and scaled shocks
from the second-stageVAR; the correlationmatrix reports shock standard deviations on the diagonal.
ĉe sample period for the dependent variables is ǉǑǊǎ.ǋ-Ǌǈǉǉ.ǌ, ǋǌǊ quarterly data points.
Autocorr. rM;t+ƥ EVARt+ƥ PEt+ƥ TYt+ƥ DEFt+ƥ VSt+ƥ
unscaled
rM;t -ǈ.ǈǏǌ ǈ.ǈǑǊ -ǈ.ǈǎǏ ǈ.ǈǌǏ ǈ.ǉǈǈ ǈ.ǈǌǍ
EVARt ǈ.ǈǏǉ -ǈ.ǉǍǋ ǈ.ǈǐǋ -ǈ.ǉǊǎ -ǈ.ǉǐǋ -ǈ.ǈǐǏ
PEt -ǈ.ǈǐǎ ǈ.ǉǏǏ -ǈ.ǉǍǉ ǈ.ǈǏǈ ǈ.ǊǊǉ ǈ.ǈǑǋ
TYt -ǈ.ǈǌǎ ǈ.ǈǏǍ -ǈ.ǈǊǑ -ǈ.ǈǐǐ ǈ.ǈǐǉ ǈ.ǈǍǈ
DEFt ǈ.ǉǍǊ -ǈ.ǉǊǌ ǈ.ǉǐǎ -ǈ.ǉǍǏ -ǈ.ǋǉǉ -ǈ.ǉǌǏ
VSt ǈ.ǈǊǊ -ǈ.ǈǋǌ ǈ.ǈǊǈ -ǈ.ǈǏǎ -ǈ.ǈǐǈ -ǈ.ǈǑǏ
scaled
rM;t ǈ.ǈǈǊ ǈ.ǈǌǍ -ǈ.ǈǈǌ ǈ.ǈǈǑ ǈ.ǈǈǏ -ǈ.ǈǈǎ
EVARt ǈ.ǈǎǈ -ǈ.ǉǈǊ ǈ.ǈǏǋ -ǈ.ǈǐǊ -ǈ.ǉǊǈ -ǈ.ǈǎǈ
PEt -ǈ.ǈǉǊ ǈ.ǉǊǍ -ǈ.ǈǏǏ ǈ.ǈǊǏ ǈ.ǉǈǑ ǈ.ǈǊǏ
TYt -ǈ.ǈǋǎ ǈ.ǈǎǏ -ǈ.ǈǊǐ -ǈ.ǈǍǐ ǈ.ǈǏǋ ǈ.ǈǋǑ
DEFt ǈ.ǈǑǌ -ǈ.ǈǐǋ ǈ.ǉǊǋ -ǈ.ǉǉǉ -ǈ.Ǌǉǐ -ǈ.ǉǈǏ
VSt ǈ.ǈǉǐ -ǈ.ǈǋǉ ǈ.ǈǈǑ -ǈ.ǈǌǌ -ǈ.ǈǎǎ -ǈ.ǈǐǋ
ǑǊ
Table Ǌ.ǌ: VAR Speciėcation Test
ĉe table reports the results of regressions forecasting the squared second-stage residuals from the
VAR estimated in Table Ǌ.ǉ with EVARt. Bootstrap standard errors that take into account the un-
certainty in generating EVAR are in parentheses. ĉe sample period for the dependent variables is
ǉǑǊǎ.ǋ-Ǌǈǉǉ.ǌ, ǋǌǊ quarterly data points.
Heteroskedastic Shocks
Squared, second-stage,
unscaled residual Constant EVARt RƦƻ
rM;t+ƥ -ǈ.ǈǈǋ ǈ.ǌǏǐ ǉǑ.Ǐǐƻ
(ǈ.ǈǈǌ) (ǈ.ǈǏǎ)
EVARt+ƥ ǈ.ǈǈǈ ǈ.ǈǉǐ Ǎ.ǐǎƻ
(ǈ.ǈǈǈ) (ǈ.ǈǈǎ)
PEt+ƥ -ǈ.ǈǈǌ ǈ.ǌǐǌ ǉǑ.ǎǉƻ
(ǈ.ǈǈǌ) (ǈ.ǈǏǎ)
TYt+ƥ ǈ.ǊǈǍ ǋ.ǏǏǈ ǉ.ǎǏƻ
(ǈ.ǈǐǌ) (ǉ.ǐǋǏ)
DEFt+ƥ -ǈ.ǉǉǏ ǎ.Ǒǎǈ Ǌǎ.ǉǊƻ
(ǈ.ǈǌǌ) (ǈ.ǑǊǊ)
VSt+ƥ ǈ.ǈǈǌ ǈ.ǉǉǐ Ǎ.ǌǏƻ
(ǈ.ǈǈǊ) (ǈ.ǈǋǌ)
corresponding autocorrelation of the scaled return residuals is essentially zero, ǈ.ǈǈǊ.
ĉough the scaled residuals in the EVAR, PE andDEF regression still display some
negative autocorrelation, the unscaled residuals are much more negatively
autocorrelated.
Table Ǌ.ǌ reports the coeﬃcients of a regression of the squared unscaled residuals
σtut+ƥ of each VAR equation on a constant and EVAR. ĉese results are consistent
with our assumption that EVAR captures the conditional volatility of market returns
(the coeﬃcient on EVAR in the regression forecasting the squared residuals of rM is
Ǒǋ
ǈ.ǌǏǐ). ĉe fact that EVAR signiėcantly predicts with a positive sign all the squared
errors of the VAR supports our underlying assumption that one parameter (σƦt )
drives the volatility of all innovations.
ĉe top panel of Table Ǌ.Ǎ presents the variance-covariance matrix and the
standard deviation/correlation matrix of the news terms, estimated as described
above. Consistent with previous research, we ėnd that discount-rate news is twice as
volatile as cash-Ěow news.
ĉe interesting new results in this table concern the variance news termNV. First,
news about future variance is more volatile than discount-rate news. Second, it is
negatively correlated (-ǈ.ǊǊ) with cash-Ěow news: as one might expect from the
literature on the “leverage eﬀect” (Black ǉǑǏǎ, Christie ǉǑǐǊ), news about low cash
Ěows is associated with news about higher future volatility. ĉird,NV correlates
negatively (-ǈ.ǈǑ) with discount-rate news, indicating that news of high volatility
tends to coincide with news of low future real returns.⁸ ĉe net eﬀect of these
correlations, documented in the lower leě panel of Table Ǌ.Ǎ, is a slightly negative
correlation of -.ǈǊ between our measure of volatility news and contemporaneous
market returns (for related research see French, Schwert, and Stambaugh ǉǑǐǏ).
ĉe lower right panel of Table Ǌ.Ǎ reports the decomposition of the vector of
innovations σƦtut+ƥ into the three termsNCF;t+ƥ;NDR;t+ƥ, andNV;t+ƥ. As shocks to
EVAR are just a linear combination of shocks to the underlying state variables, which
includes RVAR, we “unpack” EVAR to express the news terms as a function of rM, PE,
⁸ĉough the point estimate is negative, the large standard errors imply that we cannot reject the
“volatility feedback eﬀect” (Campbell and Hentschel ǉǑǑǊ, Calvet and Fisher ǊǈǈǏ).
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Figure Ǌ.ǌ: Normalized News Series
ĉis ėgure plots normalized cash-Ěow news, the negative of normalized discount-rate news, and nor-
malized variance news. ĉe series are smoothed with a trailing exponentially-weighted moving aver-
age where the decay parameter is set to ǈ.ǈǐ per quarter, and the smoothed news series is generated
asMAt(N) = Ƥ:ƤƬNt + (ƥ   Ƥ:ƤƬ)MAt ƥ(N). ĉis decay parameter implies a half-life of six years.
ĉe sample period is ǉǑǊǎ:Ǌ-Ǌǈǉǉ:ǌ.
TY, VS,DEF, and RVAR. ĉe panel shows that innovations to RVAR are mapped
more than one-to-one to news about future volatility. However, several of the other
state variables also drive news about volatility. Speciėcally, we ėnd that innovations in
PE,DEF, and VS are associated with news of higher future volatility.
Figure Ǌ.ǌ plots the smoothed series forNCF, NDR andNV using an
exponentially-weighted moving average with a quarterly decay parameter of Ƥ:ƤƬ.
ĉis decay parameter implies a half-life of six years. ĉe paĨern ofNCF and NDR we
Ǒǎ
ėnd is consistent with previous research. As a consequence, we focus on the
smoothed series for market variance news. ĉere is considerable time variation in
NV, and in particular we ėnd episodes of news of high future volatility during the
Great Depression and just before the beginning of WorldWar II, followed by a period
of liĨle news until the late ǉǑǎǈs. From then on, periods of positive volatility news
alternate with periods of negative volatility news in cycles of ǋ to Ǎ years. Spikes in
news about future volatility are found in the early ǉǑǏǈs (following the oil shocks), in
the late ǉǑǏǈs and again following the ǉǑǐǏ crash of the stock market. ĉe late ǉǑǑǈs
are characterized by strongly negative news about future returns, and at the same
time higher expected future volatility. ĉe recession of the late Ǌǈǈǈs is instead
characterized by strongly negative cash-Ěow news, together with a spike in volatility
of the highest magnitude in our sample. ĉe recovery from the ėnancial crisis has
brought positive cash-Ěow news together with news about lower future volatility.
PŇĹĸĽķŉĽłĻ ŀŃłĻ-ŇŊł ŋŃŀĵŉĽŀĽŉŏ
ĉe predictability of volatility, and especially of its long-run component, is central to
this paper. In the previous sections, we have shown that volatility is strongly
predictable, and it is predictable in particular by variables beyond lagged realizations
of volatility itself: PE andDEF contain essential information about future volatility.
We have also proposed a VAR-based methodology to construct long-horizon
forecasts of volatility that incorporate all the information in lagged volatility as well as
in the additional predictors like PE andDEF.
We now ask how well our proposed long-run volatility forecasts capture the
ǑǏ
long-horizon component of volatility. In Table Ǌ.ǎ we regress realized long-run
variance up to period h,
LHRVARh =
Σhj=ƥρj ƥRVARt+j
Σhj=ƥρj ƥ
;
on diﬀerent forecasting models of long-run variance.⁹ In particular, we estimate two
standard GARCH-type models, speciėcally designed to capture the long-run
component of volatility. ĉe ėrst one is the two-component EGARCHmodel
proposed by Adrian and Rosenberg (Ǌǈǈǐ). ĉis model assumes the existence of two
separate components of volatility, one of which is more persistent than the other, and
therefore will tend to capture the long-run dynamics of the volatility process. ĉe
other model we estimate is the FIGARCHmodel of Baillie, Bollerslev, andMikkelsen
(ǉǑǑǎ), in which the process for volatility is modeled as a fractionally-integrated
process, and whose slow, hyperbolic rate of decay of lagged, squared innovations
potentially captures long-run movements in volatility beĨer. We ėrst estimate both
GARCHmodels using the full sample of daily returns and then generate the
appropriate forecast of LHRVARh.¹⁰ To these two models, we add the set of variables
from our VAR, and compare the forecasting ability of these diﬀerent models.
Table Ǌ.ǎ Panel A reports, for diﬀerent horizons h ranging from ǉ year to ǉǍ years,
the results of forecasting regressions of long run volatility LHRVARh using diﬀerent
speciėcations. ĉe ėrst row of each sub-panel presents results using the state variables
⁹Note that we rescale by the sum of the weights ρj to maintain the scale of the coeﬃcients in the
predictive regressions across diﬀerent horizons.
¹⁰We start our forecasting exercise in January ǉǑǋǈ so that we have a long enough history of past
returns to feed the FIGARCHmodel.
Ǒǐ
in our VAR, each included separately. ĉe second row predicts LHRVARh with the
horizon-speciėc forecast implied by our VAR (VARh). ĉe third and fourth rows
forecast LHRVARh with the corresponding forecast from the EGARCHmodel
(EGh) and the FIGARCHmodel (FIGh) respectively. ĉe ėěh and sixth rows join
the VAR variables with the two GARCH-based forecasts, one at a time. ĉe seventh
and eighth row conducts a horse race between VARh and FIGh and between VARh
andDEF.
First note that both the EGARCH and FIGARCH forecasts by themselves capture
a signiėcant portion of the variation in long-run realized volatility: both have
signiėcant coeﬃcients, and both have nontrivial RƦs, even at very long horizons. Our
VAR variables provide as good or beĨer explanatory power, and RVAR, PE andDEF
appear strongly statistically signiėcant at all horizons (with the exception of RVAR at
h = ƦƤ, i.e. Ʃ years). Finally, the VAR-implied forecast, VARh, is not only signiėcantly
diﬀerent from ǈ, but it is also not signiėcantly diﬀerent from ǉ. ĉis indicates that our
VAR is able to produce forecasts of volatility that not only go in the right direction,
but are also of the right magnitude, even at very long horizons.
Very interesting results appear once we join our variables to the two GARCH
models. Even aěer controlling for the GARCH-based forecasts (which render RVAR
insigniėcant), PE andDEF always come in signiėcantly in predicting long-horizon
volatility. Moreover, and especially at long horizons, the addition of the VAR state
variables strongly increases the RƦ. We further show that when using the
VAR-implied forecast together with the FIGARCH forecast, the coeﬃcient on VARh
is still very close to one and always statistically signiėcant while the FIGARCH
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coeﬃcient moves closer to zero (though estimates of the coeﬃcient on FIGh remain
statistically signiėcant at some horizons).
We develop an additional test of our VAR-based model of stochastic volatility from
the idea that the variables that form the VAR – in particular the strongest of them,
DEF – should predict volatility at long horizons only through the VAR, not in addition
to it. In other words, the VAR forecasts should ideally represent the best way to
combine the information contained in the state variables concerning long-run
volatility. If true, aěer controlling for the VAR-implied forecast, DEF or other
variables that enter the VAR should not signiėcantly predict future long-run volatility.
We test this hypothesis by running a regression using both the VAR-implied forecast
andDEF as right-hand side variables. We ėnd that at all horizons the coeﬃcient on
VARh is still not signiėcantly diﬀerent from ǉ, while the coeﬃcient onDEF is small
and statistically indistinguishable from ǈ.
Finally, in Panel B of Table Ǌ.ǎ we examine more carefully the link betweenDEF
and LHRVAR focusing on the ǉǈ-year horizon. ĉe Table reports the results from
regressions forecasting LHRVARƨƤ with PE;DEF, PEO (PE orthogonalized toDEF),
andDEFO (DEF orthogonalized to PE). ĉe Table shows that by itself, PE has no
information about low-frequency variation in volatility. In contrast,DEF forecasts
nearly ǊǊƻ of the variation in LHRVARƨƤ. And onceDEF is orthogonalized to PE,
the RƦ increases to Ǎǉƻ. Adding PEO has liĨle eﬀect on the RƦ. We argue that this is
clear evidence of the strong predictive power of the orthogonalized component of the
default spread.
Recall our simple interpretation of these results. DEF contains information about
ǉǈǉ
future volatility as risky bonds are short the option to default. However,DEF also
contains information about future aggregate risk premia. We know from previous
work that most of the variation in PE is about aggregate risk premia. ĉerefore,
including PE in the volatility forecasting regression cleans up variation inDEF due to
aggregate risk premia and thus sharpens the link betweenDEF and future volatility.
Since PE andDEF are negatively correlated (default spreads are relatively low when
the market trades rich), both PE andDEF receive positive coeﬃcients in the multiple
regression.
In Figure Ǌ.Ǎ, we provide a visual representation of the volatility-forecasting power
of our key VAR state variables and our interpretation of the results. ĉe top panel
plots LHRVARƨƤ together with laggedDEF and PE. ĉe graph conėrms the strong
negative correlation between PE andDEF (correlation of -ǈ.ǎ) and highlights how
both variables track long-run movements in long run volatility. To isolate the
contribution of the default spread in predicting long run volatility, the boĨom panel
plots LHRVARƨƤ together withDEFO. In general, the improvement in ėt moving
from the top panel to the boĨom panel is clear.
More speciėcally, the contrasting behavior ofDEF andDEFO in the two panels
during episodes such as the tech boom help illustrate the workings of our story.
Taken in isolation, the relatively stable default spread throughout most of the late
ǉǑǑǈs would predict liĨle change in expectations of future market volatility.
However, once the declining equity premium over that period is taken into account
(as shown by the rapid increase in PE), one recognizes that a PE-adjusted spread in
the late ǉǑǑǈs actually forecasted much higher volatility ahead.
ǉǈǊ
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Figure Ǌ.Ǎ: Key Components of Long-Horizon Volatility
Wemeasure long-horizon realized variance (LHRVAR) as the annualized discounted sum of within-
quarter daily return variance, LHRVARh =
Σhj=ƥρ
j ƥRVARt+j
Σhj=ƥρj ƥ
. Each panel of this ėgure plots quar-
terly observations of ten-year realized variance, LHRVARƨƤ, over the sample period ǉǑǋǈ:ǉ-Ǌǈǈǉ:ǉ.
In Panel A, in addition to LHRVARƨƤ, we also plot lagged PE and DEF. In Panel B, in addition to
LHRVARƨƤ, we also plot the ėĨed value from a regression forecasting LHRVARƨƤ with DEFO, de-
ėned asDEF orthogonalized to demeaned PE.
ǉǈǋ
Taken together, the results in Table Ǌ.ǉ Panel A and Table Ǌ.ǎ make a strong case
that credit spreads and valuation ratios contain information about future volatility
not captured by simple univariate models, even those like the FIGARCHmodel or
the two-component EGARCHmodel that are designed to ėt long-run movements in
volatility, and that our VARmethod for calculating long-horizon forecasts preserves
this information.
Ǌ.ǋ PŇĽķĽłĻ Cĵňļ-ĺŀŃŌ, DĽňķŃŊłŉ-RĵŉĹ, ĵłĸ VŃŀĵŉĽŀĽŉŏ BĹŉĵň
TĹňŉ ĵňňĹŉň
In addition to the six VAR state variables, our analysis also requires returns on a
cross-section of test assets. We construct three sets of portfolios to use as test assets.
Our primary cross-section consists of the excess returns on the ǊǍME- and
BE/ME-sorted portfolios, studied in Fama and French (ǉǑǑǋ), extended in Davis,
Fama, and French (Ǌǈǈǈ), and made available by Professor Kenneth French on his
web site.¹¹
Daniel and Titman (ǉǑǑǏ, ǊǈǉǊ) and Lewellen, Nagel, and Shanken (Ǌǈǉǈ) point
out that it can be misleading to test asset pricing models using only portfolios sorted
by characteristics known to be related to average returns, such as size and value. In
particular, characteristics-sorted portfolios are likely to show some spread in betas
identiėed as risk by almost any asset pricing model, at least in sample. When the
model is estimated, a high premium per unit of beta will ėt the large variation in
¹¹hĨp://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/
ǉǈǌ
average returns. ĉus, at least when premia are not constrained by theory, an asset
pricing model may spuriously explain the average returns to characteristics-sorted
portfolios.
To alleviate this concern, we follow the advice of Daniel and Titman (ǉǑǑǏ, ǊǈǉǊ)
and Lewellen, Nagel, and Shanken (Ǌǈǉǈ) and construct a second set of six portfolios
double-sorted on past risk loadings to market and variance risk. First, we run a
loading-estimation regression for each stock in the CRSP database where ri;t is the log
stock return on stock i for month t.
ƧX
j=ƥ
ri;t+j = bƤ + brM
ƧX
j=ƥ
rM;t+j + bΔVAR
ƧX
j=ƥ
ΔVARt+j + "i;t+Ƨ
We calculate ΔVAR as a weighted sum of changes in the VAR state variables. ĉe
weight on each change is the corresponding value in the linear combination of VAR
shocks that deėnes news about market variance. We choose to work with changes
rather than shocks as this allows us to generate pre-formation loading estimates at a
frequency that is diﬀerent from our VAR. Namely, though we estimate our VAR using
calendar-quarter-end data, our approach allows a stock’s loading estimates to be
updated at each interimmonth.
ĉe regression is reestimated from a rolling ǋǎ-month window of overlapping
observations for each stock at the end of each month. Since these regressions are
estimated from stock-level instead of portfolio-level data, we use quarterly data to
minimize the impact of infrequent trading. With loading estimates in hand, each
month we perform a two-dimensional sequential sort on market beta and ΔVAR
ǉǈǍ
beta. First, we form three groups by sorting stocks onbbrM . ĉen, we further sort
stocks in each group to three portfolios onbbΔVAR and record returns on these nine
value-weight portfolios. ĉe ėnal set of risk-sorted portfolios are the two sets of threebbrM portfolios within the extremebbΔVAR groups. To ensure that the average returns on
these portfolio strategies are not inĚuenced by various market-microstructure issues
plaguing the smallest stocks, we exclude the ėve percent of stocks with the lowestME
from each cross-section and lag the estimated risk loadings by a month in our sorts.
In the empirical analysis, we consider two main subsamples: early
(ǉǑǋǉ:ǋ-ǉǑǎǋ:ǋ) and modern (ǉǑǎǋ:ǌ-Ǌǈǉǉ:ǌ) due to the ėndings in Campbell and
Vuolteenaho (Ǌǈǈǌ) of dramatic diﬀerences in the risks of these portfolios between
the early and modern period. ĉe ėrst subsample is shorter than that in Campbell
and Vuolteenaho (Ǌǈǈǌ) as we require each of the ǊǍ portfolios to have at least one
stock as of the time of formation in June.
Finally, we generate a parsimonious cross-section of option, bond, and equity
returns for the ǉǑǐǎ:ǉ-Ǌǈǉǉ:ǌ time period based on the ėndings in Fama and French
(ǉǑǑǋ) and Coval and Shumway (Ǌǈǈǉ). In particular, we use the S&P ǉǈǈ index
straddle returns studied by Coval and Shumway.¹² We also include proxies for the
two components of the risky bond factor of Fama and French (ǉǑǑǋ) which we
measure using the return on the Barclays Capital High Yield Bond Index (HYRET)
and the return on Barclays Capital Investment Grade Bond Index (IGRET). When
pricing the straddle and risky bond return series, we include the returns on the
¹²Speciėcally, the series we study includes only those straddle positions where the diﬀerence be-
tween the options’ strike price and the underlying price is between ǈ and Ǎ. We thank Josh Coval and
Tyler Shumway for providing their updated data series to us.
ǉǈǎ
market (RMRF), size (SMB), and value (HML) equity factors of Fama and French
(ǉǑǑǋ) as they argue these factors do a good job describing the cross-section of
average equity returns.
BĹŉĵ ŁĹĵňŊŇĹŁĹłŉ
We now examine the validity of an unconditional version of the ėrst-order condition
in equation (Ǌ.ǉǐ). We modify equation (Ǌ.ǉǐ) in three ways. First, we use simple
expected returns on the leě-hand side to make our results easier to compare with
previous empirical studies. Second, we condition down equation (Ǌ.ǉǐ) to avoid
having to estimate all required conditional moments. Finally, we cosmetically
multiply and divide all three covariances by the sample variance of the unexpected
log real return on the market portfolio. By doing so, we can express our pricing
equation in terms of betas, facilitating comparison to previous research. ĉese
modiėcations result in the following asset-pricing equation
E[Ri   Rf] = γσƦMβi;CFM + σƦMβi;DRM  
ƥ
Ʀ
ωσƦMβi;VM , (Ǌ.Ǌǎ)
where
βi;CFM 
Cov(ri;t;NCF;t)
Var(rM;t   Et ƥrM;t) ,
βi;DRM 
Cov(ri;t; NDR;t)
Var(rM;t   Et ƥrM;t) ,
and βi;VM 
Cov(ri;t;NV;t)
Var(rM;t   Et ƥrM;t) .
ǉǈǏ
We price the average excess returns on our test assets using the unconditional
ėrst-order condition in equation (Ǌ.Ǌǎ) and the quadratic relationship between the
parameters ω and γ given by (Ǌ.Ǌǌ). As a ėrst step, we estimate cash-Ěow,
discount-rate, and variance betas using the ėĨed values of the market’s cash Ěow,
discount-rate, and variance news estimated in the previous section. Speciėcally, we
estimate simpleWLS regressions of each portfolio’s log returns on each news term,
weighting each time-t+ ƥ observation pair by the weights used to estimate the VAR
in Table Ǌ.ǉ Panel B. We then scale the regression loadings by the ratio of the sample
variance of the news term in question to the sample variance of the unexpected log
real return on the market portfolio to generate estimates for our three-beta model.
Characteristic-sorted test assets
Table Ǌ.Ǐ shows the estimated betas for the ǊǍ size- and book-to-market portfolios
over the ǉǑǋǉ-ǉǑǎǋ period. ĉe portfolios are organized in a square matrix with
growth stocks at the leě, value stocks at the right, small stocks at the top, and large
stocks at the boĨom. At the right edge of the matrix we report the diﬀerences
between the extreme growth and extreme value portfolios in each size group; along
the boĨom of the matrix we report the diﬀerences between the extreme small and
extreme large portfolios in each BE/ME category. ĉe top matrix displays
post-formation cash-Ěow betas, the middle matrix displays post-formation
discount-rate betas, while the boĨommatrix displays post-formation variance betas.
In square brackets aěer each beta estimate we report a standard error, calculated
conditional on the realizations of the news series from the aggregate VARmodel.
In the pre-ǉǑǎǋ sample period, value stocks have both higher cash-Ěow and higher
ǉǈǐ
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discount-rate betas than growth stocks. An equal-weighted average of the extreme
value stocks across size quintiles has a cash-Ěow beta ǈ.ǉǊ higher than an
equal-weighted average of the extreme growth stocks. ĉe diﬀerence in estimated
discount-rate betas, ǈ.Ǌǈ, is in the same direction. Similar to value stocks, small stocks
have higher cash-Ěow betas and discount-rate betas than large stocks in this sample
(by ǈ.ǉǌ and ǈ.ǋǌ, respectively, for an equal-weighted average of the smallest stocks
across value quintiles relative to an equal-weighted average of the largest stocks).
ĉese diﬀerences are extremely similar to those in Campbell and Vuolteenaho
(Ǌǈǈǌ), despite the exclusion of the ǉǑǊǑ-ǉǑǋǉ subperiod, the replacement of the
excess log market return with the log real return, and the use of a richer,
heteroskedastic VAR.
ĉe new ėnding in Table Ǌ.Ǐ Panel A is that value stocks and small stocks are also
riskier in terms of volatility betas. An equal-weighted average of the extreme value
stocks across size quintiles has a volatility beta ǈ.Ǌǉ lower than an equal-weighted
average of the extreme growth stocks. Similarly, an equal-weighted average of the
smallest stocks across value quintiles has a volatility beta that is ǈ.ǉǐ lower than an
equal-weighted average of the largest stocks. In summary, value and small stocks were
unambiguously riskier than growth and large stocks over the ǉǑǋǉ-ǉǑǎǋ period.
Table Ǌ.ǐ reports the corresponding estimates for the post-ǉǑǎǋ period. As
documented in this subsample by Campbell and Vuolteenaho (Ǌǈǈǌ), value stocks
still have slightly higher cash-Ěow betas than growth stocks, but much lower
discount-rate betas. Our new ėnding here is that value stocks continue to have much
lower volatility betas, and the spread in volatility betas is even greater than in the early
ǉǉǈ
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period. ĉe volatility beta for the equal-weighted average of the extreme value stocks
across size quintiles is ǈ.ǍǊ lower than the volatility beta of an equal-weighted average
of the extreme growth stocks, a diﬀerence that is more than ǌǊƻ higher than the
corresponding diﬀerence in the early period.
One interesting aspect of these ėndings is the fact that the average βV of the ǊǍ
size- and book-to-market portfolios changes sign from the early to the modern
subperiod. Over the ǉǑǋǉ-ǉǑǎǋ period, the average βV is -ǈ.ǊǍ while over the
ǉǑǎǌ-Ǌǈǉǉ period this average becomes ǈ.ǋǎ. Of course, given the strong positive link
between PE and volatility news documented in the lower right panel of Table Ǌ.Ǎ, one
should not be surprised that the market’s βV can be positive. Moreover, given the
change in sign over time in PE’s correlation with some of the key state variables
driving EVAR documented in the Online Appendix, one should not be surprised that
βV changes sign as well.
ĉese results imply that in the post-ǉǑǎǋ period where the CAPM has diﬃculty
explaining the low returns on growth stocks relative to value stocks, growth stocks are
relative hedges for two key aspects of the investment opportunity set. Consistent
with Campbell and Vuolteenaho (Ǌǈǈǌ), growth stocks hedge news about future real
stock returns. ĉe novel ėnding of this paper is that growth stocks also hedge news
about the variance of the market return.
Risk-sorted test assets
Table Ǌ.Ǒ shows the estimated betas for the six risk-sorted portfolios over the
ǉǑǋǉ-ǉǑǎǋ period. ĉe portfolios are organized in a rectangular matrix with low
CAPM beta stocks at the leě, high CAPM beta stocks at the right, low volatility beta
ǉǉǊ
Table Ǌ.Ǒ: Betas for Six Risk-Sorted Portfolios in the Early Sample
bβCF LobbrM Ǌ HibbrM Diﬀ
LobbVAR ǈ.ǊǊ [ǈ.ǈǏ] ǈ.ǋǋ [ǈ.ǈǑ] ǈ.ǌǋ [ǈ.ǉǉ] ǈ.Ǌǉ [ǈ.ǈǍ]
HibbVAR ǈ.ǉǐ [ǈ.ǈǎ] ǈ.Ǌǎ [ǈ.ǈǐ] ǈ.ǋǎ [ǈ.ǉǈ] ǈ.ǉǏ [ǈ.ǈǍ]
Diﬀ -ǈ.ǈǌ [ǈ.ǈǊ] -ǈ.ǈǏ [ǈ.ǈǋ] -ǈ.ǈǐ [ǈ.ǈǊ]
bβDR LobbrM Ǌ HibbrM Diﬀ
LobbVAR ǈ.ǎǉ [ǈ.ǈǏ] ǈ.ǐǏ [ǈ.ǉǉ] ǉ.ǈǑ [ǈ.ǉǌ] ǈ.ǌǐ [ǈ.ǈǑ]
HibbVAR ǈ.ǍǍ [ǈ.ǈǎ] ǈ.Ǐǎ [ǈ.ǈǑ] ǈ.ǑǍ [ǈ.ǉǉ] ǈ.ǌǈ [ǈ.ǈǏ]
Diﬀ -ǈ.ǈǏ [ǈ.ǈǌ] -ǈ.ǉǊ [ǈ.ǈǎ] -ǈ.ǉǌ [ǈ.ǈǍ]
bβV LobbrM Ǌ HibbrM Diﬀ
LobbVAR -ǈ.ǈǐ [ǈ.ǈǑ] -ǈ.Ǌǈ [ǈ.ǉǋ] -ǈ.ǋǈ [ǈ.ǉǎ] -ǈ.ǊǊ [ǈ.ǈǑ]
HibbVAR -ǈ.ǈǎ [ǈ.ǈǑ] -ǈ.ǈǑ [ǈ.ǉǈ] -ǈ.ǉǏ [ǈ.ǉǋ] -ǈ.ǉǉ [ǈ.ǈǏ]
Diﬀ ǈ.ǈǊ [ǈ.ǈǍ] ǈ.ǉǉ [ǈ.ǈǏ] ǈ.ǉǋ [ǈ.ǈǎ]
stocks at the top, and high volatility beta stocks at the boĨom. At the right edge of the
matrix we report the diﬀerences between the high CAPM beta and the low CAPM
beta portfolios in each volatility beta group; along the boĨom of the matrix we report
the diﬀerences between the high volatility beta and the low volatility beta portfolios
in each CAPM beta category. As in Panel A, the top matrix displays post-formation
cash-Ěow betas, the middle matrix displays post-formation discount-rate betas, while
the boĨommatrix displays post-formation volatility betas.
In the pre-ǉǑǎǋ sample period, high CAPM beta stocks have both higher cash-Ěow
and higher discount-rate betas than low CAPM beta stocks. An equal-weighted
average of the high CAPM beta stocks across the two volatility beta categories has a
cash-Ěow beta ǈ.ǉǑ higher than an equal-weighted average of the low CAPM beta
stocks. ĉe diﬀerence in estimated discount-rate betas is ǈ.ǌǌ and in the same
ǉǉǋ
direction. Similar to high CAPM beta stocks, low volatility beta stocks have higher
cash-Ěow betas and discount-rate betas than high volatility beta stocks in this
subsample (by ǈ.ǈǎ and ǈ.ǉǉ, respectively, for an equal-weighted average of the low
volatility beta stocks across the three CAPM beta categories relative to a
corresponding equal-weighted average of the high volatility beta stocks).
High CAPM beta stocks and low volatility beta stocks are also riskier in terms of
volatility betas. An equal-weighted average of the high CAPM beta stocks across
volatility beta categories has a post-formation volatility beta ǈ.ǉǎ lower than an
equal-weighted average of the low CAPM beta stocks. Similarly, an equal-weighted
average of the low volatility beta stocks across CAPM beta categories has a
post-formation volatility beta that is ǈ.ǈǑ lower than an equal-weighted average of the
high volatility beta stocks. In summary, high CAPM beta and low volatility beta
stocks were unambiguously riskier than low CAPM beta and high volatility beta
stocks over the ǉǑǋǉ-ǉǑǎǋ period.
Table Ǌ.ǉǈ shows the estimated betas for the six risk-sorted portfolios over the
post-ǉǑǎǋ period. In the modern period, high CAPM beta stocks again have higher
cash-Ěow and higher discount-rate betas than low CAPM beta stocks. An
equal-weighted average of the high CAPM beta stocks across the two volatility beta
categories has a cash-Ěow beta ǈ.ǈǐ higher than an equal-weighted average of the low
CAPM beta stocks. ĉe diﬀerence in estimated discount-rate betas is ǈ.ǍǍ and in the
same direction. However, high CAPM beta stocks are no longer riskier in terms of
volatility betas. Now, an equal-weighted average of the high CAPM beta stocks across
the two volatility beta categories has a post-formation variance beta ǈ.Ǌǐ higher than
ǉǉǌ
Table Ǌ.ǉǈ: Betas for Six Risk-Sorted Portfolios in theModern Sample
LobbVAR ǈ.ǉǎ [ǈ.ǈǋ] ǈ.ǉǏ [ǈ.ǈǋ] ǈ.ǊǍ [ǈ.ǈǍ] ǈ.ǈǐ [ǈ.ǈǌ]
HibbVAR ǈ.ǉǍ [ǈ.ǈǋ] ǈ.ǉǏ [ǈ.ǈǌ] ǈ.Ǌǋ [ǈ.ǈǍ] ǈ.ǈǐ [ǈ.ǈǌ]
Diﬀ -ǈ.ǈǉ [ǈ.ǈǊ] ǈ.ǈǈ [ǈ.ǈǊ] -ǈ.ǈǉ [ǈ.ǈǊ]
bβDR LobbrM Ǌ HibbrM Diﬀ
LobbVAR ǈ.ǍǍ [ǈ.ǈǍ] ǈ.Ǐǉ [ǈ.ǈǍ] ǉ.ǉǉ [ǈ.ǈǑ] ǈ.Ǎǎ [ǈ.ǈǐ]
HibbVAR ǈ.Ǐǋ [ǈ.ǈǎ] ǈ.ǑǍ [ǈ.ǈǎ] ǉ.ǊǏ [ǈ.ǈǑ] ǈ.Ǎǌ [ǈ.ǉǉ]
Diﬀ ǈ.ǉǐ [ǈ.ǈǏ] ǈ.Ǌǌ [ǈ.ǈǏ] ǈ.ǉǎ [ǈ.ǈǎ]
bβV LobbrM Ǌ HibbrM Diﬀ
LobbVAR ǈ.ǊǊ [ǈ.ǉǑ] ǈ.ǋǉ [ǈ.ǊǊ] ǈ.Ǎǈ [ǈ.ǊǑ] ǈ.ǊǏ [ǈ.ǉǋ]
HibbVAR ǈ.ǌǌ [ǈ.ǉǎ] ǈ.ǎǌ [ǈ.ǉǐ] ǈ.ǏǊ [ǈ.ǊǏ] ǈ.Ǌǐ [ǈ.ǉǍ]
Diﬀ ǈ.Ǌǉ [ǈ.ǈǏ] ǈ.ǋǋ [ǈ.ǈǑ] ǈ.ǊǊ [ǈ.ǈǎ]
a corresponding equal-weighted average of the low CAPM beta stocks. Since, in the
three-beta model, covariation with aggregate volatility has a negative premium, the
three-beta model can potentially explain why stocks with high past CAPM betas have
oﬀered relatively liĨle extra return, at least in the modern period.
In the post-ǉǑǎǋ period, sorts on volatility beta continue to generate economically
and statistically signiėcant spread in post-formation volatility beta. An
equal-weighted average of low volatility beta stocks across the three CAPM beta
categories has a post-formation volatility beta that is ǈ.Ǌǎ lower than the
post-formation volatility beta of a corresponding equal-weighted average of high
volatility beta stocks. Sorts on volatility beta also generate spread in discount-rate
beta, but essentially no spread in cash-Ěow betas in the post-ǉǑǎǋ period.
Non-equity test assets
ǉǉǍ
Finally, Table Ǌ.ǉǉ reports the three ICAPM betas of the S&P ǉǈǈ index straddle
position analyzed in Coval and Shumway (Ǌǈǈǉ) along with the corresponding
ICAPM betas of the three equity factors and the default bond factor of Fama and
French (ǉǑǑǋ) over the period ǉǑǐǎ:ǉ - Ǌǈǉǉ:ǌ. Consistent with the nature of a
straddle bet, we ėnd that the straddle has a very large volatility beta of ǉ.Ǎǉ along with
a large negative discount-rate beta of -ǉ.Ǐǉ and a large (relatively speaking) negative
cash-Ěow beta of -ǈ.ǋǑ. As one would expect, the betas of the Fama-French equity
factors are consistent with the ėndings for the size- and book-to-market-sorted
portfolios in Table Ǌ.ǐ Panel B. Finally, the riskier component of Fama and French’s
(ǉǑǑǋ) risky bond factor,HYRET, has a cash-Ěow beta of ǈ.ǈǎ, a discount-rate beta of
ǈ.Ǌǎ, and a volatility beta of -ǈ.Ǌǈ. ĉese betas are economically and statistically
signiėcant from those of the safer component, IGRET. ĉe diﬀerence in volatility
beta betweenHYRET and IGRET is consistent with the fact that risky corporate debt
is short the option to default.
BĹŉĵ ńŇĽķĽłĻ
We next turn to pricing the cross-section with these three ICAPM betas. We evaluate
the performance of ėve asset-pricing models: ǉ) the traditional CAPM that restricts
cash-Ěow and discount-rate betas to have the same price of risk and sets the price of
variance risk equal to zero; Ǌ) the two-beta intertemporal asset pricing model of
Campbell and Vuolteenaho (Ǌǈǈǌ) that restricts the price of discount-rate risk to
equal the variance of the market return, ǋ) our three-beta intertemporal asset pricing
model that restricts the price of discount-rate risk to equal the variance of the market
ǉǉǎ
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return and constrains the price of cash-Ěow and variance risk to be related by
equation (Ǌ.Ǌǌ), with ρ = Ƥ:ƭƩ per year; ǌ) a partially-constrained three-beta model
that restricts the price of discount-rate risk to equal the variance of the market return
but freely estimates the other two risk prices (eﬀectively decoupling γ and ω), and Ǎ)
an unrestricted three-beta model that allows free risk prices for cash-Ěow,
discount-rate, and volatility betas. Each model is estimated in two diﬀerent forms:
one with a restricted zero-beta rate equal to the Treasury-bill rate, and one with an
unrestricted zero-beta rate following Black (ǉǑǏǊ).
Characteristic-sorted test assets
Table Ǌ.ǉǊ reports results for the early sample period ǉǑǋǉ-ǉǑǎǋ, using ǊǍ size- and
book-to-market-sorted portfolios as test assets. ĉe table has ten columns, two
speciėcations for each of our ėve asset pricing models. ĉe ėrst ǉǎ rows of Table Ǌ.ǉǊ
are divided into four sets of four rows. ĉe ėrst set of four rows corresponds to the
zero-beta rate (in excess of the Treasury-bill rate), the second set to the premium on
cash-Ěow beta, the third set to the premium on discount-rate beta, and the fourth set
to the premium on volatility beta. Within each set, the ėrst row reports the point
estimate in fractions per quarter, and the second row annualizes this estimate,
multiplying by ǌǈǈ to aid in interpretation. ĉese parameters are estimated from a
cross-sectional regression
Rei = gƤ + gƥbβi;CFM + gƦbβi;DRM + gƧbβi;VM + ei; (Ǌ.ǊǏ)
where a bar denotes time-series mean and Rei  Ri   Rrf denotes the sample average
simple excess return on asset i. ĉe third and fourth rows present two alternative
ǉǉǐ
standard errors of the monthly estimate, described below.
Below the premia estimates, we report the RƦ statistic for a cross-sectional
regression of average returns on our test assets onto the ėĨed values from the model.
We also report a composite pricing error, computed as a quadratic form of the pricing
errors. ĉe weighting matrix in the quadratic form is a diagonal matrix with the
inverse of the sample test asset return volatilities on the main diagonal.
Standard errors are produced with a bootstrap from ǉǈ,ǈǈǈ simulated realizations.
Our bootstrap experiment samples test-asset returns and ėrst-stage VAR errors, and
uses the ėrst-stage and second-stageWLS VAR estimates in Table Ǌ.ǉ to generate the
state-variable data.¹³ We partition the VAR errors and test-asset returns into two
groups, one for ǉǑǋǉ to ǉǑǎǋ and another for ǉǑǎǋ to Ǌǈǉǉ, which enables us to use
the same simulated realizations in subperiod analyses. ĉe ėrst set of standard errors
(labeled A) conditions on estimated news terms and generates betas and return
premia separately for each simulated realization, while the second set (labeled B) also
estimates the ėrst-stage and second-stage VAR and the news terms separately for each
simulated realization. Standard errors B thus incorporate the considerable additional
sampling uncertainty due to the fact that the news terms as well as betas are generated
regressors.
Two alternative Ǎ-percent critical values for the composite pricing error are
produced with a bootstrap method similar to the one we have described above,
except that the test-asset returns are adjusted to be consistent with the pricing model
before the random samples are generated. Critical values A condition on estimated
¹³When simulating the bootstrap, we drop realizations which would result in negative RVAR and
redraw.
ǉǉǑ
news terms, while critical values B take account of the fact that news terms must be
estimated.
Finally, Table Ǌ.ǉǊ reports the implied risk-aversion coeﬃcient, γ, which can be
recovered as gƥ=gƦ, as well as the sensitivity of news about risk to news about market
variance, ω, which can be recovered as Ʀ  gƧ=gƦ. ĉe three-beta ICAPM estimates
are constrained so that both γ and the implied ω are strictly positive.
Table Ǌ.ǉǊ shows that in the ǉǑǋǉ-ǉǑǎǋ period, the restricted three-beta model
explains the cross-section of stock returns reasonably well. ĉe cross-sectional RƦ
statistics are almost Ǎǎƻ for both forms of this model. Both the Sharpe-Lintner and
Black versions of the CAPM do a slightly poorer job describing the cross-section
(both RƦ statistics are roughly ǍǊƻ). ĉe two-beta ICAPM of Campbell and
Vuolteenaho (Ǌǈǈǌ) performs slightly beĨer than the CAPM and slightly worse than
the volatility ICAPM. None of the theoretically-motivated models considered are
rejected by the data based on the composite pricing test. Consistent with the claim
that the three-beta model does a good job describing the cross-section, Table Ǌ.ǉǊ
shows that the constrained and the unrestricted factor model barely improve pricing
relative to the three-beta ICAPM.
Figure Ǌ.ǎ provides a visual summary of these results. ĉe ėgure plots the
predicted average excess return on the horizontal axis and the actual sample average
excess return on the vertical axis. In summary, we ėnd that the three-beta ICAPM
improves pricing relative to both the Sharpe-Lintner and Black versions of the
CAPM.
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Figure Ǌ.ǎ: Pricing ǊǍ Size and Value Portfolios, Early Period
ĉe four diagrams correspond to (clockwise from the top leě) the CAPM with a constrained zero-
beta rate, the CAPMwith an unconstrained zero-beta rate, the three-factor ICAPMwith a free zero-
beta rate, and the three-factor ICAPM with the zero-beta rate constrained to the risk-freee rate. ĉe
horizontal axes correspond to the predicted average excess returns and the vertical axes to the sample
average realized excess returns for the ǊǍ ME- and BE/ME-sorted portfolios. ĉe predicted values
are from regressions presented in Table Ǌ.ǉǊ for the sample period ǉǑǋǉ:ǋ-ǉǑǎǋ:Ǌ.
ǉǊǊ
ĉis success is due in part to the inclusion of volatility betas in the speciėcation.
For the Black version of the three-beta ICAPM, the spread in volatility betas across
the ǊǍ size- and book-to-market-sorted portfolios generates an annualized spread in
average returns of ǉ.ǌǎƻ compared to a comparable spread of Ǐ.ǌǉƻ and ǋ.ǉǐƻ for
cash-Ěow and discount-rate betas. Variation in volatility betas accounts for Ǌƻ of the
variation in explained returns compared to ǋǑƻ and Ǐƻ for cash-Ěow and
discount-rate betas respectively. ĉe remaining ǍǊƻ of the explained variation in
average returns is due of course to the covariation among the three types of betas.
Results are very diﬀerent in the ǉǑǎǋ-Ǌǈǉǉ period. Table Ǌ.ǉǋ shows that in this
period, both versions of the CAPM do a very poor job of explaining cross-sectional
variation in average returns on portfolios sorted by size and book-to-market. When
the zero-beta rate is leě as a free parameter, the cross-sectional regression picks a
negative premium for the CAPM beta and implies an RƦ of roughly Ǎƻ. When the
zero-beta rate is constrained to the risk-free rate, the CAPM RƦ falls to roughly -ǋǏƻ.
Both versions of the static CAPM are easily rejected at the ėve-percent level by both
sets of critical values.
In the modern period, the unconstrained zero-beta rate version of the two-beta
Campbell and Vuolteenaho (Ǌǈǈǌ) model does a beĨer job describing the
cross-section of average returns than the CAPM. However, the implied coeﬃcient of
risk aversion, Ǌǈ.Ǐǈ, is arguably extreme.
ĉe three-beta model with the restricted zero-beta rate also does a poor job
explaining cross-sectional variation in average returns across our test assets. However,
if we continue to restrict the risk price for discount-rate and variance news but allow
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Figure Ǌ.Ǐ: Pricing ǊǍ Size and Value Portfolios, Modern Period
ĉe four diagrams correspond to (clockwise from the top leě) the CAPM with a constrained zero-
beta rate, the CAPMwith an unconstrained zero-beta rate, the three-factor ICAPMwith a free zero-
beta rate, and the three-factor ICAPM with the zero-beta rate constrained to the risk-freee rate. ĉe
horizontal axes correspond to the predicted average excess returns and the vertical axes to the sample
average realized excess returns for the ǊǍ ME- and BE/ME-sorted portfolios. ĉe predicted values
are from regressions presented in Table Ǌ.ǉǋ for the sample period ǉǑǎǋ:ǋ-Ǌǈǉǉ:ǌ.
an unrestricted zero-beta rate, the explained variation increases to roughly ǎǑƻ,
three-quarters larger than the RƦ of the corresponding two-beta ICAPM.ĉe
estimated risk price for cash-Ěow beta is an economically reasonable ǋǈ percent per
year with an implied coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion of Ǒ.ǎǋ. Both versions of our
intertemporal CAPMwith stochastic volatility are not rejected at the Ǎ-percent level
by either set of critical values.
Figure Ǌ.Ǐ provides a visual summary of these results. For the Black version of the
ǉǊǍ
three-beta ICAPM, spread in volatility betas across the ǊǍ size- and
book-to-market-sorted portfolios generates an annualized spread in average returns
of ǎ.ǍǊƻ compared to a comparable spread of ǋ.Ǒǈƻ and Ǌ.Ǌǌƻ for cash-Ěow and
discount-rate betas. Variation in volatility betas accounts for ǑǊƻ of the variation in
explained returns compared to Ǌǈƻ for cash-Ěow betas as well as Ǐƻ for discount-rate
betas. Covariation among the three types of betas is responsible for the remaining
-ǉǑƻ of explained variation in average returns.
ĉe relatively poor performance of the risk-free rate version of the three-beta
ICAPM is due to the derived link between γ and ω. To show this, Figure Ǌ.ǐ provides
two contour plots (one each for the risk-free and zero-beta rate versions of the model
in the top and boĨom panels of the ėgure respectively) of the RƦ resulting from
combinations of (γ,ω) ranging from (ǈ,ǈ) to (ǌǈ,ǉǎ). On the same ėgure we also plot
the relation between γ and ω derived in equation (Ǌ.Ǌǌ). ĉe top panel of Figure Ǌ.ǐ
shows that even with the intercept restricted to zero, RƦ’s are as high as Ǐǈƻ for some
combinations of (γ,ω). Unfortunately, as the plot shows, these combinations do not
coincide with the curve implied by equation (Ǌ.Ǌǌ). Once the zero-beta rate is
unconstrained, the contours for RƦ’s greater than ǎǈƻ cover a much larger area of the
plot and coincide nicely with the ICAPM relation of equation (Ǌ.Ǌǌ).
Consistent with the contour plots of Figure Ǌ.ǐ, the pricing results in Table Ǌ.ǉǋ
based on the partially-constrained factor model further conėrms that the link
between γ and ω is responsible for the poor ėt of the restricted zero-beta rate version
of the three-beta ICAPM in the modern period. When removing the constraint
linking γ and ω but leaving the constraint on the discount-rate beta premium in place,
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Figure Ǌ.ǐ: Contour Plots Showing Goodness-of-Fit
ĉe two contour plots show how the RƦ of the cross-sectional regression explaining the average re-
turns on the ǊǍ size- and book-to-market portfolios varies for diﬀerent values of γ and ω for the risk-
free rate (top panel) and zero-beta rate (boĨom panel) three-beta ICAPMmodel estimated in Table
Ǌ.ǉǋ for the sample period ǉǑǎǋ:ǋ-Ǌǈǉǉ:ǌ. ĉe two plots also indicate the approximate ICAPM rela-
tion between γ and ω described in equation (Ǌ.Ǌǌ).
ǉǊǏ
the RƦ increases from -ǍǏƻ to Ǐǌƻ. Nevertheless, the risk prices for γ and ω remain
economically large and of the right sign.
Risk-sorted test assets
We conėrm that the success of the three-beta ICAPM is robust by expanding the
set of test portfolios beyond the ǊǍ size- and book-to-market-sorted portfolios. First,
we show that our three-beta model not only describes the cross-section of
characteristics-sorted portfolios but also can explain the average returns on
risk-sorted portfolios. We examine risk-sorted portfolios as Daniel and Titman
(ǉǑǑǏ, ǊǈǉǊ) and Lewellen, Nagel, and Shanken (Ǌǈǉǈ) argue that asset-pricing tests
using only portfolios sorted by characteristics known to be related to average returns,
such as size and value, can be misleading due to the low-dimensional factor structure
of the ǊǍ size and book-to-market-sorted portfolios.
Table Ǌ.ǉǌ prices the six risk-sorted portfolios described in Table Ǌ.Ǐ Panel B in
conjunction with six of the ǊǍ size- and book-to-market-sorted portfolios of Table Ǌ.Ǐ
Panel A (the low, medium, and high BE/ME portfolios within the small and largeME
quintiles). We continue to ėnd that the three-beta ICAPM improves pricing relative
to both the Sharpe-Lintner and Black versions of the CAPM.Moreover, the relatively
high RƦ (ǍǏƻ) is not disproportionately due to characteristics-sorted portfolios as
the RƦ for the risk-sorted subset (ǎǑƻ) is not only comparable to but also larger than
the RƦ for the characteristics-sorted subset (Ǎǉƻ). Figure Ǌ.Ǒ shows this success
graphically.
Table Ǌ.ǉǍ prices the cross-section of characteristics- and risk-sorted portfolios in
ǉǊǐ
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Figure Ǌ.Ǒ: Pricing Risk Sorted Portfolios, Early Period
ĉe four diagrams correspond to (clockwise from the top leě) the CAPM with a constrained zero-
beta rate, the CAPMwith an unconstrained zero-beta rate, the three-factor ICAPMwith a free zero-
beta rate, and the three-factor ICAPM with the zero-beta rate constrained to the risk-freee rate. ĉe
horizontal axes correspond to the predicted average excess returns and the vertical axes to the sample
average realized excess returns for the ǊǍ ME- and BE/ME-sorted portfolios. ĉe predicted values
are from regressions presented in Table Ǌ.ǉǋ for the sample period ǉǑǎǋ:ǋ-Ǌǈǉǉ:ǌ.
ǉǋǈ
the modern period. We ėnd that the zero-beta rate three-beta ICAPM is not rejected
by the data while both versions of the CAPM are rejected. Again, the relatively high
RƦ for the zero-beta rate version of the volatility ICAPM (Ǐǎƻ) is not
disproportionately due to characteristics-sorted portfolios as the RƦ for the
risk-sorted subset (ǐǉƻ) is not only comparable to but also larger than the RƦ for the
characteristics-sorted subset (ǏǏƻ). Figure Ǌ.ǉǈ provides a graphically summary of
these results.
Non-equity test assets
We also show that our three-beta model can help explain average returns on
non-equity portfolios designed to be highly correlated with aggregate volatility risk,
namely the S&P ǉǈǈ index straddles of Coval and Shumway (Ǌǈǈǉ). We ėrst
calculate the expected return on straddle portfolio based on the estimates of the
zero-beta rate volatility ICAPM in Table Ǌ.ǉǋ. ĉe contributions to expected
quarterly return from the straddle’s cash-Ěow, discount-rate, and volatility betas are
-Ǌ.ǑǊƻ, -ǉ.ǋǋƻ, and -ǋ.ǐǏƻ respectively. As the average quarterly realized return on
the straddle is -Ǌǉ.ǎǎƻ, an equity-based estimate of the three-beta model explains
roughly ǋǐƻ of the realized straddle premium.
Table ?? shows that our intertemporal CAPMwith stochastic volatility is not
rejected at the Ǎ-percent level when we price the joint cross-section of equity, bond,
and straddle returns. ĉe implied risk aversion coeﬃcient (roughly ǉǍ for both the
risk-free and zero-beta rate implementations of the model) is high but not
unreasonable. In sharp contrast, the CAPM is strongly rejected. ĉough the two-beta
ǉǋǉ
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Figure Ǌ.ǉǈ: Pricing Risk Sorted Portfolios, Modern Period
ĉe four diagrams correspond to (clockwise from the top leě) the CAPM with a constrained zero-
beta rate, the CAPMwith an unconstrained zero-beta rate, the three-factor ICAPMwith a free zero-
beta rate, and the three-factor ICAPM with the zero-beta rate constrained to the risk-free rate. ĉe
horizontal axes correspond to the predicted average excess returns and the vertical axes to the sample
average realized excess returns for six ME- and BE/ME-sorted portfolios (denoted by triangles) and
six risk-sorted portfolios (denoted by asterisks). ĉe predicted values are from regressions presented
in Table Ǌ.ǉǌ for the sample period ǉǑǋǉ:ǋ-ǉǑǎǋ:Ǌ.
ǉǋǋ
ICAPM is not rejected, the required risk aversion is too extreme (over Ǎǋ for both
versions of the model) to be realistic.
Summary of US ėnancial history
Figure Ǌ.ǉǉ (third panel) plots the time-series of the smoothed combined shock
γNCF   NDR   ƥƦωNV based on the estimate of the zero-beta model for the modern
period (Table Ǌ.ǉǋ). ĉe correlation of this shock with the associatedNCF is ǈ.Ǒǈ.
Similarly, the correlation of this shock with the associatedNDR is ǈ.Ǌǎ. Finally, the
correlation of this shock with the associatedNV is -ǈ.Ǐǎ. Figure Ǌ.ǉǉ also plots the
corresponding smoothed shock series for the CAPM (NCF   NDR) and for the
two-beta ICAPM (γNCF   NDR). ĉe two-beta model shiěs the history of good and
bad times relative to the CAPM, as emphasized by Campbell, Giglio, and Polk
(ǊǈǉǊ). ĉemodel with stochastic volatility further accentuates that periods with
high market volatility, such as the ǉǑǋǈs and the late Ǌǈǈǈs, are particularly hard
times for long-term investors.
Ǌ.ǌ TļĹ CŃłŉŇĽĶŊŉĽŃł Ńĺ SŉŃķļĵňŉĽķ VŃŀĵŉĽŀĽŉŏ
We extend the approximate closed-form intertemporal capital asset pricing model of
Campbell (ǉǑǑǋ) to allow for stochastic volatility. Our model recognizes that an
investor’s investment opportunities may deteriorate either because expected stock
returns decline or because the volatility of stock returns increases. A conservative
long-term investor will wish to hedge against both types of changes in investment
opportunities; thus, a stock’s risk is determined not only by its beta with unexpected
ǉǋǌ
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Figure Ǌ.ǉǉ: Pricing Risk Sorted Portfolios, Modern Period
ĉis ėgure plots the time-series of the smoothed combined shock for the CAPM (NCF   NDR),
the two-beta ICAPM (γNCF   NDR), and the three-beta ICAPM that includes stochastic volatil-
ity (γNCF   NDR   ƥƦωNV) for the unconstrained zero-beta rate speciėcations estimated in Table
ǐ for the modern subperiod. ĉe shock is smoothed with a trailing exponentially-weighted moving
average. ĉe decay parameter is set to ǈ.ǈǐ per quarter, and the smoothed news series is generated as
MAt(SDF) = Ƥ:ƤƬSDFt +(ƥ  Ƥ:ƤƬ)MAt ƥ(N). ĉis decay parameter implies a half-life of six years.
ĉe sample period is ǉǑǊǎ:Ǌ-Ǌǈǉǉ:ǌ.
ǉǋǍ
market returns and news about future returns (or equivalently, news about market
cash Ěows and discount rates), but also by its beta with news about future market
volatility. Although our model has three dimensions of risk, the prices of all these
risks are determined by a single free parameter, the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion.
Our implementation models the return on the aggregate stock market as one
element of a vector autoregressive (VAR) system; the volatility of all shocks to the
VAR is another element of the system. ĉe empirical implementation of our VAR
reveals new low-frequency movements in market volatility tied to the default spread.
We show that the negative post-ǉǑǎǋ CAPM alphas of growth stocks are justiėed
because these stocks hedge long-term investors against both declining expected stock
returns, and increasing volatility. ĉe addition of volatility risk to the model helps it
to deliver a moderate, economically reasonable value of risk aversion.
Our empirical work is limited in one important respect. We test only the
unconditional implications of the model and do not evaluate its conditional
implications. A full conditional test is likely to be a challenging hurdle for the model.
To see why, recall that we assume a rational long-term investor always holds ǉǈǈƻ of
his or her assets in equities. However, time-variation in real stock returns generally
gives the long-term investor an incentive to shiě the relative weights on cash and
equity, unless real interest rates and market volatility move in exactly the right way to
make the equity premium proportional to market volatility. Although we do not
explicitly test whether this is the case, previous work by Campbell (ǉǑǐǏ) and
Harvey (ǉǑǐǑ, ǉǑǑǉ) rejects this proportionality restriction.
One way to support the assumption of constant ǉǈǈƻ equity investment is to
ǉǋǎ
invoke binding leverage constraints. Indeed, in the modern sample, the Black (ǉǑǏǊ)
version of our three-beta model is consistent with this interpretation as the estimated
diﬀerence between the zero-beta and risk-free rates is positive, statistically signiėcant,
and economically large. However, the risk aversion coeﬃcient we estimate may be
too large to explain why leverage constraints should bind.
Nevertheless, our model does directly answer the interesting microeconomic
question: Are there reasonable preference parameters that would make a long-term
investor, constrained to invest ǉǈǈƻ in equity, content to hold the market rather than
tilting towards value stocks or other high-return stock portfolios? Our answer is
clearly yes.
ǉǋǏ
ĉe high brokerage charges and the heavy transfer
tax...suﬃciently diminish the liquidity of the market. But
a liĪle consideration of this expedient brings us up against
a dilemma, and shows how the liquidity of investment
markets oĜen faciliates, though it sometimes impedes, the
course of new investment.
JohnMaynard Keynes
3
Informative Prices and the
Coﬆ of CapitalMarkets
IłŋĹňŉŃŇň ňńĹłĸ ĵ ĻŇĹĵŉ ĸĹĵŀ of time and money speculating on ėnancial
valuations or hiring others to trade on their behalf. While criticizing speculation is
always fashionable, the scale of the recent increase in resources spent on capital
markets has many people concerned that we are wasting talent and resources. ĉere
seems to be liĨle consensus among ėnancial economists regarding the value of this
speculative activity; however, it is easy to observe the increase in quantity.
Historically, the share of national income spent on ėnancial market activity remained
ǉǋǐ
relatively stable until the mid-ǉǑǏǈs, when the ėnancial sector began to growmuch
more rapidly than the aggregate US economy. Before rushing to judge whether we
now spend too much, or too liĨle, on active investing, we need theory and evidence
that promise to explain the root cause of this growth and the resulting eﬀect on asset
prices.
In this paper, I document how the sharp decline in the cost of ėnancial transactions
facilitated the modern increase in ėnancial activity. To clarify the forces at work, I
present a stylized model of an economy with a ėnancial sector that allows investors to
trade ownership claims on a risky investment. ĉe supply of investment responds to
asset prices, and investor demand drives costly ėnancial activity. Investors decide
howmuch of their resources to employ researching the future prospects of the
uncertain outcome, andmarket transaction costs aﬀect the quantity and time horizon
of informed speculation. We see the surprising result that the ėnancial sector
consumes more resources through spending on active investing as it operates more
eﬃciently. As dynamic trading strategies become feasible, the model suggests that the
information content of asset prices increases, especially over short-horizons.
Historical data on USmarket activity and asset prices conėrm these predictions.
ĉemost signiėcant decrease in transaction costs occurred in ǉǑǏǍ, when onMay
Day the SEC demanded that stock exchanges end the practice of forcing a ėxed
commission schedule on all equity transactions. In response to broker competition,
the average cost of institutional trading plummeted to about half of previous levels.¹
ĉis event is signiėcant not only in the historical time series, but it also provides a
¹US Securities and Exchange Commission, Directorate of Economic and Policy Research. Staﬀ
Report on the Securities Industry in ȕȝțȜ ( July Ǌǎ, ǉǑǏǑ)
ǉǋǑ
natural seĨing for identifying the causal mechanism. ĉis regulatory change leads to
a surge in capital market spending, trading, and compensation, with an impact that
predictably varies across investment characteristics and time horizons.
ĉe eﬃciency of modern ėnancial markets enables dynamic trading strategies and
encourages investors to spend more resources on research and trading, but increased
eﬃciency does not necessarily align the incentives of private speculators toward
activities with the greatest social beneėt. Returning again to the stylized model shows
that increases in the eﬃciency of ėnancial market operations may lead to less eﬃcient
economic outcomes.
SńĹłĸĽłĻ Ńł CĵńĽŉĵŀMĵŇĿĹŉ AķŉĽŋĽŉŏ
Consider howmuch the United States spends on capital market activities each year as
a share of total national production. Figure ǋ.ǉ shows the cost of capital markets as a
percentage of the GDP of the US private sector, where capital market spending
consists of the proėts and employee compensation tabulated using the gross value
addedmeasures reported by United States Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).²ĉe
cost of capital markets is remarkably stable for approximately half a century.
Beginning with a cost of ǈ.ǊǏƻ of GDP in ǉǑǊǈ to a cost of ǈ.ǋǍƻ in ǉǑǏǈ, spending
stays fairly close to its average of ǈ.ǋǊƻ with the exception of a moderate dip around
WorldWar II.ĉen, a liĨle before ǉǑǐǈ, we notice a dramatic surge in the cost of
capital markets to the point where capital markets now consume two percent of
annual spending.
²A complete description of the underlying data will be available in an online appendix.
ǉǌǈ
1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
2.0%
2.5%
Capital Market Cost as Share of Private GDP
1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
Capital Market Employee Compensation Relative to US Average
Figure ǋ.ǉ: Capital Market Spending and Compensation
ĉe upper plot shows the share of GDP aĨributed to the capital markets sector using the gross value
added measure, and the lower plot shows the ratio of average employee compensation in the capital
markets sector relative to theUS private industry average. ĉeprimary source for these calculations is
the industry accounts data published by theUSBureau of Economic Analysis as ofMarch Ǌǈǉǉ. Cap-
ital markets-related industries are described in Table ǋ.ǉ. Data prior to ǉǑǌǏ comes from Philippon
(ǊǈǉǊ).
ǉǌǉ
Philippon (ǊǈǉǊ) lays out the scope of the historical challenge as he tabulates the
costs and quantities of various ėnancial activities over the past ǉǋǈ years in the United
States. In his analysis, it appears that the unit cost of ėnancial intermediation has
remained relatively stable over time despite advancements in technology. He notes a
puzzling increase in the cost of ėnancial activity over the past ǋǈ years that he cannot
explain with a corresponding increase in the quantity or quality of ėnancial services.
With a particular focus on this modern period, Greenwood and Scharfstein (ǊǈǉǊ)
aĨribute the modern growth of the ėnancial sector as a whole to two speciėc
components: an increase in active investing and an expansion in credit markets. To
contrast these two culprits, I allocate the corresponding ėnancial activities from the
national industry accounts data, as shown in Table ǋ.ǉ. ĉe resources consumed in
credit and banking activities grew signiėcantly over the past century but follow a
distinct paĨern from the resources spent investing in ėnancial markets. ĉe upper
plot in Figure ǋ.Ǌ shows both activities consumed a growing fraction of GDP, but the
cost of banking and credit expanded at steady consistent pace sinceWorldWar II
while the surge in trading and investing seems to be a more recent phenomenon.
Unlike the capital markets sector, the lower plot of Figure ǋ.Ǌ shows the historical
compensation of employees in the banking and credit sector diﬀers only slightly from
the private sector average and increases only moderately in recent decades.
ǉǌǊ
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Figure ǋ.Ǌ: Contrasting Banking and Credit vs. Capital Market Activities
ĉe upper plot contrasts the cost of banking and credit activity with the cost of capital markets using
gross value added, and the lower plot shows the respective employee compensation ratios relative to
the US private industry average. ĉe primary source for these calculations is the industry accounts
data published by the US Bureau of Economic Analysis as ofMarch Ǌǈǉǉ. ĉe classiėcation to indus-
try groups is shown in Table ǋ.ǉ. Data prior to ǉǑǌǏ comes from Philippon (ǊǈǉǊ).
ǉǌǋ
Table ǋ.ǉ: Financial sector components in national income accounts
ĉis table shows the components of the ėnancial sector and the associated NAICS codes as used by
the US Bureau of Economic Analysis in their national income accounts. ĉe grouping of the compo-
nents has not always been historically consistent. ĉe highlighted industries are those which will be
termed the capital markets sector and are the primary focus of this paper.
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate
Banking and Credit (ǍǊǉ & ǍǊǊ)
Banking
Credit agencies other than banks
Capital Markets (ǍǊǋ & ǍǊǍ)
Security and commodity brokers
Funds, trusts, and other ėnancial vehicles
Holding and other investment oﬃces
Insurance (ǍǊǌ)
Insurance carriers
Insurance agents, brokers, and service
Real Estate and Leasing (Ǎǋǉ, ǍǋǊ, Ǎǋǋ)
Real Estate
Rental and leasing services and lessors of intangible assets
TļĹŃŇĽĹň Ńĺ ĺĽłĵłķĽĵŀ ĽłŋĹňŉŁĹłŉ ĸĽňŉŃŇŉĽŃłň
Dissatisfaction with the quantity of talent and resources consumed by ėnancial
markets seems to peak during economic downturns. Amidst the Great Depression,
Keynes criticized American ėnancial markets, arguing, “when the capital
development of a country becomes the by-product of the activities of a casino, the
job is likely to be ill-done.”³ On the other hand, the broad impact of ėnancial crises
could also suggest we need a large and highly compensated ėnancial sector to replace
animal spirits with dispassionate analysts.
Certainly, there is a need to understand the circumstances and incentives that pull
resources toward ėnancial markets. What gives rise to a distorted ėnancial sector?
³Keynes, John Maynard, ĉe General ĉeory of Employment, Interest and Money (London:
Macmillan, ǉǑǋǎ), page ǉǍǑ.
ǉǌǌ
Economic research oﬀers three explanations for outsized ėnancial activity: irrational
investors do not know they trade too much, rational investors cannot help trading too
much, or perhaps the industry is rife with rent-seeking.
Financial markets seem to be amazingly adroit at exploiting irrational beliefs and
behaviors. Fanciful trading or the decision to pay exorbitant fees to popular
investment managers may funnel unnecessary fees into ėnance and have other
negative consequences (De Long, Shleifer, Summers andWaldmann, ǉǑǐǑ).
In a model where market participants are assumed to be rational, they may still
spend too much on active investment because inference is diﬃcult (Pástor and
Stambaugh, Ǌǈǉǈ) or out of a desire to avoid being the greater fool when negotiating
transactions. Glode, Green and Lowery (ǊǈǉǊ) present this situation as an arms race
externality for ėnancial expertise. ĉemodel presented by Bolton, Santos and
Scheinkman (Ǌǈǉǉ) has a similar mechanism; opaque markets aĨract talent and
more informed valuations lure the best investments away from public exchanges.
ĉese explanations capture important aspects of ėnancial markets, but neither
seems uniquely modern. If traders are foolish now, they were foolish before. Shrewd
traders will always prefer to be beĨer informed than their counterparty. We are forced
to ask: what changed?
Philippon and Reshef (Ǌǈǉǋ) point toward the rent-seeking channel, and propose
the growth in compensation is a result of deregulation. ĉe active government
oversight intended to curb the worst excesses in the ėnancial markets of the ǉǑǊǈs
was gradually relaxed Ǎǈ years later, and Philippon and Reshef propose rents lured
talent frommore productive endeavors (Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, ǉǑǑǉ).
ǉǌǍ
Supporting this view, Bai, Philippon and Savov (ǊǈǉǊ) suggest modern asset
prices show no increase in their information content over the past Ǎǈ years. ĉey
suggest the increase in ėnancial spending may result from rent extraction, suggesting
the growth in active investment has had liĨle eﬀect on asset prices.
UłĸĹŇňŉĵłĸĽłĻ ŉļĹ ķĵŊňĹň ĵłĸ ķŃłňĹŅŊĹłķĹň Ńĺ ŉļĹ ķŃňŉ Ńĺ ķĵńĽŉĵŀ ŁĵŇ-
ĿĹŉň
With so much highly compensated talent Ěowing into investment management, it is
hard to believe that asset prices are no more informative in the modern information
age than they were in the bygone era when investors in top hats exchanged small
pieces of paper. As an alternative explanation for the root cause of the modern
growth of capital markets, I propose technological eﬃciency. ĉe decreasing cost of
transacting makes dynamic trading strategies feasible and draws talent and
technology toward acquiring faster paced information. Conėrming the results of Bai
et al. (ǊǈǉǊ), I ėnd only very weak evidence that modern asset prices capture more
long-horizon information; however, I ėnd strong evidence of an increase in active
trading and information content at horizons of less than one year.
To help frame the empirical ėndings, I present a stylized model illustrating the role
of trading horizons in costly capital markets. ĉe key comparative static will measure
the eﬀect of increases in trading eﬃciency. ĉemodel predicts that as the cost of
ėnancial activity decreases, total spending in the ėnancial sector actually increases,
especially for short-horizon speculation.
ĉis explanation has a large degree of empirical success in explaining aggregate
ǉǌǎ
spending on capital markets over time, particularly in regard to aggregate spending on
active investing (French, Ǌǈǈǐ). More eﬃcient transaction costs lead to higher
quantities of informed trading, providing an underlying explanation for Greenwood
and Scharfstein’s observation that the observed growth of modern ėnance coincides
with a growth in actively investing. ĉe events of May ǉǑǏǍ highlight the signiėcance
of this mechanism, as the SEC instituted rule ǉǑ-b and replaced the high trading
commissions enforced by stock exchange members with competitive transaction
rates. Using this event and information from historical fee schedules, we observe how
the operational eﬃciency of capital markets aﬀects the ėnancial industry and market
prices.
ĉis paper provides new evidence on the changes that caused and accompanied
the modern growth in the cost of capital markets. Linking these ėndings to economic
theory clariėes the underlying incentives and opens the door to the broader question
of whether the returns to ėnance are worth the cost.
ǋ.ǉ A SŉŏŀĽŐĹĸMŃĸĹŀ Ńĺ CĵńĽŉĵŀMĵŇĿĹŉň
In this section, I present a stylized model of capital markets where the supply of the
risky investment responds to asset prices and where the ėnancial market is costly to
operate. I will show how changes in the cost of transacting aﬀect the quantity of
resources spent on ėnance and aﬀect the characteristics of asset prices.
To beĨer understand the role ėnancial markets play, consider an illustrative,
general equilibrium framework where investors spend resources in acquiring
information and engaging in costly transactions. In the spirit of the Q-theory
ǉǌǏ
(Brainard and Tobin, ǉǑǏǏ), the supply of investment will respond to the market
price, so the information in asset prices plays a key role in capital allocation.
Ultimately, we want to observe how changes in the cost of transacting aﬀects the
resources spent in capital markets. Additionally, the model will distinguish between
short-run and long-run behavior, generating novel predictions relating the growth in
capital market spending to asset prices which will be conėrmed in the data.
Unlike the opaque bilateral seĨing of Glode et al. (ǊǈǉǊ), all market prices in the
model will be publicly observed, which has historically been true for equity markets
and is becoming increasingly common across asset classes. ĉe setup more closely
resembles the endogenous information seĨing of Grossman and Stiglitz (ǉǑǐǈ),
adding the salient features necessary to model a costly ėnancial market and multiple
time horizons.
ĉe key comparative statics will be the impact of an exogenous change of
transaction costs on total capital market spending and the information content of
asset prices, noting the diﬀerential impact by trading horizon. I brieĚy mention the
welfare implications in section ǋ.ǌ.
TļĹ SĹŔĽłĻ
TļĹ ňŊńńŀŏ Ńĺ ŇĽňĿŏ ĽłŋĹňŉŁĹłŉ
Consider a risky investment traded publicly over a T periods (t 2 [ƥ;T]) prior to
yielding an uncertain payout X consumer in period T+ ƥ, where the uncertain
ǉǌǐ
component of X is
X  E [X] =
TX
t=ƥ
θt + ". (ǋ.ǉ)
Each of the component random variables are independent, mean-zero, and normally
distributed with variances σƦθ and σƦ". ĉe full, random component
P
θt becomes
public knowledge in period T+ ƥ. However, market participants can spend resources
to discover the information in period ǈ, and they will be termed long-horizon
investors. Alternately, short-horizon investors may spend a smaller amount of
resources to discover each piece of short horizon information (θt) in period t. ĉe
random component " cannot be observed prior to period T+ ƥ.
ĉe quantity of the risky investment is responsive to investment demand, allowing
the quantity of shares in one period,Qt, to increase or decrease with the market price,
Pt. For simplicity, we’ll model this as a linear supply curve, with slope parameter
b > Ƥ. ĉe change in investment supply will be
Qt+ƥ   Qt = b (Pt   Pt ƥ) . (ǋ.Ǌ)
where the initial price is assumed to be the unconditional expectation, PƤ = EƤ [Pƥ].
By construction, the supply of investment is ėxed in the short-run (contemporaneous
with the trading period) and responds to ėnancial market prices over longer horizons
(the next period).
ǉǌǑ
IłŋĹňŉŃŇň ĵłĸ ĺĽłĵłķĽĵŀ ŁĵŇĿĹŉň
ĉe agents will be modeled by a continuum of identical investors. Wealth can be
transferred across periods at an interest rate of zero and is consumed in the ėnal
period. Each investor is endowed with wƤ units of wealth (measured in units of ėnal
consumption) and a share, qƤ, of the risky investment. By construction, the total
initial quantity of investment isQƤ =
R
i2[Ƥ;ƥ] qƤ;idi.
Individuals can choose whether they want to acquire information and actively
speculate based on the diﬀerence between their valuation and the observed market
price. To learn the full value of
P
θt during the ėrst trading period requires paying
kL, whereas short-horizon traders who only learn each component θt at time t pay
kS  kL. Alternately, investors may choose to infer their valuations from the public
market price. Since their valuations will not diﬀer from the market price, they will not
actively trade and I’ll refer to these traders as passive, though they might make trades
driven by changes in their uncertainty.
Each individual seeks to maximize expected CAĆutility of ėnal consumption.
For convenience, we’ll denote the consumption of investor i as their ėnal wealth, wi,
with associated expected utility E[  exp f awig] for absolute risk aversion
parameter a.
Investors must commit whether to spend resources on information in period t = Ƥ
before any trading happens. In subsequent periods prior to the ėnal outcome,
investors may choose to trade their holdings of the risky asset at the prevailing market
price. ĉe transaction costs associated with capital markets are passed directly
through to investors. For analytical convenience, we’ll assume they take a quadratic
ǉǍǈ
form so that the trading from a prior holding of qi;t ƥ shares in period t  ƥ to qi;t
during the trading in period twill result in a transaction cost of cƦ (qt   qt ƥ)Ʀ.
We can describe the evolution of investor wealth as
wi;t+ƥ = wi;t + qi;t (Pt+ƥ   Pt)  cƦ (qi;t+ƥ   qi;t)
Ʀ (ǋ.ǋ)
where agents are identically endowed with wƤ consumption and qƤ shares of the risky
investment. In the ėnal period, the price of the risky investment will simply be the
outcome, i.e. PT+ƥ = X.
PŃŇŉĺŃŀĽŃ ķļŃĽķĹ
ĉe linear-CAĆ-normal framework allows the expected utility from the perspective
of investor i in trading period t to be calculated as
Ei;t [  exp f awig] =   exp

 aEi;t [wi] + a
Ʀ
Ʀ
Vari;t [wi]

: (ǋ.ǌ)
ĉrough monotonic transformations, the investor can maximize the
certainty-equivalent, which takes the mean-variance form, Ei;t [wi]  aƦVari;t [wi]. ĉe
concavity of the problem suggests we can ėnd the optimal portfolio in each period,
qi;t, at the point where the ėrst order condition holds,
@
@qi;tEi;t [wi;Ƨ] =
a
Ʀ
@
@qi;tVari;t [wi;Ƨ].
To motivate the optimal portfolio rules, we can work backwards from the ėnal
trading period. ĉe optimal portfolio qi;T in last trading period that maximizes the
ǉǍǉ
utility of consumption in the subsequent period will have the associated ėrst order
condition
qi;T =
Ei;T [X  PT] + cqi;T ƥ
aVari;T [X] + c
. (ǋ.Ǎ)
ĉis is the classic myopic portfolio rule with a transaction cost adjustment. In the
numerator, we see the optimal portfolio increases linearly with the expected return,
Ei;T [X  PT]. ĉe second term in the numerator shows howmuch transaction costs
discourage trading by anchoring the portfolio at the initial position, qi;T ƥ. ĉe
magnitude of the transaction costs, c, determines the extent to which this aﬀects the
optimal portfolio.
In solving the model, I will show how the anchoring feature of transaction costs
results in optimal portfolio rules that are a weighted average of their myopic,
one-period expected return and the returns oﬀered in future periods.
EŅŊĽŀĽĶŇĽŊŁ
In this seĨing, investors can be grouped into three types based on their information
sets. ĉemass of agents of type j are those who pay kj for their investment
information will be measured as the quantity λj 2 [Ƥ; ƥ].
Deėnition In a rational expectations equilibrium,
(a) markets will clear
(b) investors will choose to spend resources on information to maximize ex ante
utility, leading to an allocation fλL; λSg and where λN = ƥ  λL   λS is the
fraction of individuals who will only infer information frommarket prices
ǉǍǊ
(c) investors of each type have an optimal demand function qi;t (Pt) for the risky
asset conditional on the market price, which will be constructed from their
rational beliefs about random variables (θt and νt) conditional on the observed
price.
MĵŇĿĹŉ ķŀĹĵŇĽłĻ
It will be useful to explicitly deėne market clearing. Noisy supply shocks will add
uncertainty so that the market price does not perfectly reveal all information.
Speciėcally, the total quantity of investment supply will equal investment demand,
Qt =
X
i
λiqi;t +
νt
aσƦ" + c
, (ǋ.ǎ)
comprising the sum of the individual demands (qi;t) times the mass of the investor
type (λi) plus the scaled demand shock νt  N (σƦν). ĉe values in the denominator
scale the shock by variance and transaction costs. In this sense, the noise can be
interpreted in the same way as the demands of an informed investor, as can be seen
from demand function (ǋ.Ǎ), but obviously the shock is unrelated to the actual ėnal
payout of the investment.
IłŉŊĽŉĽŃł
To build the intuition behind this model and its equilibrium, consider Figure ǋ.ǋ. For
this particular illustration, this will assume just one trading period (T = ƥ) and there
is no distinction between long-horizon and short-horizon informed investors, though
ǉǍǋ
the paper will generally consider T > ƥ in order to highlight the importance of time
horizon. ĉe leě panel plots the fraction of informed speculators along the horizontal
axis, ranging from ǈ to ǉ. ĉe vertical axis measures expected utility for both the
informed speculators and the expected utility for the uninformed, passive investors.
When there are no informed speculators, the information advantage is obvious as the
expected utility for informed active investors is signiėcantly higher than that of the
passive investors who observe only the market price. As the fraction of the informed
investors increases, the diﬀerence between the two expected utilities decreases. ĉis
is the general case, and the intuition extends to the multiple period seĨing; as the
market price becomes more informative the relative advantage of paying for the
information decreases. With these parameters, the equilibrium point of indiﬀerence
between acquiring the costly information occurs at the point where approximately ƥƨ
of the investors acquire the costly information. To the right of the equilibrium point,
the trading proėts resulting from learning more about the risky outcome θ are not
worth the resources it could cost (k).
On the right panel, the horizontal axis continues to measure the fraction of
informed speculators, and on the vertical axis we see the equilibrium price. In the
case of no informed investors, the variation in price is entirely due to the supply
shocks ν. As the fraction of informed traders increases, we see two eﬀects. ĉe
average price increases as investors are willing to commit more capital to investment
because there is less uncertainty. Additionally, the variance of the market prices
increases. ĉis is because the price now also contains information about the
investment prospects. Not surprisingly, the information content of asset prices levels
ǉǍǌ
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Figure ǋ.ǋ: Intuition behind model equilibrium
ĉeplots above correspond to themodel presented in the paper in the one-period seĨing,T = ƥ. ĉe
model parameters are: QƤ = ƥ, X = ƥƤƤ, σƦε = σƦθ = ƥƤƦ, σƦν = ƦƦ, a = Ƥ:ƥ, c = ƥƤ, and k = ƥ. For
illustration, the investment supply is allowed to be elastic in the short-run (ΔQ = b(P E[P])), with
linear supply parameter b = Ƥ:Ʀ. ĉe leě axis plots the expected utility for the informed speculators
and the uninformed passive investors. ĉe right axis plots how the distribution of the market price,
P, changes with respect to the quantity of informed speculators.
of around the equilibrium point, further evidence that liĨle additional value is gained
acquiring information that is already largely in the market price.
Proposition ǉ (Equilibria) ĉere exist rational expectations equilibria under the
assumed parameter restrictions (Ƥ < kS < kL).
ĉe proof for the one-period case (T = ƥ) should be clear from the discussion
above. ĉere will be no long-horizon traders. Since the expected utilities are
continuous in λ 2 [Ƥ; ƥ], we simply need to appeal to the intermediate value theorem
for existence. ĉe diﬀerence between the expected utility of the informed and
uninformed traders will nearly always be monotonically decreasing in λ, which
guarantees uniqueness.
ǉǍǍ
ĉe same intermediate value approach guarantees a unique solution in the case of
multiple periods (T > Ʀ) in the case where one or more type is always inferior and
has optimal weight zero. ĉe existence of the multiple horizon solution when there is
a positive mass of each of the three types can be motivated by working backwards
from the ėnal period. In the ėnal period, informed traders face a situation identical to
the one-period model. In prior periods, the relative advantage to the long-horizon
information is decreasing in λL. ĉemass of investors in λS will be uninformed about
the information θt+k (for k > ƥ), and like the uninformed investors, can infer more
information as λL increases. As long as there are positive quantities of each investor
type, the marginal eﬀect of more traders will follow the same relative rank impact on
ex ante utility, guaranteeing a unique solution.
CļĵŇĵķŉĹŇĽŐĽłĻ ĵ ŁŊŀŉĽńŀĹ ļŃŇĽŐŃł ňŃŀŊŉĽŃł (T = Ʀ)
To characterize the analytical diﬀerences between long-horizon and short-horizon
speculation, I will more fully characterize the solution for T = Ʀ. In this seĨing, the
outcome will be a long-run event in the ėrst period and a short-run event in the
second period, which immediately precedes the investment outcome. Aěer this
short-horizon trading is complete, investor iwill consume
wi = wƤ+qƤPƥ+qi;ƥ (PƦ   Pƥ)+qi;Ʀ (X  PƦ)  cƦ ((qi;ƥ   qƤ)
Ʀ + (qi;Ʀ   qi;ƥ)Ʀ) ki.
(ǋ.Ǐ)
ǉǍǎ
AňňŊŁĽłĻ ŀĽłĹĵŇĽŉŏ ĵłĸ ŉļĹ ŇĹňŊŀŉĽłĻ ĹŎńĹķŉĵŉĽŃłň
To calculate the investor demand functions, we need to know their expectations,
which will be aﬀected by the information they perceive from the market prices they
observe. I will assert and then prove that the market prices can be expressed as linear
functions of the unknown variables,
Pƥ = Pƥ + βƥθƥ + βƦθƦ + βνƥνƥ (ǋ.ǐ)
and
PƦ = PƦ + βP (Pƥ   P) + βƧθƥ + βƨθƦ + βνƦνƦ. (ǋ.Ǒ)
ĉe unknown coeﬃcients are derived in the appendix, thus conėrming the assumed
linear functional form.
Additionally, to help with the notation and intuition, we note that the beliefs of
uninformed and short-run traders hold about X from observing the market price in
period ǉ will be aﬀected by the variation in price. We can express these expectations
as
ES;ƥ [X] = X+ ρS;ƥYS;ƥ (ǋ.ǉǈ)
where
YS;ƥ = θƦ +
βνƥ
βƦ
νƥ (ǋ.ǉǉ)
/  Pƥ   Pƥ   βƥθƥ (ǋ.ǉǊ)
ǉǍǏ
and so that ρ 2 [Ƥ; ƥ] is a simple function of the assumed parameters
ρ = σ
Ʀ
θ
σƦθ +

βνƥ;ƥ
βθ;ƥ
Ʀ
σƦν
.
ĉe investors who have spent no resources on information simply take valuations
from their deviation from the market price
(EN;ƥ [X]  X) / (Pƥ   P) (ǋ.ǉǋ)
PŃŇŉĺŃŀĽŃ ŃńŉĽŁĽŐĵŉĽŃł Ľł ńĹŇĽŃĸ Ǌ
ĉe investors will be categorized by the trading period in which they receive
information about θ: in the long-horizon (L), short-horizon (S) and not at all (N).
For each of the three investor types (L; S; andN), we can express their optimal
portfolio in terms of their prior position and their current expectations Ei;Ʀ [X] and
Vari;Ʀ [X]. ĉe long-run and short-run speculators will both know θƥ and θƦ in period
Ʀ so EL;Ʀ [X] =ES;Ʀ [X]. ĉe associated variance will be VarL;Ʀ [X] =VarS;Ʀ [X] = σƦ".
From (ǋ.Ǎ) we can conclude that the optimal portfolio for these two types of
investors will be
qL;Ʀ =
(X+ θƥ + θƦ   PƦ) + cqL;ƥ
aσƦ" + c
(ǋ.ǉǌ)
and
qS;Ʀ =
(X+ θƥ + θƦ   PƦ) + cqS;ƥ
aσƦ" + c
(ǋ.ǉǍ)
ǉǍǐ
ĉe optimal portfolio for the investors who purchase no information
qN;Ʀ =
EN;Ʀ [X  PƦ] + cqN;ƥ
aVarN;Ʀ [X] + c
(ǋ.ǉǎ)
depends on the expectations, En;Ʀ [θ] and Varn;Ʀ [θ], which will be derived later.
PŃŇŉĺŃŀĽŃ ŃńŉĽŁĽŐĵŉĽŃł Ľł ńĹŇĽŃĸ ǉ
When investing for the long-run (in period ƥ), investors choose their allocation aware
of their optimal short-run portfolio rules in equations (ǋ.ǉǌ - ǋ.ǉǎ). ĉose short-run
rules show that each portfolio allocation is linearly related to the expected return
(Ei [X  PƦ]) and the prior portfolio allocation (qi;ƥ).
ĉe form of the period ǉ demand function for long-horizon investors is similar to
that of the other two investor types. It is derived by substituting the period ƥ demand
from equation (ǋ.ǉǌ) into equation (ǋ.Ǐ) and taking the ėrst order conditions to ėnd
the optimal portfolio
qL;ƥ =
(ƥ  Γ)EL;ƥ [PƦ   Pƥ] + ΓEL;ƥ [X  Pƥ] + cqƤ
Ω + c

ƥ+

aσƦ"
aσƦ"+c
Ʀ (ǋ.ǉǏ)
where the tilt toward the long-run return is
Γ = c
aσƦ" + c| {z }
return next period
+ a
(ƦaσƦ" + c) βƦνƦσ
Ʀ
νaƦσƨ"
(aσƦ" + c)
ƨ| {z }
prefer to avoid adverse νƦ
ǉǍǑ
and the variance
Ω =

c
aσƦ" + c
Ʀ
σƦ"| {z }
variance of X
+

aσƦ"
aσƦ" + c
ƨ
βƦνƦ;Ʀσ
Ʀ
ν| {z }
variance in PƦ
.
To develop some intuition for this long-horizon portfolio rule in equation (ǋ.ǉǏ),
consider the three terms in the numerator. As before, there is a weight pulling the
optimal portfolio toward the initial position, qƤ as a result of transaction costs. ĉe
other two terms are a weighted average of the myopic expected return, EL;ƥ [PƦ   Pƥ]
and the long-run expected return, EL;ƥ [X  Pƥ], with respective weights (ƥ  Γ) and
Γ.
ĉe weight Γ that the investor tilts toward the long-horizon return will always be
weakly positive, Γ 2 [Ƥ; ƥ), and its magnitude will increase with transaction costs.
ĉe relationship with transaction costs arises from the investor recognizing positions
taken today will persist into the future due to the anchoring eﬀect of transaction
costs. Additionally, there is some uncertainty in the price next period, so investors
have an incentive to lock in Pƥ now rather than pay an uncertain PƦ.
ĉe demand functions for the short-run and uninformed investors take an
identical form, with slightly diﬀerent values for Γ and Ω.
DĹŇĽŋĽłĻ ĽłŋĹňŉŃŇ ĸĹŁĵłĸ
ĉis section derives the demand functions for the model with two trading periods
(T = Ʀ). For each investor, we use their expectations to maximize the utility of ėnal
ǉǎǈ
wealth, as deėned in equation (ǋ.Ǐ),
wi = wƤ ki+qƤPƥ+qi;ƥ (PƦ   Pƥ)+qi;Ʀ (X  PƦ)  cƦ ((qi;ƥ   qƤ)
Ʀ + (qi;Ʀ   qi;ƥ)Ʀ) .
ĉe ėrst order condition, @
@qi;tEi;t [wi] =
a
Ʀ
@
@qi;tVari;t [wi], can be used to derive the
investor demand functions. In period Ǌ, the only source of uncertainty isX and we get
qi;Ʀ =
Ei;Ʀ [X  PƦ] + cqi;ƥ
aVari;Ʀ [X] + c
,
which leads to the optimal demand functions presented for each type of investor, as
in (ǋ.Ǎ).
Deriving the demand functions for period ǉ with multiple horizons requires a fair
amount of algebra. Beginning with the expression for expected wealth,
Ei;ƥ [wi] = wƤ   ki + qƤPƥ + qi;ƥEi;ƥ [PƦ   Pƥ] + Ei;ƥ [qi;Ʀ (X  PƦ)]
  c
Ʀ
((qi;ƥ   qƤ)Ʀ + Ei;ƥ [(qi;Ʀ   qi;ƥ)Ʀ]) ,
we can substitute in period Ǌ’s demand function
Ei;ƥ [wi] = wƤ + qƤPƥ + qi;ƥEi;ƥ [PƦ   Pƥ] + Ei;ƥ

Ei;Ʀ [X  PƦ] + cqi;ƥ
aVari;Ʀ [X] + c
(X  PƦ)

  c
Ʀ

(qi;ƥ   qƤ)Ʀ + Ei;ƥ
Ei;Ʀ [X]  PƦ + cqi;ƥ
aVari;Ʀ [X] + c
  qi;ƥ
Ʀ
ǉǎǉ
with ėrst derivative
@
@qi;ƥ
E [wi] = Ei;ƥ [PƦ   Pƥ] + cEi;ƥ [X  PƦ]aVari;Ʀ [X] + c   c (qi;ƥ   qƤ)
 c

aVari;Ʀ [X]
aVari;Ʀ [X] + c
Ʀ
qi;ƥ + c
aVari;Ʀ [X]El;ƥ [X  PƦ]
(aVari;Ʀ [X] + c)Ʀ
so the ėnal expression is
@
@qi;ƥ
E [wi] = Ei;ƥ [PƦ   Pƥ]
+

c
aVari;Ʀ [X] + c
+ c aVari;Ʀ [X]
(aVari;Ʀ [X] + c)Ʀ

Ei;ƥ [X  PƦ]
+cqƤ   c

ƥ+

aVari;Ʀ [X]
aVari;Ʀ [X] + c
Ʀ
qi;ƥ
ĉe optimal portfolio in period one will be the one that solves the ėrst order
condition,
qi;ƥ =
Ei;ƥ [PƦ   Pƥ] +

c
aVari;Ʀ[X]+c + c
aVari;Ʀ[X]
(aVari;Ʀ[X]+c)Ʀ

Ei;ƥ [X  PƦ] + cqƤ
a
Ʀqi;ƥ
Vari;ƥ [wi] +

ƥ+

aVari;Ʀ[X]
aVari;Ʀ[X]+c
Ʀ
c
:
ĉe expected values for PƦ and X are apparent from the assumed linearity in (ǋ.ǐ)
and (ǋ.Ǒ), so the task at hand is to come up with expressions for aƦqi;ƥVari;ƥ [wƧ], where
ǉǎǊ
the variance term can be expressed as
Vari;ƥ [wi] = Vari;ƥ
h
qi;ƥPƦ + qi;Ʀ (X  PƦ)  cƦ (qi;Ʀ   qi;ƥ)
Ʀ
i
= Vari;ƥ
h
qi;ƥPƦ + qi;Ʀ (X  PƦ)  cƦq
Ʀ
i;Ʀ + cql;ƥqi;Ʀ
i
= Vari;ƥ
h
qi;ƥPƦ + qi;Ʀ (X  Ei;Ʀ [X]) + qƦi;Ʀ

aVari;Ʀ [X] +
c
Ʀ
i
and the remaining calculation requires using the expectations of each investor and
calculating the sensitivity with respect to the ėrst period allocation.
LŃłĻ-ļŃŇĽŐŃł ĽłŋĹňŉŃŇň Ľł ńĹŇĽŃĸ ǉ
For long-horizon investors, the uncertain terms will be:
PƦ   EL;ƥ [PƦ] = βνƦ;ƦνƦ,
X  EL;ƥ [X] = X  El;Ʀ [X] = ".
ĉe optimal position during the ėnal trading period
qL;Ʀ =
EL;ƥ [X  PƦ] + cqL;ƥ
aσƦ" + c
  βνƦνƦ
aσƦ" + c
= EL;ƥ [qL;Ʀ] 
βνƦ
aσƦ" + c
νƦ.
ǉǎǋ
From this, we can calculate the variance
VarL;ƥ [wL] = VarL;ƥ
264 qL;ƥβνƦνƦ + EL;Ʀ [qL;Ʀ] "  βνƦaσƦ"+c νƦ"
+

EL;ƥ [qL;Ʀ]  βνƦaσƦ"+c νƦ
Ʀ  
aσƦ" + cƦ

375
= VarL;ƥ
266664

c
aσƦ"+c
qL;ƥ + EL;ƥ[X PƦ]aσƦ"+c

"
+

qL;ƥ

aσƦ"
aσƦ"+c
Ʀ
  ƦEL;ƥ [X  PƦ] aσ
Ʀ
"+
c
Ʀ
(aσƦ"+c)
Ʀ

βνƦνƦ
  βνƦaσƦ"+c νƦ"+
aσƦ"+ cƦ
(aσƦ"+c)
Ʀ βƦνƦν
Ʀ
Ʀ
377775
and using the normality and independence of " and νƦ,
Var [wL] = Var[aν + b"+ cνƦ + dν"]
= aƦσƦν + bƦσƦ" + ƦcƦσƨν + dƦσƦνσƦ"
we can write
VarL;ƥ [wL] =

c
aσƦ" + c
qi;ƥ +
EL;ƥ [X  PƦ]
aσƦ" + c
Ʀ
σƦ"
+

qL;ƥ

aσƦ"
aσƦ" + c
Ʀ
  EL;ƥ [X  PƦ] Ʀaσ
Ʀ
" + c
(aσƦ" + c)
Ʀ
Ʀ
βƦνƦσ
Ʀ
ν
+
 βνƦ
aσƦ" + c
Ʀ
σƦνσƦ" + Ʀ
 aσƦ" + cƦ
(aσƦ" + c)
Ʀ
Ʀ
βƨνƦ;Ʀσ
ƨ
Ʀ .
ǉǎǌ
To calculate the demand function, we need to evaluate the ėrst derivative
@
@qƥ;l
Vari;ƥ [wi] = Ʀ
c
aσƦ" + c

c
aσƦ" + c
qi;ƥ +
EL;ƥ [X  PƦ]
aσƦ" + c

σƦ"
+Ʀ

aσƦ"
aσƦ" + c
Ʀ
qi;ƥ

aσƦ"
aσƦ" + c
Ʀ
βƦνƦσ
Ʀ
ν
 Ʀ

aσƦ"
aσƦ" + c
Ʀ
EL;ƥ [X  PƦ] Ʀaσ
Ʀ
" + c
(aσƦ" + c)
Ʀ

βƦνƦσ
Ʀ
ν
and calculate the term
a
Ʀ
@VarL;ƥ [wL]
@qƥ;l
= a

aσƦ"
aσƦ" + c
ƨ
βƦνƦσ
Ʀ
ν +

c
aσƦ" + c
Ʀ
σƦ"

qi;ƥ
 a

(ƦaσƦ" + c) aƦσƨ"βƦνƦσ
Ʀ
ν
(aσƦ" + c)
ƨ  
cσƦ"
(aσƦ" + c)
Ʀ

EL;Ʀ [X  PƦ]
ĉe optimal portfolio for the long-term speculator is then
qL;ƥ =
EL;ƥ [PƦ   Pƥ] +
n
c
aσƦ"+c
+ a (Ʀaσ
Ʀ
"+c)βƦνƦ;Ʀσ
Ʀ
νaƦσ
ƨ
"
(aσƦ"+c)
ƨ
o
EL;ƥ [X  PƦ] + cqƤ
a
n
c
aσƦ"+c
Ʀ
σƦ" +

aσƦ"
aσƦ"+c
ƨ
βƦνƦ;Ʀσ
Ʀ
ν
o
+ c

ƥ 

aσƦ"
aσƦ"+c
Ʀ
which can be wriĨen as in equation (ǋ.ǉǏ)
qL;ƥ =
EL;ƥ [PƦ   Pƥ] + ΓlEL;ƥ [X  PƦ] + cqƤ
aΩ + c

ƥ 

aσƦ"
aσƦ"+c
Ʀ
=
(ƥ  Γ)EL;ƥ [PƦ   Pƥ] + ΓEL;ƥ [X  Pƥ] + cqƤ
aΩ + c

ƥ 

aσƦ"
aσƦ"+c
Ʀ
ǉǎǍ
ĉe variance term, Ω is a linear combination of the uncertainty in next period’s
price (σƦν) and uncertainty in the ėnal payout (σƦ")
Ω =

c
aσƦ" + c
Ʀ
σƦ"| {z }
variance of X
+

aσƦ"
aσƦ" + c
ƨ
βƦνƦ;Ʀσ
Ʀ
ν| {z }
variance in PƦ
.
ĉe sensitivity to next period’s expected return is
Γ = c
aσƦ" + c| {z }
return next period
+ a(Ʀaσ
Ʀ
" + c) aƦσƨ"
(aσƦ" + c)
ƨ βƦνƦ;Ʀσ
Ʀ
ν| {z }
prefer to avoid uncertain νƦ
.
ĉe weight Γ that the investor tilts toward the long-horizon return will always be
positive, and its magnitude will increase with transaction costs. ĉe relationship with
transaction costs comes from the investor recognizing positions taken now will
persist later. Additionally, there is some uncertainty in the price next period, so
investors have an incentive to lock in Pƥ now rather than pay an uncertain PƦ.
SļŃŇŉ-ļŃŇĽŐŃł ĽłŋĹňŉŃŇň Ľł ńĹŇĽŃĸ ǉ
For the short-run investors, the uncertain terms will be
PƦ   EN;ƥ [PƦ] = βƨeS + βνƦνƦ
and
X  Es;ƥ [X] = eS + ",
ǉǎǎ
where
eS = (θƦ   ES;ƥ [θƦ]) .
ĉe optimal portfolio in the ėnal trading period can then be expressed as
qS;Ʀ =
ES;Ʀ [X  PƦ] + cqS;ƥ
aσƦ" + c
=
ES;ƥ [X  PƦ] + cqS;ƥ
aσƦ" + c
+
ES;Ʀ [X  PƦ]  ES;ƥ [X  PƦ]
aσƦ" + c
= ES;ƥ [qS;Ʀ] +
eS
 
ƥ  βƨ

aσƦ" + c
  βνƦνƦ
aσƦ" + c
.
So we can calculate the variance as
VarS;ƥ [wS] = VarS;ƥ
h
qS;ƥPƦ + qS;Ʀ (X  ES;Ʀ [X]) + qƦS;Ʀ

aσƦ" +
c
Ʀ
i
So the variance is
VarS;ƥ [wS] =
 
qS;ƥ   Ʀ
 
ƥ  βƨ

ES;ƥ [qS;Ʀ]
 
aσƦ" + cƦ

aσƦ" + c
!Ʀ
βƦƨσ
Ʀ
S;ƥ
+
 
qS;ƥ   Ʀ
ES;ƥ [qS;Ʀ]
 
aσƦ" + cƦ

aσƦ" + c
!Ʀ
βƦνƦσ
Ʀ
ν
+(ES;ƥ [qS;Ʀ])Ʀ σƦ"
+VarS;ƥ
2664

eS(ƥ βƨ)
aσƦ"+c
  βνƦ νƦaσƦ"+c
Ʀ  
aσƦ" + cƦ

+

eS(ƥ βƨ)
aσƦ"+c
  βνƦ νƦaσƦ"+c

"
3775
ǉǎǏ
and we can substitute in ES;ƥ [qS;Ʀ] = ES;ƥ[X PƦ]+cqS;ƥaσƦ"+c and get ėrst derivative
@VarS;ƥ [wS]
@qS;ƥ
= ƦqS;ƥ

aƦσƨ"
(aσƦ" + c)
Ʀ
Ʀ
βƦνƦσ
Ʀ
ν +

c
aσƦ" + c
Ʀ
σƦ"

+ƦqS;ƥ
aƦσƨ"   βƨ (ƦacσƦ" + cƦ)
(aσƦ" + c)
Ʀ
Ʀ
βƦƨσ
Ʀ
S;ƥ

 ƦES;ƥ [X  PƦ]
0B@ aƦσƨ"(ƦaσƦ"+c)(aσƦ"+c)ƨ βƦνƦσƦν   cσƦ"(aσƦ"+c)Ʀ
+
(aƦσƨ" βƨ(ƦacσƦ"+cƦ))(ƥ βƨ)(ƦaσƦ"+c)
(aσƦ"+c)
ƨ βƦƨσƦS;ƥ
1CA
ĉe optimal portfolio can be expressed in a form analogous to the long-run
demand function in equation (ǋ.ǉǏ) by naming the short-horizon parameters, Γs and
Ωs,
qS;ƥ =
(ƥ  ΓS)ES;ƥ [PƦ   Pƥ] + ΓSES;ƥ [X  Pƥ] + cqƤ
aΩS + c

ƥ+

aσƦ"
aσƦ"+c
Ʀ :
ĉe intuition and form are nearly identical, with the short-horizon investors tilting
slightly more toward the long-run return, ES;ƥ [X  PƦ], due to their uncertainty
about θƦ,
ΓS = Γ + a
 
ƥ  βƨ
  
aƦσƨ"   βƨ (ƦacσƦ" + cƦ)

(aσƦ" + c)
ƨ βƦƨσ
Ʀ
eƥ| {z }
prefer to avoid uncertain eƥ
:
ĉeir associated uncertainty term, ΩS, is
ΩS =

c
aσƦ" + c
Ʀ
σƦ" +
 
aƦσƨ"   βƨ (ƦacσƦ" + cƦ)
Ʀ βƦƨσƦS;ƥ + aƨσƬ"βƦνƦσƦν
(aσƦ" + c)
ƨ :
ǉǎǐ
UłĽłĺŃŇŁĹĸ ĽłŋĹňŉŃŇň Ľł ńĹŇĽŃĸ ǉ
ĉe uninformed investors have the highest degree of uncertainty. In period ǉ, this is
summarized by the uncertain terms:
X  EN;Ʀ [X] = eƥ + eƦ + "
where the errors in expectations in the ėnal period are expressed as
eƥ = (θƥ   EN;Ʀ [θƥ])
eƦ = (θƦ   EN;Ʀ [θƦ]) :
ĉe additional, orthogonal error in the ėrst period expectation is
Δeƥ = (θƥ   EN;ƥ [θƥ])  (θƥ   EN;Ʀ [θƥ])
ΔeƦ = (θƦ   EN;ƥ [θƦ])  (θƦ   EN;Ʀ [θƦ])
so that
PƦ   EN;ƥ [PƦ] = βƧ (eƥ + Δeƥ) + βƨ (eƦ + ΔeƦ) + βνƦνƦ
and
X  EN;ƥ [X] = (eƥ + Δeƥ) + (eƦ + ΔeƦ) + ".
ǉǎǑ
ĉe optimal portfolio in the ėnal trading period can then be expressed as
qN;Ʀ =
EN;Ʀ [X  PƦ] + cqN;ƥ
aVarN;Ʀ [X] + c
=
EN;ƥ [X  PƦ] + cqN;ƥ
aVarN;Ʀ [X] + c
+
EN;Ʀ [X  PƦ]  EN;ƥ [X  PƦ]
aVarN;Ʀ [X] + c
=
EN;ƥ [X  PƦ] + cqN;ƥ
aVarN;Ʀ [X] + c
+
EN;Ʀ [X]  EN;ƥ [X]  PƦ   EN;ƥ [PƦ]
aVarN;Ʀ [X] + c
= EN;ƥ [qN;Ʀ] +
Δeƥ + ΔeƦ   βƧ (eƥ + Δeƥ)  βƨ (eƦ + ΔeƦ)  βνƦνƦ
aVarN;Ʀ [X] + c
= EN;ƥ [qN;Ʀ] +
Δeƥ
 
ƥ  βƧ

+ ΔeƦ
 
ƥ  βƨ
  βƧeƥ   βƨeƦ   βνƦνƦ
aVarN;Ʀ [X] + c
.
ĉe uncertainty from the perspective of the investors who acquire no information
will be
VarN;ƥ [wN] = VarN;ƥ
h
qN;ƥPƦ + qN;Ʀ (X  EN;Ʀ [X]) + qƦN;Ʀ

aVarN;Ʀ [X] +
c
Ʀ
i
:
ǉǏǈ
SpliĨing out the terms,
VarN;ƥ [wN] =

qN;ƥβƧ + EN;ƥ [qN;Ʀ]  ƦβƧEN;ƥ [qN;Ʀ]
aVarN;Ʀ [X] + cƦ
aVarN;Ʀ [X] + c
Ʀ
σƦeƥ
+

qN;ƥβƨ + EN;ƥ [qN;Ʀ]  ƦβƨEN;ƥ [qN;Ʀ]
aVarN;Ʀ [X] + cƦ
aVarN;Ʀ [X] + c
Ʀ
σƦeƦ
+

qN;ƥβƧ +
 
ƥ  βƧ

ƦEN;ƥ [qN;Ʀ]
aVarN;Ʀ [X] + cƦ
aVarN;Ʀ [X] + c
Ʀ
σƦΔeƥ
+

qN;ƥβƨ +
 
ƥ  βƨ

ƦEN;ƥ [qN;Ʀ]
aVarN;Ʀ [X] + cƦ
aVarN;Ʀ [X] + c
Ʀ
σƦΔeƦ
+

qN;ƥ   ƦEN;ƥ [qN;Ʀ]
aVarN;Ʀ [X] + cƦ
aVarN;Ʀ [X] + c
Ʀ
βƦνƦσ
Ʀ
νƦ
+ fEN;ƥ [qN;Ʀ]gƦ σƦ"
+ fthe terms without qN;ƥg ;
and taking the ėrst derivative yields the comon form
qN;ƥ =
(ƥ  ΓN)EN;ƥ [PƦ   Pƥ] + ΓNEN;ƥ [X  Pƥ] + cqƤ
aΩN + c

ƥ+

aσƦ"
aσƦ"+c
Ʀ :
In this case,
ΩN =

c
aVarN;Ʀ[X]+c + βƧ

aVarN;Ʀ[X]
aVarN;Ʀ[X]+c
ƦƦ
σƦeƥ
+

c
aVarN;Ʀ[X]+c + βƨ

aVarN;Ʀ[X]
aVarN;Ʀ[X]+c
ƦƦ
σƦeƦ
+

ƥ  βƧ

aVarN;Ʀ[X]
aVarN;Ʀ[X]+c
ƦƦ
σƦΔeƥ +

ƥ  βƨ

aVarN;Ʀ[X]
aVarN;Ʀ[X]+c
ƦƦ
σƦΔeƦ
+

ƥ 

aVarN;Ʀ[X]
aVarN;Ʀ[X]+c
ƦƦ
βƦνƦσ
Ʀ
νƦ +
n
c
aVarN;Ʀ[X]+c
oƦ
σƦ"
ǉǏǉ
and
ΓN =
c
aVarN;Ʀ [X] + c
+ c aVarN;Ʀ [X]
(aVarN;Ʀ [X] + c)Ʀ
+a
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
 
c (aVarN;Ʀ [X] + c) + βƧ (aVarN;Ʀ [X])
Ʀ
  aVarN;Ʀ [X] + c  βƧ (ƦaVarN;Ʀ [X] + c)
(aVarN;Ʀ [X] + c)ƨ
9>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>;
σƦeƥ
+a
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
 
c (aVarN;Ʀ [X] + c) + βƨ (aVarN;Ʀ [X])
Ʀ
  aVarN;Ʀ [X] + c  βƨ (ƦaVarN;Ʀ [X] + c)
(aVarN;Ʀ [X] + c)ƨ
9>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>;
σƦeƦ
+a
8><>:

ƥ  βƧ

aVarN;Ʀ[X]
aVarN;Ʀ[X]+c
Ʀ


(ƥ βƧ)(ƦaVarN;Ʀ[X]+c)
(aVarN;Ʀ[X]+c)Ʀ

9>=>; σƦΔeƥ
+a
8><>:

ƥ  βƨ

aVarN;Ʀ[X]
aVarN;Ʀ[X]+c
Ʀ


(ƥ βƨ)(ƦaVarN;Ʀ[X]+c)
(aVarN;Ʀ[X]+c)Ʀ

9>=>; σƦΔeƦ
 a

ƥ 

aVarN;Ʀ [X]
aVarN;Ʀ [X] + c
Ʀ ƦaVarN;Ʀ [X] + c
(aVarN;Ʀ [X] + c)Ʀ

βƦνƦσ
Ʀ
νƦ
+a

c
(aVarN;Ʀ [X] + c)Ʀ
Ʀ
σƦ"
MĵŇĿĹŉ CŀĹĵŇĽłĻ ĵłĸ IłŋĹňŉŃŇ ĹŎńĹķŉĵŉĽŃłň
ĉe investors will form expectations about investment prospects (X) and the eﬀect of
the noise shocks (νƥ and νƦ) from the market price. Intuitively, investor expectations
ǉǏǊ
of θ increase in the market price, but larger noise shocks dampens this relationship. It
remains to be veriėed that the assumed linear relationship between prices and the
unknown variables as suggested in equations (ǋ.ǐ) and (ǋ.Ǒ) holds.
In period ǉ, the market clears when
QƤ = λNqN;ƥ + λSqS;ƥ + λLqL;ƥ +
νƥ
aσƦ" + c
:
ĉe demand functions for the short-horizon and long-horizon investors are both
linear in E[X] and hence linear in the state variables, so substituting them into the
market clearing condition shows the price to be linear in the state variables. ĉe
expectations of the risky payout will all be linear in Pƥ, which can be seen from
substituting in the demand functions to the market clearing condition
Pƥ /
8<:λS
0@ (ƥ  ΓS) βƧ + ΓS
aΩS + c

ƥ+

aσƦ"
aσƦ"+c
Ʀ
1A+ λL
0@ (ƥ  Γ) βƧθƥ + Γθƥ
aΩ + c

ƥ 

aσƦ"
aσƦ"+c
Ʀ
1A9=; θƥ8<:λL
0@ (ƥ  Γ) βƨ + Γ
aΩ + c

ƥ 

aσƦ"
aσƦ"+c
Ʀ
1A9=; θƦ
+

ƥ
aσƦ" + c

νƥ
ĉis conėrms (ǋ.ǐ).
Similarly, in period Ǌ the market clearing condition shows that
PƦ / λS + λLaσƦ" + c
(θƥ + θƦ) +

ƥ
aσƦ" + c

νƦ;
ǉǏǋ
which conėrms (ǋ.Ǒ).
TļĹ ĽŁńĵķŉ Ńĺ ŁŃŇĹ ĹĺĺĽķĽĹłŉ ŉŇĵłňĵķŉĽŃłň
Let’s now turn to the question of what happens if the ėnancial sector is more
operationally eﬃcient and the cost of transacting decreases. I consider two key
comparative statics: how does this aﬀect total active investment management (@
P
λi
@c )
and how does this eﬀect diﬀer by investment horizon (@λs
@c versus
@λl
@c ).
Proposition Ǌ (More activemanagement) As the cost of transacting decreases, total
informed trading increases,
@
P
λi
@c
 Ƥ
and this becomes a strict inequality if there is any interior solution (i.e. Ȕ<λj < ƥ for some
j).
ĉe value gained from information lies in the ability capitalize on the information
through active trading. Clearly, in the limiting case, limc!1 λn ! ƥ. For interior
solutions, we must consider the marginal impact of transaction costs on the relative
utility of informed and uninformed investors. ĉe unconditional expected utility of
an informed speculator will be a decreasing, continuous function of transaction costs.
ĉe unconditional expected utility of a passive investors will also decrease–but much
less rapidly. Hence, @
P
λN
@c  Ƥ. Since these functions are continuous, equality will
only hold in the corner solutions where marginal changes in expected utility have no
eﬀect on the allocations of investor type.
ǉǏǌ
Proposition ǋ (Shorter investment horizons) Lower transaction costs have a greater
eﬀect on short-horizon investors than long-horizon investors,
@λS
@c
 @λL
@c
with strict inequality for interior solutions (i.e. λL 2 (Ƥ; ƥ) and λS 2 (Ƥ; ƥ)).
ĉis result comes from the fact that the short-horizon investors’ optimal portfolio
contains a subset of the information of the long-horizon investor. So the desire to
spread trading over a longer horizon is oﬀset by the fact that the short-horizon signal
in period ǉ (θƥ) may be in the opposite direction as the signal in period Ǌ (θƦ). As a
result, short-horizon traders are forced to trade more for the same expected return.
In fact, in a model with many periods (T large), the short-horizon traders will ėnd
that the independence of θt makes trading in the earliest periods costly relative to the
weakness of their accumulated signal. As the ėnal horizon approaches, the
short-horizon traders will be more inclined to trade as their accumulated signal is
stronger and less likely to suggest they need to unwind their trades because of future
information.
In contrast, the long-horizon traders are eager to trade on their information as
early as possible, but they submit to spreading their trading across later periods in
their desire to minimize their transaction costs. ĉere are also information
advantages to spreading out trades, since larger trades move prices and allow other
traders to freely infer the costly information, but the inėnitesimal traders do not
absorb this externality.
ǉǏǍ
ǋ.Ǌ EŎńŀĵĽłĽłĻŉļĹEŁńĽŇĽķĵŀGŇŃŌŉļĽłCĵńĽŉĵŀMĵŇĿĹŉSńĹłĸ-
ĽłĻ
A key contribution of this paper is document the relationship between the eﬃciency
of ėnancial transactions and the growth of modern ėnance. As improvements in
technology and market organization make transactions less costly, we should expect
to see the volume of transactions increase. ĉis simply follows from the economic
Law of Demand. A more surprising result is that as ėnancial costs decrease, total
spending on ėnance increases. ĉis is fundamentally a statement about elasticities.
In this section, I focus on establishing the relationship between ėnancial eﬃciency
and the aggregate measures of ėnancial spending and activity. I use timing to assert
causality in the Granger sense, and using the (plausibly) exogenous historical break
inMay of ǉǑǏǍ. ĉe evidence is statistically strong but open to the criticism that the
changes in eﬃciency may be interrelated with contemporaneous events. In section
ǋ.ǋ, I will use cross-sectional variation in the panel data to establish even stronger
results and focus more explicitly on measuring the information content and
investment horizon, two key features of the model.
A ŉĽŁĹ ňĹŇĽĹň Ńĺ ŉŇĵłňĵķŉĽŃł ķŃňŉň
With the possible exception of the very recent past, brokerage commissions were the
primary cost in trading equities (Berkowitz, Logue and Noser, ǉǑǐǐ). ĉey funded
all the operations required in ėnancial market transactions. To test the eﬃciency
explanation for the growth of capital markets, I construct a historical time series that
ǉǏǎ
measures the representative cost of transacting. ĉemeasure I propose splices two
date ranges: ǉǑǊǏ-ǉǑǏǍ and ǉǑǏǍ-Ǌǈǉǈ.
PŇĹ-ǉǑǏǍ: ŉļĹ NYSE ĺĽŎĹĸ ķŃŁŁĽňňĽŃł ňķļĹĸŊŀĹ
From its founding in ǉǏǑǊ up to ǉǑǏǍ, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
enforced a minimum commission schedule on all of its member ėrms. ĉe smaller,
regional exchanges mirrored the commission schedule of the NYSE, and in the rare
cases where they didn’t, they faced enormous industry pressure to conform. ĉe
stated goal was to ”prevent competition amongst the members” to protect their
proėts. Exchange members referenced the general fear of unfeĨered trading and
defended high trading costs by observing that ”a very low or competitive rate would
also promote speculation.” ⁴
An example commission schedule, corresponding to the NYSE rates for ǉǑǍǎ is
displayed in Figure ǋ.ǌ. We can see how the formula deėning the commission rate is a
function of the nominal share price. Purchasing a round lot (ǉǈǈ shares) of a stock
costing Ʈǋǈ per share, for example, would have a commission of ƮǉǍ +ǈ.Ǎ times Ʈǋǈ.
A round lot of a Ʈǎǈ stock would cost ƮǋǍ +ǈ.ǉ times Ʈǎǈ.
To construct a time series of the average transaction cost prior to ǉǑǏǍ I collect the
NYSE commission schedules, including the NYSE annual fact books and the
monthly S&P Stock Owners Guide. Combining these commission schedules with
trading volume and price data from CRSP,⁵ I construct an annual series of the
⁴Report of the CommiĨee Appointed Pursuant to House Resolutions ǌǊǑ and Ǎǈǌ to Investigate
the Concentration of Control of Money and Credit, H.R. REP. NO. ǎǊ-ǉǍǑǋ
⁵Center for Research in Security Prices. Graduate School of Business,ĉe University of Chicago
ǉǏǏ
Figure ǋ.ǌ: NYSE Commission Schedule, ǉǑǍǎ
An image of the New York Stock Exchange minimum commission schedule for ǉǑǍǎ, as reported on
page Ǐ of the NYSE Fact Book for ǉǑǎǍ.
ǉǏǐ
weighted average cost of trading.
Mĵŏ Dĵŏ ǉǑǏǍ
In the aěermath of the ėnancial disasters surrounding the Great Depression, the
Securities Exchange Act of ǉǑǋǌ charged the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) with regulating and approving changes to any enforced commission schedules.
Over the following forty years, the NYSE would periodically submit proposals to
increase rates. A paĨern emerged whereby the NYSE would complain about the
rising costs and shrinking proėts of its members, propose an increase in the
commission schedule in order to maintain an appropriate level of proėtability, and
they would get immediate approval from the SEC.
In ǉǑǎǐ, however the SEC scrutinized the latest proposed increase with more
skepticism. Regulators asked why the cost of transacting in the ėnancial markets
could not itself be the product of a competitive response. ĉe response from the
exchange was emphatic: ”One does not move the keystone of an industry which
facilitates the raising of the bulk of new capital for this country...Negotiated rates
would bring a degree of destructive competition.”⁶
Although the SEC continued to approve a series of regular increases, this initial
dissatisfaction was not placated. On January Ǌǋ, ǉǑǏǍ the SEC adopted rule ǉǑ-b,
requiring all stock exchanges to end the practice of the ėxed commission schedule
and allowmembers to set rates competitively. ĉis rule was to go in eﬀect onMay ǉ,
ǉǑǏǍ. Distressed brokers and the popular press referred to the deadline as May Day.
(ǊǈǉǊ), Used with permission. All rights reserved.
⁶Richard Hack, NYSE president (August ǉǑ, ǉǑǎǐ)
ǉǏǑ
As brokers competed for the ėrst time on trading costs, there was a sharp drop in
costs, especially for institutional investors. ĉe SEC instituted a number of studies
trying to measure the impact of their rule. Only two weeks aěer the beginning of
competitive rates, the SECCommissioner noted that they “have seen sharp price
cuĨing, in some instances to half or less of previously prevailing rates.”⁷ĉe SEC
study of ǉǑǏǐ concluded that institutional trading costs had stabilized to a level ǍǊ.Ǒƻ
below their ėxed rate levels.⁸ Interestingly, the costs to individual traders decreased
only moderately, giving rise to price discrimination among investor types (Tinic and
West, ǉǑǐǈ).
PŃňŉ-ǉǑǏǍ: NYSE ŁĹŁĶĹŇ ĺĽłĵłķĽĵŀ ňŉĵŉĹŁĹłŉň
To continue the time series measuring the cost of transacting in the modern period of
negotiated commissions post-ǉǑǏǍ, I collect commission revenues from the member
ėnancial statements of the NYSE and divide them by trading volume to estimate the
weighted average cost per share.
Figure ǋ.Ǎ shows the composite time series from ǉǑǊǏ to Ǌǈǉǈ. We can see the
signiėcant increase in the early ǉǑǋǈ￿s followed by a relatively steady increase in costs
for almost Ǎǈ years until the sudden drop resulting from the events of May ǉǑǏǍ. To
ensure the aggregate time series is a fair representation of aggregate transaction costs,
I compare it to a number of independent measures. ĉese include: the survey results
fromGreenwich Associates, a consultancy that surveys institutional investors
⁷Remarks by A. A. Sommer Jr. in a talk titled ”ĉe New Breath of Competition” delivered at the
Seminar on the Analysis of Security Prices, University of Chicago, May ǉǍ, ǉǑǏǍ.
⁸SEC Staﬀ Report on the Securities Industry in ǉǑǏǐ
ǉǐǈ
regarding the costs they pay for their transactions; the SEC studies measuring
transaction costs in the wake of rule ǉǑ-b; and for historical purposes, the cost
associated with trading a Ʈǋǈ stock, holding the nominal share price constant through
the duration of the ėxed commission schedule. Each of these measures corresponds
relatively closely to the composite series I created.
Since the post-ǉǑǏǍ series imputes costs rather than calculating them directly, it is
especially useful to compare them with data published by Greenwich Associates, a
ėrm that has been polling institutional investors on their average commission costs
since ǉǑǏǎ. ĉe time series of their survey results is ploĨed in green triangles
alongside my own estimates on Figure ǋ.Ǎ. ĉe two series are highly similar, except in
the ėrst few years of the sample where the commissions paid by institutions are even
lower than the computed average. ĉis is consistent with historical reports that the
trading commissions charged to individuals did not drop immediately in response to
the deregulation until the advent of discount stock brokers around ǉǑǐǈ.
Looking at the data prior to ǉǑǏǍ, I plot the evolution of the cost of trading a Ʈǋǈ
stock using the orange squares. Historical paĨerns in share prices and trading volume
cause the higher frequency variation in my composite series, making it useful to
compare against a series where the nominal share price is held constant. Any changes
can then be aĨributed to the imposed cost schedule and not to endogenous investor
behavior. Focusing on the cost of trading a Ʈǋǈ stock from ǉǑǊǐ to ǉǑǏǋ, we see the
round trip cost more than tripled, from ǉ.ǈǏƻ to ǋ.ǌǎƻ of the notional value.
Including the additional ǉ.Ǐƻ for paying the typical Ʈǉ/ǌ cost from the bid-ask spread,
the total cost of buying and selling exceeded Ǎƻ in ǉǑǏǍ. It is important to note the
ǉǐǉ
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ǉǐǊ
economic importance of this magnitude. To put this in perspective, the average stock
response to an earnings announcement is in the range of ǌƻ⁹, so even if it were
possible to know earnings announcements with certainty, you would typically not be
able to recover the cost of transacting. ĉe costs were so high that only large
misvaluations could merit aĨention. A speculator would favor low frequency
information, with the hope that transaction costs might be amortized over a long
horizon. Furthermore, any dynamic trading strategy, such as a portfolio rebalancing
rule or a derivative replication, would be incredibly costly.
TĽŁĹ ňĹŇĽĹň ĵłĵŀŏňĽň
We can expect the constructed time series of transaction costs to be negatively
correlated with trading volume, a relationship that should hold true in nearly any
economic model. If the proposed eﬃciency explanation for capital market growth
plays a signiėcant role, transaction costs should also be negatively related to capital
market spending. In particular, this increase should correspond to active investment
management and not just an increase in the operational costs associated with higher
trading volume. Lastly, the prediction of more informed speculation also suggests
that employees with higher skill and compensation enter the sector in response to a
cheaper cost of transacting.
ĉe series measuring the cost of capital markets continues to be the value added
measure of capital market industries relative to private GDP with annual data from
ǉǑǊǏ to Ǌǈǉǈ. ĉe series measuring capital markets compensation relative to average
⁹See, for example, Francis, Schipper and Vincent (ǊǈǈǊ).
ǉǐǋ
US private compensation was also previously described and ploĨed in Figure ǋ.ǉ. I
measure equity turnover by collecting all available CRSP data on stock volume and
shares outstanding for common equity of US ėrms. Additional details behind the
data sources and data construction can be found in the online data appendix.
SŊŁŁĵŇŏ ňŉĵŉĽňŉĽķň ĵłĸ ňĽŁńŀĹ ŇĹĻŇĹňňĽŃł ĵłĵŀŏňĽň
ĉe summary statistics for these four time series are presented in Table ǋ.Ǌ. We can
see that the transaction cost, measured in basis points (hundredths of one percent),
averages Ǐǉ basis points over the full sample. ĉe series ranges signiėcantly from
more than ǉǍǈ bps near its peak to just a few basis points in recent years. ĉe fraction
of GDP devoted to capital markets averages about ǏǑ basis points over this time
series, averaging about ǋǈ basis points before ǉǑǏǍ and increasing to about Ǌǈǈ basis
points in recent years. ĉe compensation for capital market employees has an average
that is approximately twice the US private sector average over the full sample,
increasing to almost ǌ times average compensation in recent years. Equity turnover is
about Ǎǎƻ a year on average, suggesting an average holding period of approximately
two years. While turnover was very high in the late ǉǑǊǈ0s, it was consistently low for
most of the Ǌǈth century and then rises again in the recent past, with a current
horizon of just a few months.
ĉe correlations of the four series are displayed in the boĨom panel of Table ǋ.Ǌ.
As predicted, transaction costs have a strong negative relationship with the size of
capital market spending and the volume of trade. While supporting the idea of a
contemporaneous relationship, the slow-moving nature of all four time series might
ǉǐǌ
Table ǋ.Ǌ: Time series summary statistics and correlations
ĉis table shows summary statistics for annual data on: the average commission cost of transacting
stocks in the United States (tcost) constructed as described in section ǋ.Ǌ; the percentage of national
income consumed by capital markets related activity using a GDP value-added measure divided by
private GDP calculated using data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (capmktƻ); the ratio of
the average salary for employees in capital markets related industries relative to the average salary
across all private-sector employees using data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (comp ratio);
and the annual turnover in US equities measured by dividing annual volume by shares outstanding
as reported in CRSP. Annual observations are used over the period ǉǑǊǏ-Ǌǈǉǈ to calculate the mean,
standard deviation and various percentiles in the upper panel. Correlations are displayed in the lower
panel.
ǉǑǊǏ-Ǌǈǉǈ
mean std. ǉ ƻile Ǎǈ ƻile ǑǑ ƻile
tcost (bps) Ǐǉ.ǉ ǌǋ.ǎ ǋ.ǎ Ǐǐ.ǌ ǉǍǊ.ǈ
capmktƻ (bps) Ǐǐ.ǐ ǎǍ.Ǐ ǐ.Ǎ ǌǋ.ǉ ǊǊǉ.ǎ
comp ratio Ǌ.ǈǑ ǈ.ǏǏ ǉ.Ǌǈ ǉ.ǏǊ ǋ.ǑǊ
turnover ǍǍ.Ǐ Ǎǐ.Ǒ Ǐ.ǋ ǋǈ.ǌ ǊǏǏ.ǉ
Correlation
tcost capmkt comp turnover
tcost (bps) ǉ.ǈǈ -ǈ.ǐǉ -ǈ.ǐǋ -ǈ.Ǐǎ
capmkt (bps) -ǈ.ǐǉ ǉ.ǈǈ ǈ.Ǒǈ ǈ.ǏǊ
comp ratio -ǈ.ǐǋ ǈ.Ǒǈ ǉ.ǈǈ ǈ.ǐǏ
turnover -ǈ.Ǐǎ ǈ.ǏǊ ǈ.ǐǏ ǉ.ǈǈ
ǉǐǍ
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Figure ǋ.ǎ: Predicting the cost of capital markets using the cost of transacting
ĉe above ėgure plots in red the percentage of national income consumed by capital markets related
activity using a GDP value-added measure divided by private GDP calculated using data from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis. ĉe doĨed line shows the ėt of a time series regression using the com-
posite commission time series and a linear time trend.
cast doubt on the statistical signiėcance.
We can see this more precisely in the simple regressions shown in Table ǋ.ǋ, where
the GDP share of capital market (capmkt), the relative compensation ratio for capital
markets (comp) and the estimated US equity market turnover (turnover) are each
regressed on the transaction cost series (tcost). As an illustration of the strength of
this predictive relationship, Figure ǋ.ǎ plots the growth in the cost of capital markets
(shown previously in Figure ǋ.ǉ) against the predicted value from the regression.
While there is certainly some unexplained variation, the visual ėt is striking. Note
that each of these series is highly persistent, as is observed in their plots, so it comes
as no surprise that an augmented Dickey-Fuler test does not reject the possibility of a
ǉǐǎ
unit root. ĉis degree of persistence would discount the signiėcance of their
observed correlations.
RĹĻŇĹňňĽŃł Ńĺ ĺĽŇňŉ ĸĽĺĺĹŇĹłķĹň
Tomake a stronger case for this relationship and establish causality (in the Granger
sense that past transaction costs forecast growth in capital market activity), we can
consider how the changes in one series aﬀects the other by taking ėrst diﬀerences.
With the high degree of persistence in the raw time series, they may be susceptible to
the type of spurious regression results that occur with unit roots. ĉe ėrst diﬀerences
could then reveal if the time series are truly related, and if so, if one tends to forecast
the other. Table ǋ.ǋ reports the results for regressions forecasting annual changes in
capital market spending, the capital market compensation ratio, and trading volume
as each is regressed on annual changes in transaction costs with up to ǌ lags.
ĉe predicted negative relationship remains. Interestingly, changes in transaction
costs lead changes in the other series by approximately Ǌ to ǋ years. For example, in
the ėrst regression of capital market spending on lagged changes in transaction costs
we see negative coeﬃcients for every lag with the second lag being of the strongest
magnitude. We can interpret this coeﬃcient as suggesting a one basis point decrease
in the cost of transactions predicts that capital markets will consume a ǉǋ basis point
higher share of private GDP two years in the future. ĉe same one basis point
decrease in the cost of transacting would predict the average compensation of capital
markets professionals in three years to rise by an additional ǈ.ǉǐ times the
compensation of the average US employee. Looking at the eﬀect on trading volume,
ǉǐǏ
Table ǋ.ǋ: Time series regressions of ėrst diﬀerences
ĉis table shows the results of regressing changes in the income share of capital markets (Δcapmkt),
capital market compensation (Δcomp), and equity turnover by volume (Δturnover) on changes in
the commission cost of stock transactions (Δtcost) with up to four lags. Newey-West adjusted t-
statistics, with four lags, are reported in parentheses. Statistical signiėcance is noted with: *** p <
Ƥ:Ƥƥ, ** p < Ƥ:ƤƩ, * p < Ƥ:ƥ.
Δcapmkt Δcomp Δturnover
(ǉ) (Ǌ) (ǋ)
Δtcost -ǋ.ǌǎ ǌ.ǋǋ ǈ.ǎǊ
(ǌ.Ǒǋ) (ǐ.ǌǍ) (ǎ.ǋǌ)
L(Δtcost) -ǋ.ǈǉ ǋ.ǌǊ -ǌ.Ǌǌ
(ǎ.Ǌǈ) (Ǒ.ǏǏ) (Ǎ.ǍǍ)
LƦ(Δtcost) -ǉǊ.Ǒǐ* Ǌ.ǎǊ -Ǌ.ǑǍ
(Ǐ.ǊǑ) (ǉǉ.ǎǏ) (Ǎ.ǎǌ)
LƧ(Δtcost) -Ǌ.ǌǉ -ǉǐ.ǉǉ** -Ǒ.ǉǎ**
(ǌ.ǏǏ) (Ǐ.ǈǏ) (ǌ.ǉǋ)
Lƨ(Δtcost) -ǎ.ǈǎ -Ǐ.Ǌǈ -Ǐ.ǋǌ
(ǎ.Ǎǎ) (Ǐ.ǑǍ) (Ǎ.ǐǎ)
Constant ǉ.ǑǊ Ǌ.ǋǐ Ǌ.ǉǎ
(ǉ.ǉǏ) (ǉ.Ǎǎ) (ǉ.ǏǊ)
Observations ǐǈ ǐǈ ǐǈ
ǉǐǐ
this one basis point decrease in transaction costs would suggest trading volume to be
Ǒƻ higher in three years’ time.
ĉis is actually what we might predict if innovations to transaction costs are
unexpected. In the context of the proposed model, investors commit to their type ex
ante, so we would expect the delayed response to correspond to the time it takes to
acquire the talent and research necessary to launch new dynamic strategies.
ĉe statistical relationship seems compelling, although any claims about the
importance of the eﬃciency mechanism are certainly open to critiques of omiĨed
variable bias. A number of important regulatory and technological changes happened
during the ǉǑǏǈ’s. ĉe coincident growth in capital markets and decline in
transaction costs could be coincidence, although it would be diﬃcult to explain the
strong predictive power of the transaction cost changes exhibited in Table ǋ.ǋ. To
strengthen the identiėcation of the true mechanism causing ėnancial growth, we can
look at the cross-section of ėrms and focus on speciėc predictions around the events
of May ǉǑǏǍ.
ǋ.ǋ MĵŇĿĹŉ AķŉĽŋĽŉŏ ĵłĸ AňňĹŉ PŇĽķĹň Ľł ŉļĹ CŇŃňň SĹķŉĽŃł
Moving from broad statements about ėnancial activity to the activity we observe for
individual ėrms provides a more reėnedmeasure of howmuch of the growth in active
investing can be explained by transaction eﬃciency. ĉemodel presented in section
ǋ.ǉ had speciėc predictions regarding trading activity and the information content of
asset prices. As trading eﬃciency increases we expect to see more trading volume and
more informative asset prices. ĉere should also be a diﬀerentially large impact on
ǉǐǑ
the shorter investment horizons relative to longer horizons. Observing
cross-sectional variation in the prices and trading activity of individual ėrms over the
past few decades will generate micro-level support to add to the macro-level time
series evidence presented in the previous section.
For increased conėdence that we are isolating a key driving mechanism behind the
growth of active investing, we can use the events of May ǉǑǏǍ as Rule ǉǑ-b came in
force. First, we expect that the subsequent drop in transaction costs associated with
competitive brokerage commissions should lead to a subsequent increase in the
trading and information content of US equities. Following a key prediction of the
model, we should expect this to be stronger for shorter horizons. ĉen, to beĨer
identify the eﬃciency channel, we can use speciėc features of how the ėxed
commission schedule aﬀected the cross-section of ėrms until May ǉǑǏǍ to measure
diﬀerential eﬀects. ĉis additional level of control helps rule out competing
explanations that might have occurred on or around ǉǑǏǍ.
CŃłłĹķŉĽłĻ ŉļĹ ńĵłĹŀ ĸĵŉĵ ŌĽŉļ ŉļĹ ňŉŏŀĽŐĹĸ ŁŃĸĹŀ
In the stylized model of section ǋ.ǉ, the information content of long-horizon prices
can be measured through the regression coeﬃcient from projecting the risky
investment outcome (X  E[X]) on to the change in the long-horizon price
(RL = PƤ   Pƥ), deėning
βL =
Cov[X;RL]
Var[RL]
=
βθ;ƥσƦθ
Var[RL]
:
ǉǑǈ
Intuitively, the information content of long-horizon prices is positively related to the
quantity of long-horizon active investors.¹⁰
ĉe information content of short-horizon prices can be similarly expressed by
(RS = Pƥ   PƦ)
βS =
Cov[X;RS]
Var[RS]
=
βθ;ƦσƦθ
Var[RS]
:
which increases with the sum of the long-horizon and the short-horizon active
investors.
We can construct an analogous measure with empirical data on stock prices and
earnings. I deėne the ”long horizon” as the period stretching from two years prior to a
ėrm’s earnings announcement to Ǐ months prior to the earnings announcement, the
”short horizon” spanning Ǐ months prior to the earnings announcement to one
month prior to the earnings announcement, and the ”announcement period” spans
from one month before to twomonths aěer the announcement. ĉe risky investment
outcome will be deėned as the scaled change in a ėrm’s quarterly earnings (Δxt).
ĉis motivates a corresponding empirical regression of the ėrm’s uncertain payout
on the returns over each horizon,
Δxt = βƤ + βL  rL + βS  rS + βA  rA (ǋ.ǉǐ)
Each of the returns will be measured as the change in log-price, so if time t is
¹⁰Formally, this can be stated as @Cov[X;RL]@λL > Ƥ, and also,
βL
@λL > Ƥ given Var[RL] > βθ;ƥσ
Ʀ
θ .
ǉǑǉ
measured in months relative to the earnings announcement,
rL = ln(Pt ƫ)  ln(Pt Ʀƨ)
rS = ln(Pt ƥ)  ln(Pt Ƨ))
rA = ln(Pt+ƥ)  ln(Pt ƥ)):
Similarly, the risky payout will be measured as a log return scaled by the price
observed prior to all the returns. If EPSt corresponds to the earnings-per-share
reported on the announcement date, the risky payout in the panel regressions
speciėed by (ǋ.ǉǐ) will be deėned as
Δxt = ln

ƥ+ EPSt   EPSt Ƨ
Pt Ʀƨ

:
DĹňķŇĽńŉĽŃł Ńĺ ńĵłĹŀ ĸĵŉĵ
For each year from ǉǑǎǈ to ǊǈǉǊ, I construct a universe of ėrms by selecting the ǉǈǈǈ
largest ėrms by market capitalization, as measured by their CRSP-reported market
cap on December ǋǉst of the prior year. For this set of ėrms, I collect historical
weekly total returns, nominal share prices, trading volume, and shares outstanding.
Using the linked CRSP-Compustat data, I collect a panel of their reported earnings
per share and the date of the earnings announcement.
ĉe announcements dates are not always available, particularly early in the sample,
so I create an additional supplemental series of earnings announcement data where I
ǉǑǊ
use historical announcement paĨerns to estimate the date when not available. ĉis
has the advantage of increasing the sample size, and the methodology for estimating
historical announcement dates appears to be very accurate when checked against
ėrms for which the actual dates are known. Since the announcement return period is
deėned to begin one month prior to the reported announcement, any imprecision
should have liĨle eﬀect on the results of the subsequent panel regressions.
Table ǋ.ǌ reports the summary statistics for the variables considered in the panel
data regression. ĉe earnings news measure (Δxt) for these large ėrms over the ǌǍ
year sample averages approximately zero with a standard deviation of approximately
Ǌƻ. ĉemarket price for the ėrms in the sample appears surprisingly high, at about
Ʈǉǈǌ, but this is actually an artifact of Berkshire-Hathaway’s inordinately large
nominal share price. ĉemedian share price is ƮǋǊ with a standard deviation of ƮǊǌ.
Dividing the trading volume recorded in CRSP for each quarter by the shares
outstanding, I obtain ėrm-level annualized turnover rates for each ėrm-quarter in the
panel. Over the full sample, annualized turnover averages Ǌ.ǋǎ, with a wide degree of
variation across ėrms. ĉe return variables, rL, rS and rA, each correspond to a
diﬀerent horizon length, so the magnitudes of their average returns and standard
deviations are not directly comparable.
ĉe lower panel of Table ǋ.ǌ reports the same summary statistics for the
sub-sample corresponding to the ėve years before May of ǉǑǏǍ, the two years of
observations that overlap withMay ǉǑǏǍ, and ėve years aěerward. ĉis subsample,
and ones like it, will be used in the panel regressions where the data window tightens
around the events around the implementation of Rule ǉǑ-b.
ǉǑǋ
Table ǋ.ǌ: Summary Statistics for Panel Data Analysis
ĉe summary statistics below are for the quarterly panel data collected for the ǉ,ǈǈǈ ėrms in the an-
nual universe being analyzed. ĉe universe is reset each year, taking the ǉ,ǈǈǈ largest ėrms bymarket
cap. ĉe ėrst panel cover the full sample period, while the lower panel covers the Ǎ-year window be-
fore ėxed exchange regime was ended onMay ǉ, ǉǑǏǍ up until Ǎ-years aěerMay ǉ, ǉǑǏǏãthe date at
which none of the collected series overlap with the ėxed-rate commission regime.
mean std. ǉ ƻile Ǎǈ ƻile ǑǑ ƻile
ǉǑǎǎ - Ǌǈǉǈ
Δxt -ǈ.ǈǉ Ǌ.ǈǐ -Ǒ.ǐǐ ǈ.ǈǍ ǐ.ǐǋ
price ǉǈǌ.ǉǈ Ǌǋ.Ǎǎ ǎ.Ǌǌ ǋǊ.Ǎǈ ǉǋǊ.ǎǈ
turnover Ǌ.ǋǎ ǋ.Ǌǈ ǈ.ǉǈ ǉ.ǋǑ ǉǌ.Ǎǐ
rL ǈ.ǉǊǌ ǈ.ǌǌǎ -ǈ.ǐǋǍ ǈ.ǈǐǊ ǉ.ǍǊǎ
rS ǈ.ǈǉǋ ǈ.Ǌǉǎ -ǈ.ǍǏǏ ǈ.ǈǉǉ ǈ.ǍǑǐ
rA ǈ.ǈǈǎ ǈ.ǉǍǎ -ǈ.ǌǉǉ ǈ.ǈǈǌ ǈ.ǌǋǌ
(N = ǉǋǌ,ǉǊǐ)
ǉǑǏǈ-ǉǑǐǊ
Δxt ǈ.ǈǊ ǉ.ǑǏ -Ǐ.ǎǈ ǈ.ǈǏ ǎ.Ǒǈ
price ǋǊ.ǉǏ ǊǊ.Ǌǎ ǎ.ǏǍ ǊǏ.ǋǐ ǉǉǉ.ǐǈ
turnover ǈ.ǐǉ ǈ.ǐǏ ǈ.ǈǍ ǈ.Ǎǐ ǌ.ǉǑ
rL ǈ.ǉǈǊ ǈ.ǋǐǐ -ǈ.ǏǐǍ ǈ.ǈǏǍ ǉ.ǊǌǍ
rS ǈ.ǈǉǏ ǈ.ǉǑǋ -ǈ.ǌǐǍ ǈ.ǈǉǊ ǈ.Ǎǌǎ
rA ǈ.ǈǈǏ ǈ.ǉǋǑ -ǈ.ǋǋǎ ǈ.ǈǈǌ ǈ.ǋǑǌ
(N = ǋǎ,ǉǏǌ)
ǉǑǌ
RŃŀŀĽłĻ ńĵłĹŀ ŇĹĻŇĹňňĽŃł
To generate a graphical measure of the changing information content of prices over
time, we can perform a rolling panel regression. I hold the window length constant at
two years and then estimate the panel regression corresponding to equation (ǋ.ǉǐ)
with ėrm ėxed eﬀects. Figure ǋ.Ǐ displays the rolling coeﬃcient estimates as a
scaĨerplot in the upper axis, where each estimated long horizon coeﬃcient, βL,
corresponds to a white circle and each estimated short-horizon coeﬃcient, βS,
correspond to a shaded circle. ĉe lower axis reports the estimated root mean square
error (RMSE) and the R-squared coeﬃcient of each regression.
ĉe rising paĨern in the information content of asset prices is clearly visible.
While the magnitude of these betas are roughly similar in the ėrst ǉǈ years of the
sample, the predictive power of the short-horizon prices increases much more rapidly
than the long-horizon prices. In a more careful subsequent regression estimating the
trend in information content over time, I show the increase in the long horizon
coeﬃcient, while positive, to be statistically diﬃcult to distinguish from a hypothesis
of no change.
ĉis is consistent with the results of Bai et al. (ǊǈǉǊ). ĉey look at the information
content of prices at one to three years prior to earnings releases. ĉis is what my
results would consider long-horizon information, and I ėnd no compelling evidence
that this information has improved over time.
On the other hand, asset prices less than one year prior to earnings
announcements show a consistent increase in information content. Previewing my
focus on the events of May ǉǑǏǍ, this ėgure already gives a strong visual indication
ǉǑǍ
that the strongest increases in information content correspond to this change as
active investing increased dramatically.
While this rolling analysis is instructive, the underlying investment seĨing may not
be fully comparable as the sample rolls across time. ĉe information gathering
problemmay be diﬀerent from one decade to the next, and there may be signiėcant
changes in the price-to-earnings relationship that would aﬀect the magnitude of the
coeﬃcients.
With that in mind, it is interesting to look at the boĨom axis of Figure ǋ.Ǐ and note
how both the explained variation (RƦ) and the unexplained variation (RMSE) are
increasing in the late ǉǑǏǈ’s and, to a lesser extent, over the full historical sample. ĉis
suggests that the raw diﬃculty of forecasting earnings increased, but so did the
fraction of variation that prices could explain.
PĵłĹŀ ŇĹĻŇĹňňĽŃł ŌĽŉļ ŉŇĹłĸ
To directly estimate the paĨern of change in the information contained in asset prices
over the full sample, I run a full panel regression, interacting the return variables with
the time trend. ĉe variable, trend is measured in years, and the coeﬃcient on
rL  trend can be interpreted as the annual change in the regression coeﬃcient
measuring long-horizon information content. Corresponding interaction terms are
used for the short-horizon and announcement return.
Table ǋ.Ǎ reports the results of the base panel regressions suggested in equation
(ǋ.ǉǐ) as well as a version with these time trend interactions. ĉe reported standard
errors are estimated using industry clustering, where I use the two digit SIC code as
ǉǑǎ
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Figure ǋ.Ǐ: Rolling Regression Coeﬃcient andMoving Average, ǉǑǎǍ-Ǌǈǉǈ
ĉe two axes plot the results of the rolling regressions described in section ǋ.ǋ. ĉe top axis plots the
estimated regression coeﬃcients and the lower axis plots the square root of the mean squared error
(RMSE) and the RƦ values.
ǉǑǏ
the deėnition for industry throughout.
ĉe regression reported in the ėrst column of Table ǋ.Ǎ reports the results of the
base regression using ėrm ėxed eﬀects, considering variation within ėrms. ĉe
second regression speciėcation uses industry and quarter ėxed eﬀects to isolate the
impact of variation among similar ėrms in the same time period. ĉe results of each
speciėcation are very similar. ĉe strong statistical signiėcance of these regression
coeﬃcients should not be too surprising; changes in asset prices correspond to
present and future changes in earnings. On the other hand, the coeﬃcient on the
long-horizon return is not particularly strong in the ėrst speciėcation with ėrm ėxed
eﬀects, and disappears entirely in the second speciėcation.
ĉe third speciėcation is the primary one of interest. It shows the gradual change
in these coeﬃcients over time. ĉe interaction term between the short horizon
return and the time trend is statistically signiėcant at the ǉƻ level. In contrast the
long horizon return shows liĨle evidence of increasing informativeness over time. Of
note, the three-month return around the earnings announcement actually shows a
decreasing relationship in predicting the reported earnings. ĉe fact that we observe
opposite eﬀects on the short-horizon and announcement returns may indicate a
substitution of information being pulled into earlier asset prices.
TļĹ ńŃňŉ-ǉǑǏǍ ĹĺĺĹķŉ
Over such a long sample, any number of underlying parameters could be changing.
ĉe types of ėrms today are certainly very diﬀerent than those of the ǉǑǎǈs. ĉere
could very well be diﬀerences in the diﬃculty of predicting their future proėtability,
ǉǑǐ
Table ǋ.Ǎ: Base panel regression with time trend
ĉe regression estimates below are the result of panel regressions of earnings news (Δx deėned in
section ǋ.ǋ of the paper) on past log returns, log returns interacted with a time trend. ĉe regres-
sion also includes a constant term and constant trend variable, but the coeﬃcients are not reported.
Industry-clustered, heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses below each estimated
coeﬃcient. Statistical signiėcance is noted with: *** p < Ƥ:Ƥƥ, ** p < Ƥ:ƤƩ, * p < Ƥ:ƥ.
(ǉ) (Ǌ) (ǋ)
rL ǈ.ǈǋǋ -ǈ.ǈǈǉ ǈ.ǈǊǑ
(ǈ.ǈǊǐ) (ǈ.ǈǊǎ) (ǈ.ǈǍǋ)
rL  trend ǈ.ǈǈǈǈ
(ǈ.ǈǈǊǈ)
rS ǈ.ǎǎǏ*** ǈ.ǏǉǊ*** ǈ.ǋǉǍ***
(ǈ.ǈǏǐ) (ǈ.ǈǏǋ) (ǈ.ǉǈǈ)
rS  trend ǈ.ǈǉǉǈ***
(ǈ.ǈǈǊǎ)
rA ǈ.ǏǊǈ*** ǈ.ǐǉǎ*** ǉ.ǋǐǈ***
(ǈ.ǈǐǈ) (ǈ.ǈǏǋ) (ǈ.ǉǌǍ)
rA  trend -ǈ.ǈǊǈǐ***
(ǈ.ǈǈǍǎ)
Fixed Eﬀects
ƺ ėrms ǋ,ǈǎǉ ǋ,ǈǎǉ
ƺ industries ǎǎ
ƺ quarters ǉǏǍ
Observations ǉǋǌ,ǉǊǐ ǉǋǌ,ǉǊǐ ǉǋǌ,ǉǊǐ
ǉǑǑ
there can be diﬀerences across industries, and there could be diﬀerences in their
accounting conventions. To be sure that we are truly measuring changes in asset price
information and not these other confounding features, we can focus on the change in
transaction eﬃciency associated with the implementation of Rule ǉǑ-b inMay of
ǉǑǏǍ and tighten the estimation window around this period.
I estimate panel regressions using the same framework as before, but I now interact
the returns with a dummy variable, postƫƩ, that equals one for observations where all
corresponding variables are observed aěer the advent of competitive commissions
(i.e. aěer May of ǉǑǏǏ). Interacting with this dummy variables tests for a
discontinuity in the parameter estimates when crossing this boundary. ĉis
regression is reported in Table ǋ.ǎ.
ĉere are four regression speciėcations in the columns of the table, with each one
representing a smaller window around ǉǑǏǍ. ĉe ėrst speciėcation estimates the
panel regression over the full sample, comparing pre-ǉǑǏǍ to post-ǉǑǏǍ data using the
observations from ǉǑǎǎ to Ǌǈǉǈ. Both long horizon and short horizon prices show
dramatic increases in their information content, with their coeﬃcients increasing by a
factor of four. However, only the short horizon variables show statistical signiėcance.
ĉe three successive regression speciėcations with tighter and tighter sample
windows increase the standard errors in the coeﬃcient estimates but decrease the
concern that other factors unrelated to eﬃciency and information are driving this
result. Looking at the coeﬃcient estimates, the post-ǉǑǏǍ eﬀect on short horizon
price information remains roughly equal for each time window considered. ĉe eﬀect
on long horizon information is always weaker than short horizon and diﬃcult to
Ǌǈǈ
Table ǋ.ǎ: Testing theMay Day eﬀect in the time series
ĉe regression estimates below are the result of panel regressions of earnings news (Δx deėned in
section ǋ.ǋ of the paper) on past log returns and log returns interacted with a post-ǉǑǏǍ dummy vari-
able. Coeﬃcients for constant term and constant post-ǉǑǏǍ dummy are estimated but not reported.
Industry-clustered, heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical
signiėcance is noted with: *** p < Ƥ:Ƥƥ, ** p < Ƥ:ƤƩ, * p < Ƥ:ƥ.
full-sample ǉǈ yr window Ǎ yr window ǋ yr window
(ǉ) (Ǌ) (ǋ) (ǌ)
rL ǈ.ǈǉǈ ǈ.ǈǉǈ ǈ.ǈǉǎ ǈ.ǈǎǑ
(ǈ.ǈǋǍ) (ǈ.ǈǋǍ) (ǈ.ǈǍǉ) (ǈ.ǈǏǌ)
rL  postƫƩ ǈ.ǈǋǉ ǈ.ǈǏǐ -ǈ.ǈǈǈ -ǈ.ǉǋǏ
(ǈ.ǈǌǋ) (ǈ.ǈǍǍ) (ǈ.ǈǎǊ) (ǈ.ǉǈǍ)
rS ǈ.Ǌǋǌ*** ǈ.ǊǋǍ*** ǈ.ǊǍǍ*** ǈ.ǋǏǍ**
(ǈ.ǈǎǎ) (ǈ.ǈǎǎ) (ǈ.ǈǐǎ) (ǈ.ǉǍǋ)
rS  postƫƩ ǈ.Ǎǉǋ*** ǈ.Ǎǎǈ*** ǈ.ǌǎǑ** ǈ.ǌǈǏ
(ǈ.ǉǉǑ) (ǈ.ǉǐǈ) (ǈ.Ǌǈǐ) (ǈ.ǋǉǑ)
rA ǈ.ǐǉǉ*** ǈ.ǐǉǊ*** ǈ.Ǒǋǋ*** ǈ.ǐǏǈ***
(ǈ.ǉǊǐ) (ǈ.ǉǊǑ) (ǈ.ǉǏǐ) (ǈ.ǊǍǉ)
rA  postƫƩ -ǈ.ǉǊǌ ǈ.Ǎǉǌ*** ǈ.Ǐǈǌ** ǉ.ǈǏǏ**
(ǈ.ǉǏǋ) (ǈ.ǉǑǉ) (ǈ.ǊǐǏ) (ǈ.ǌǑǎ)
Fixed Eﬀects
ƺ ėrms ǋ,ǈǍǐ ǉ,ǎǍǋ ǉ,ǊǈǍ ǉ,ǈǍǑ
Observations ǉǊǐ,ǉǉǌ ǍǍ,ǉǐǌ ǋǈ,ǉǎǈ ǉǐ,ǈǏǈ
Ǌǈǉ
distinguish from zero.
IĸĹłŉĽĺĽķĵŉĽŃł ŊňĽłĻ ķŇŃňň-ňĹķŉĽŃłĵŀ ķŃňŉ ĸĽĺĺĹŇĹłŉĽĵŀň
So far the panel analysis has only used the dimension of time to associate active
trading and information with transaction eﬃciency. ĉe strongest evidence for this
channel will come from the diﬀerential impact across stocks.
ĉeNYSE ėxed commission schedule was always a function of the nominal share
price. Assuming the nominal share price is a historical artifact, this creates variation
across stocks that is plausibly unrelated to any economic characteristics. ĉe
commission schedule was set as a decreasing function of nominal share price, so
stocks with lower prices were much more expensive to trade than those with higher
share prices.¹¹
ĉere are various ways to exploit this variation. ĉemost simplistic is to use a
diﬀerence in diﬀerences approach. I form three categories: lowP for stocks with a
nominal share price less than ƮǉǍ,midP for stocks whose nominal share price is
between ƮǉǍ and Ʈǋǈ, and highP for stocks whose nominal share price is above Ʈǋǈ.
We can then look at the diﬀerential impact across categories before and aěer ǉǑǏǍ.
Table ǋ.Ǐ reports the results of this approach, where the coeﬃcients of interest are
the magnitudes of the product: rL  lowP postƫƩ, rL  midP postƫƩ,
rL highP postƫƩ, rS highP postƫƩ, and so forth. ĉe prediction we are testing is
whether these coeﬃcients are positive (indicating more information post-ǉǑǏǍ) and
¹¹A surprising fact about stock prices is that the distribution of their nominal price per share has
been remarkably consistent over time despite inĚation and secular changes in investor and investment
characteristics. ĉis has been discussed byWeld, Michaely,ĉaler and Benartzi (ǊǈǈǑ).
ǊǈǊ
monotonically decreasing in nominal price (indicating a diﬀerential impact across
ėrms according to the relative change in transaction eﬃciency). As in the previous
table, each regression speciėcation corresponds to tighter windows around ǉǑǏǍ.
ĉe results for short-horizon prices are just as predicted. All prices appear more
informative, but the impact on securities with the largest change in transaction costs
(lowP) is an order of magnitude higher than stocks where the change was more
moderate. As hoped, the relationship is monotonic across the three categories and
roughly consistent as the time window shrinks.
In the ėrst regression speciėcation, which uses the longest window, there is some
evidence of an increase in information content of long-horizon prices, and the
cross-sectional relationship with respect to nominal share price is monotonically
decreasing. However, the statistical signiėcance is low, and result disappears entirely
in the speciėcations with shorter sampling windows.
ǋ.ǌ IŁńŀĽķĵŉĽŃłň ĵłĸCŃłķŀŊňĽŃłň
ĉe empirical analysis shows great success in explaining the modern growth in the
cost of capital markets and in looking at its eﬀect on asset prices. However, looking at
the information in asset prices only opens the door to broader questions about the
social beneėts of these changes.
In the simple model presented here, the beneėts of active trading largely come
from two sources: the noise shocks and the eﬃcient allocation of capital. However,
the improved capital allocation is a broadly shared positive externality, not something
Ǌǈǋ
Table ǋ.Ǐ: TestingMay Day eﬀect in the cross-section
Coeﬃcients for constant term and unique permutations of constant dummies are not reported.
Industry-clustered, heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical
signiėcance is noted with: *** p < Ƥ:Ƥƥ, ** p < Ƥ:ƤƩ, * p < Ƥ:ƥ.
ǉǈ yr window Ǎ yr window ǋ yr window
(ǉ) (Ǌ) (ǋ)
Long-horizon return
RLH : : : -ǈ.ǈǉǌ ǈ.ǈǈǌ ǈ.ǈǉǍ
(ǈ.ǈǊǈ) (ǈ.ǈǊǑ) (ǈ.ǈǌǊ)
lowP ǈ.ǈǊǍ -ǈ.ǈǈǑ -ǈ.ǈǊǋ
(ǈ.ǉǊǈ) (ǈ.ǉǋǏ) (ǈ.ǉǐǈ)
midP -ǈ.ǈǌǈ -ǈ.ǈǐǏ -ǈ.ǉǎǌ
(ǈ.ǈǋǐ) (ǈ.ǈǍǎ) (ǈ.ǉǉǉ)
lowP postƫƩ ǈ.ǉǋǏ -ǈ.ǈǑǉ -ǈ.ǉǑǋ
(ǈ.ǉǑǉ) (ǈ.Ǌǈǉ) (ǈ.Ǌǎǉ)
midP postƫƩ ǈ.ǉǊǍ*** ǈ.ǈǎǋǑ ǈ.ǉǉǋ
(ǈ.ǈǌǏ) (ǈ.ǈǎǊ) (ǈ.ǉǋǍ)
highP postƫƩ -ǈ.ǈǉǋ -ǈ.ǈǌǈ -ǈ.ǈǎǍǑ
(ǈ.ǉǑǉ) (ǈ.ǊǐǏ) (ǈ.ǌǑǎ)
Short-horizon return
RSH : : : ǈ.ǉǐǎ*** ǈ.ǊǊǍ*** ǈ.ǋǉǋ***
(ǈ.ǈǌǈ) (ǈ.ǈǍǐ) (ǈ.ǈǐǑ)
lowP -ǈ.ǈǊǉǏ -ǈ.ǈǊǏ -ǈ.ǈǑǌ
(ǈ.ǊǊǍ) (ǈ.Ǌǌǌ) (ǈ.ǋǊǍ)
midP ǈ.ǉǋǉ -ǈ.ǈǋǏǍ -ǈ.ǈǊǍ
(ǈ.ǉǌǎ) (ǈ.ǉǎǐ) (ǈ.ǊǈǑ)
lowP postƫƩ Ǌ.Ǌǈǉ*** Ǌ.ǈǍǎ*** ǉ.ǑǋǑ***
(ǈ.ǌǉǎ) (ǈ.ǍǊǈ) (ǈ.ǎǏǍ)
midP postƫƩ ǈ.ǊǑǊ ǈ.ǋǎǐ ǈ.ǈǎǏ
(ǈ.Ǌǌǉ) (ǈ.Ǌǌǐ) (ǈ.ǊǑǊ)
highP postƫƩ ǈ.ǉǎǌ* ǈ.ǉǌǌ* ǈ.ǉǏǈ
(ǈ.ǈǐǊ) (ǈ.ǈǐǌ) (ǈ.ǉǊǉ)
Fixed eﬀects
ƺ industries ǎǌ ǎǉ ǎǉ
Observations ǎǉ,ǉǑǐ ǋǎ,ǉǏǌ Ǌǌ,ǈǐǌ
Ǌǈǌ
the active investors accrue directly. ĉe immediate trading proėts come at the
expense of a counterparty. To what extent will these noise traders be happy in
funding trading proėts?
SŃķĽĵŀ ŌĹŀĺĵŇĹ
ĉe bigger normative question everyone wants to answer is: are we spending too
much on ėnance? Taking the empirical results back to the modeling framework, we
easily see two important welfare eﬀects. First, investors ėght over their slice of the
pie, leading to what Stein (ǉǑǐǏ) terms ”welfare-reducing speculation.”ĉese
expenses are wasteful and would suggest too much spending in ėnancial markets.
Second, more informed asset prices increase the size of the pie, but the informed
investors capture only a small portion of this beneėt. All of us who use public market
prices are free-riders, and this positive externality suggests we aren’t spending nearly
enough on informed speculation.
ĉe welfare-reducing speculation can be clearly seen in the simple model where
the supply of the risky investment is perfectly inelastic, as it would be for very short
horizons. Using the same model parameters that illustrated the equilibrium in
section ǋ.ǉ, I add a doĨed line to the leě panel of Figure ǋ.ǐ to show the social welfare
(calculated as average expected utility) in the same plot as the expected utility of the
active and passive investors. Since the resources spent on information have no eﬀect
on total output, social welfare is maximized with practically no informed trading, a
solution clearly less than the competitive equilibrium.
It is this type of intuition that drives the suggestions of Philippon (Ǌǈǉǈ), who
ǊǈǍ
suggests we may have too few engineers relative to ėnanciers, or Bolton et al. (Ǌǈǉǉ)
who similarly contrasts an overabundance of ėnanciers relative to entrepreneurs.
In contrast, the free-riding eﬀect is illustrated in the case of an elastic investment
supply, as we would expect for long horizons. ĉe leě panel of Figure ǋ.Ǒ shows the
equilibrium for the same parameters used in the previously discussed example, except
the supply of investment will now respond to more accurate asset prices. As you can
see, the socially optimal level of informed investment would allocate nearly half of
investors to buy information, but the competitive equilibrium allocates far fewer
since the uninformed investors are free riding on the social beneėts of more informed
asset prices.
ĉis analysis builds on the fundamental insight of Hirshleifer (ǉǑǏǉ), who
contrasts the private and social value of foreknowledge. In the model presented here,
all information is foreknowledge, learning about information that will inevitably be
public knowledge later.
CŃłķŀŊňĽŃłň
In the aěermath of the recent ėnancial crisis, scrutiny of ėnancial institutions has
increased. ĉe growth in the resources poured into active investment and the surging
compensation levels of ėnancial professionals are used as prima facie evidence that
ėnancial markets have become ineﬃcient, with many doubting that more active
management leads to more informative asset prices.
In a stylized model, I show that investment research and trading are complements,
which causes the quantity of both to increase. Financial markets becomemore
Ǌǈǎ
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Figure ǋ.ǐ:Welfare in the case of inelastic investment supply (short-horizon)
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Figure ǋ.Ǒ:Welfare in the case of elastic investment supply (long-horizon)
ǊǈǏ
informationally and operationally eﬃcient. Empirically, this explanation is very
successful in explaining the growth in resources spent in capital markets.
Furthermore, it introduces new evidence on the importance of time horizon. Trading
horizons have shortened, and there is a corresponding increase in the short-horizon
information contained in asset prices.
Since shorter trading horizons may not be socially optimal, this result could be
interpreted as justiėcation for Summers and Summers (ǉǑǐǑ) claim that a non-zero
tax on trading might be welfare enhancing, although this requires more explicit
measurement of the beneėts that arise from informative markets and the recognition
that the actual implementation of a ėnancial transaction tax may be impractical
(Campbell and Froot, ǉǑǑǌ).
ĉe types of dynamic strategies that become feasible with lower transaction costs
not only make short-horizon information more valuable but they can also come
closer to dynamically completing markets. It is certainly no accident that equity
options became widely available in the late ǉǑǏǈs and early ǉǑǐǈs, precisely when US
transaction costs experienced their largest drop. ĉe newfound exposures made
possible by dynamical hedging may have aĨracted investors to trade on new risks
(Simsek, ǊǈǉǊ).
ĉe cost of capital markets has grown enormously over the past few decades. A
portion of this can be aĨributed to the events of May ǉǑǏǍ that enabled dynamic
trading strategies and spurred an increase in active investing. ĉis opened the door to
modern capital markets, with information and tradesmoving at ever shorter horizons.
Ǌǈǐ
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